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Abstract
The hierarchical graph model is developed for representing strategic conflicts having
a hierarchical structure. More specifically, in a hierarchical graph model, one or more
decision makers (DMs) at a higher level are involved in lower level or local disputes, such
as when a central government is participating in separate disputes with di↵erent provincial
governments. These newly defined hierarchical models constitute significant expansions of
the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) methodology. Moreover, relationships
are developed between preference and stability in local conflicts and those in the higher
level conflict. To test and refine the various hierarchical definitions, the new approach is
applied to three real world conflicts: controversies over water diversions in China, sales
competition of aircraft between Airbus and Boeing, and the dispute between the USA
and China over greenhouse gas emissions. DMs are provided with possible resolutions and
guidance for courses of actions to follow, which can be beneficial in a hierarchical conflict.
GMCR is a conflict analysis methodology that possesses a flexible structure which
allows it to be applied to a wide range of real world disputes. Hierarchy in a graph model
is defined in this thesis for describing the structure of a complex conflict that includes
smaller interrelated conflicts. In a hierarchical graph model, DMs are classified as common
decision makers (CDMs) and local decision makers (LDMs). They can initiate di↵erent
types of moves, and have interrelated preferences.
Among the di↵erent hierarchical graph models, the basic hierarchical graph model has
the simplest structure, containing three DMs: a CDM appearing in both of the two smaller
conflicts, plus one LDM in each of the two smaller conflicts. A duo hierarchical graph model
has two CDMs and two local conflicts. Each LDM, together with both CDMs, appears
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in one local conflict. A general hierarchical model may include any number of smaller or
local conflicts, and any number of CDMs and LDMs.
Stability results in a graph model reflect di↵erent solution concepts or stability defini-
tions. Because of the connections between local conflicts, stability in the hierarchical model
can be partially obtained from the stability calculations in local models. One component
of this thesis is the investigation of the stability interrelationships between stabilities in a
hierarchical graph and those in the local conflicts.
Hierarchical graph models can be applied to various practical conflicts. Water diver-
sion conflicts in China, caused by the implementation of the South-North Water Diversion
Project, are an excellent example. The duo hierarchical graph model can model a compe-
tition between Airbus and Boeing, regarding the marketing of wide-body and narrow-body
aircraft in the Asia Pacific region. Conflicts between China and the USA over compli-
ance with a bilateral greenhouse gas emissions agreement are modelled by a hierarchal
graph model with a more complicated structure. The disputes take place between the two
national governments, both of which also face domestic opposition and concerns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Hierarchical Conflicts
Strategic conflict refers to competitive or opposing actions that reflect the inconsistent
interests and objectives of human beings (Hipel, 2002). Conflicts are ubiquitous in every
human society, ranging from divergence of opinion among individuals to fierce antagonism
between social groups. A strategic conflict is an interaction among decision makers (DMs),
who can a↵ect the courses of the conflict by their independent actions, in accordance with
their preferences (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).
Strategic conflicts often take place when DMs attempt to seize natural and social re-
sources. Because of the scarcity of natural resources and the significant impacts of human
activities on the natural environment, environmental issues have become an origin of con-
flicts in the modern world. An environmental conflict involves a clash of interests between
individuals or social groups seeking profits by exploiting natural resources, and stakeholders
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whose well-being may be at risk. Major environmental conflicts include disputes over wa-
ter usage among nations or parties, the negotiations on reducing greenhouse gas emissions
among countries, and the connection between the economic growth and the deteriorating
air quality in the developing world.
The struggle over social resources, such as wealth and power, is also at the root of
many conflicts. In business competition, enterprises contest over selling goods to gain more
profits or market share. The terminology of business competition has been well defined in
economics (Stigler, 1988; Blaug, 2008; Fleisher and Bensoussan, 2003): it can be regarded
as conflict when competitors pursue the same resources, such as market share, and interact
with each other. For example, in a duopoly market, each company uses business strategies
to grab more market share and thereby put its opponent at a disadvantage.
In the real world, a dispute often includes smaller conflicts that are connected spatially
or logically. These connected conflicts are called hierarchical conflicts. Failure to perceive
these connections may lead to inaccurate predictions about the outcome of the conflict and
irrational solutions for DMs. For example, a large-scale construction project initiated by a
national government can evoke disputes during the implementation at di↵erent locations.
The government cannot properly resolve these disputes without considering the conflicts
at all locations.
A historical example is the global rivalry between Britain and France during the Seven
Years’ War. The military contest which occurred in three major theatres, comprising the
European continent, North America, and India, ended in a victory for the British and
their allies. With its strong navy, Britain carried out several successful military operations
in overseas colonies, while the strategy for France with its overwhelming army was to
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concentrate on continental Europe, hoping that losses overseas could be traded for victories
in Europe through treaty negotiation. Victory for Britain was the result of its vision over
all continents, and the e↵ective deployment of troops in all theatres.
The word “hierarchy” originated from the Greek word “hierarchia”, meaning “rule of a
high priest” or “leader of sacred rites” (Liddell et al., 1940). Hierarchy refers to the arrange-
ment of a particular set of ranks or levels (Dawkins, 1976; Simon, 1991). The hierarchical
structure of conflicts has been widely discussed within the Game Theory paradigm. Hierar-
chical games denote interrelated games with di↵erent ranks or multiple levels. Weights and
thresholds may be assigned to define the seniority of players in a hierarchical game (Beimel
et al., 2008). The weight structure in hierarchical games was investigated by Gvozdeva et
al. (2013). The hierarchical game was used for allocating resources among players (Gilles,
2010; Beimel et al., 2008; Farras and Padro, 2010), while the solutions to this game are
complex. Markov models have been utilized to analyze hierarchical games within the game
of tennis. The mathematical models describe players as attempting to win in tennis by
optimizing their available energy (Gale, 1971; George, 1973; Gillman, 1985; Walker and
Wooders, 2001; Brimberg et al., 2004). The results obtained for tennis have also been
applied to other real world conflicts, such as defence strategy, which can be modelled by
a hierarchical scoring system (Epstein, 2012). Theoretical contributions to hierarchical
scoring include calculations of the parameters in a hierarchical model using probabilistic
functions (Morris, 1977).
Stackelberg games also constitute hierarchical conflicts, because players are divided into
a leader and several followers (Von Stackelberg, 1934; Simaan and Cruz, 1973). Di↵erent
from other models in game theory, players in a Stackelberg game move sequentially and
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have asymmetric information about the game.
This brief literature review shows that models have been constructed to analyze hi-
erarchical conflicts. However, these models require a large amount of input information,
thereby forfeiting flexibility and simplicity. For example, in game theory, utility values
that describe the preferences of DMs, and threshold values to define levels in a hierarchical
game, are needed. The Markov model used to analyze tennis games requires computations
using probabilities. However, these probabilities are di cult to calibrate (Lichtenstein et
al., 1982). Therefore, a formal methodology to model hierarchical conflict using a flexible
structure and simpler model input is required to provide better predictions and resolutions
(Howard, 1971; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).
1.2 Classical Approaches of Conflict Analysis
The ubiquitousness of strategic conflicts in the real world and the importance of conflict
support the call for comprehensive methodologies to understand conflicts and produce
positive resolutions for DMs to take reasonable and beneficial actions (Kilgour and Hipel,
2005). The conflict methods can also help mediators propose resolutions.
Various approaches have been developed to analyze decision behaviour. The study of
decision making processes of human beings is a psychological science (Marshall, 1920).
Among the descriptive approaches used to model decision making behaviour in reality
is Prospect Theory, developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which states that the
decisions of mankind are based on relative gains and losses, and that losses are more
significant than gains. In Satisficing Theory (Simon, 1978; 1990), a decision maker will
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search for a reasonable outcome that reflects the information the decision makers have,
the constraints of time and other resources, and the decision makers’ cognitive limitations
(Simon, 1991).
The normative approaches to analyze decision process were developed to investigate
how a better decision should be made. Analysis on human conflicts is a multidisciplinary
domain of research, combining knowledge in economics, sociology, philosophy, and math-
ematics (Hipel, 2009). Among various conflict analysis methods in di↵erent disciplines,
game theory is a formal methodology to investigate strategic conflicts using mathematical
tools. Not until the mid 1940s did game theory rapidly develop. The book written by
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), called Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
is widely considered as the start of modern game theory. In this book, the rationality
of players is discussed and their choices are formally analyzed (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).
Decision makers in game theory are assumed rational, because it is important for policy
makers or mediators to know how a better outcome can be achieved. Besides, although
individuals may not be rational, the actions for large organizations are close to rational.
It is strategically important to know what an organization should do for its managers or
policy makers. To describe rationality in a game, Nash (1950) defined a solution concept
of a non-cooperative game, called Nash equilibrium, to describe a situation for two DMs,
at which both of them cannot make a better choice.
The game theoretic models can be classified as being quantitive or non-quantitive. The
genealogy of these models is depicted in Fig. 1.1. In quantitive models, preference rela-
tions for DMs are expressed using utility values (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) to
represent a DM’s gains or losses in making a choice. Strategies for a DM can be classified
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as pure strategies, which mean definite actions for the DM, and mixed strategies, denoted
by the probabilistic mixture of actions. In comparison, non-quantitive models were de-
signed for use with relative preferences, in which a DM may prefer one state to another or
consider the two states to be equally preferred. Normal and extensive form models are two
representative quantitive models. In a normal form model, each DM can only move once
by changing his or her choices. Extensive games were developed to describe the sequence
of moves for DMs. Cooperative games, which describe conflicts among DMs in allocating
limited resources, can also be analyzed using quantitive approaches. In quantitive mod-
els, the use of utility values has drawbacks because they are usually hard to measure.
The determination of utility is usually intuitive and lacks statistics to validate the value.
In addition, the probabilities underlying mixed strategies may be di cult to estimate in
practice.
Figure 1.1: Genealogy of conflict analysis methodologies (Hipel and Fang, 2005)
Non-quantitive models, in comparison, can overcome the aforementioned drawbacks.
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Howard developed the Metagame Analysis methodology (1971) to mitigate these short-
comings. In a metagame, DMs can move in any order and at any time. Relative pref-
erence for a DM is represented by a comparison of each pair of possible outcomes. An
outcome, formally called a state, can be more preferred, less preferred, or equal in pref-
erence. Drama theory is an extension of metagame theory by considering emotions for
DMs (Howard, 1999). In a drama theoretic model, emotional interactions among DMs and
possible scenarios are investigated.
Conflict Analysis, devised by Fraser and Hipel (1984), is an important extension of the
metagame methodology by introducing sequential stability (SEQ) and symmetric stability
(SMR), as additional new solution concepts for capturing human behaviour under conflict
(Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). In general, a DM will consider a state to be stable if other
DMs can somehow block possible improvements. Stability analyses can be carried out
by investigating the stability of each feasible state for each DM under a given solution
concept. An equilibrium is a state that is stable under a given solution concept for all
DMs. Conflict analysis can be used with the option form proposed by Howard (1971) and
stability calculation can be conveniently carried out using the tableau form proposed by
Fraser and Hipel (1979; 1984)
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993), placed at the
bottom of Fig. 1.1, further improved Conflict Analysis. It possesses a flexible theoretical
structure based on graph theory and can produce meaningful analytical results (Kilgour and
Hipel, 2005). A directed graph for each DM keeps track of the moves in one step that the
DM has from each state. Its unique advantages over other conflict methodologies are that
it can handle irreversible moves, model common moves, and provide a flexible framework
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for calculating stability results. It aims to obtain strategic insight into practical conflicts
occurring either currently or in the past. The solution concepts defined in the graph model
are Nash stability (R) (Nash, 1950; 1951), sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel,
1979; 1984), general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), symmetric metarationality
(SMR) (Howard, 1971), and limited move stability (Zagare, 1984; Brams and Wittman,
1981; Fang et al., 1993). Furthermore, a decision support system, called GMCR II, was
designed to facilitate the calculation of stabilities in real world conflicts (Fang et al., 2003a;
b). It is also a useful platform for carrying out in-depth analyses, such as status quo analysis
(Li et al., 2005) and sensitivity analysis. Other studies on GMCR methodologies and
applications include coalition analysis (Kilgour et al., 2001; Inohara and Hipel, 2008a;b),
preference uncertainty (Li et al., 2004), strength of preference (Hamouda et al., 2004; Xu
et al., 2010), fuzzy preference (Bashar et al., 2014), and the matrix representation of a
conflict (Xu et al., 2009a). A detailed introduction to GMCR methodologies is provided
in Chapter 2.
1.3 Research Objectives
The objective of this research is to develop theoretical models within the GMCR paradigm
to analyze strategic conflicts having a hierarchical structure. A hierarchical graph model
is constructed to describe a hierarchical conflict, in which each subconflict is modelled by
a regular graph model, called a local graph model. DMs, states, moves for DMs, and
their preference relations are defined with respect to hierarchical conflicts as follows. In a
hierarchical conflict, some DMs appear in all subconflicts while others only take part in
one of them. States denote the possible outcomes of a conflict. The states in a hierarchical
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conflict model are said to be the combination of all possible outcomes in local graph models.
The moves in a hierarchical conflict represent a collection of possible actions for DMs in
subconflicts. Preference relations for DMs in hierarchical conflicts will be defined in this
thesis. Because of the unique structure of hierarchical graph model, the preferences for DMs
in a hierarchical conflict cannot be fully determined by the preference information in all
subconflicts. This feature of the hierarchical graph model will be explained in Section 4.2.2.
Di↵erent patterns of preference structure will be designed by ordering the subconflicts
according to importance.
Stabilities refer to the stable states at which, according to the graph model, DMs may
stop depending on their di↵erent perceptions of sanctions. For some DMs in a hierarchical
graph model, an improvement does not necessarily imply improvements in all local mod-
els. Hence, the stabilities in a hierarchical conflict cannot be completely predicted from
the stabilities in subconflicts. Therefore, the interrelationships between stabilities in the
hierarchical model and local models deserve formal investigation. Theorems will be formu-
lated and proven to o↵er insights into the conditions under which a state in a hierarchical
graph model is stable under a given solution concept.
As a hierarchical graph model usually has numerous states, the exhaustive method of
calculating stabilities becomes time-consuming. Thus, di↵erent algorithms for calculating
stabilities in a hierarchical model will be designed in the thesis. A possible way is to use
the stability interrelationships. Theorems describing the interrelationship will be proposed
in order to determine the stabilities in a hierarchical model. The decision support system
GMCR II will be utilized to calculate stabilities in a hierarchical model, provided the
preference relations for DMs are easy to input. The matrix representation approach (Xu et
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al, 2009a) will also be used for carrying out stability calculations. Corresponding matrices
should be defined to represent moves and preferences in a hierarchical model.
One of the most important objectives in this research is to apply the hierarchical graph
model to real world conflicts. Environmental conflicts, such as water diversion conflicts in
China and greenhouse gas treaty disputes between China and the USA, are analyzed. The
hierarchical graph model is also used to study the sales competition between Airbus and
Boeing in di↵erent markets. In each case study, the advantages of the new methodology are
demonstrated by comparing the stabilities in the hierarchical model with those obtained
separately in local models.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized into eight chapters. A detailed introduction to GMCR
methodology is provided in Chapter 2. A lead-in example, a water diversion conflict in
China, is given in Chapter 3.
A hierarchical graph model with the simplest structure, called basic hierarchical graph
model, is introduced in Chapters 4 and 5. Preferences for DMs in the two chapters are
defined in di↵erent ways, referred to as lexicographic preference in Chapter 4 and weighted
preference in Chapter 5, respectively. In both chapters, water diversion conflicts in China
are reinvestigated using the hierarchical graph model paradigm. The approaches of cal-
culating stabilities of the real world conflicts in the two chapters are developed based
on di↵erent preference structures. The e ciencies of the two approaches in calculating
stabilities are compared.
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Another hierarchical graph model with a more complex structure, called the duo hierar-
chical graph model, is proposed in Chapter 6. This model is applied to a sales competition
between Airbus and Boeing in the narrow and wide body jet markets.
The general expression of the hierarchical graph model, called the general hierarchical
graph model, is introduced in Chapter 7. The disputes between China and USA on ad-
herence to the greenhouse emissions treaty are studied using this model. The conclusion
of this thesis and possible extensions of the hierarchical graph model are introduced in
Chapter 8. The structure of the thesis is depicted in Fig. 1.2.
11
Figure 1.2: Structure of thesis
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Chapter 2
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
2.1 Introduction
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) constitutes a systems thinking method-
ology used for modeling and analyzing strategic conflicts. GMCR is used to represent de-
cision makers (DMs), states, possible moves, and preference relations in a strategic conflict
(Kilgour et al., 1987). DMs are defined as stakeholders who can a↵ect the outcome of a
conflict. Usually, a state is defined as a combination of possible choices, called options,
selected by all DMs. Only states which are feasible could occur in the real world and are
analyzed. A DM can move between two states by changing his or her option. The options
for other DMs remain fixed.
A DM has his or her relative preferences over the feasible states in a conflict. The
preferences of a specific DM can be represented by either a pairwise comparison between
two states or a list of all the states from most to least preferred, where ties are allowed for
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the case of transitive preferences. Solution concepts, or stability definitions, are utilized to
describe di↵erent types of human behaviour under conflict in a graph model, including Nash
(R) stability, sequential stability (SEQ), general metarationality (GMR), and symmetric
metarationality (SMR). States are identified under each stability definition for each DM,
which reflect his or her possible actions based on individual interests. Equilibria are states
which are stable for all DMs for a specific solution concept. These equilibria are the
outcomes or possible resolutions of a conflict that are likely to happen (Fang et al., 1993).
In-depth analyses of a conflict under the graph model paradigm include coalition anal-
ysis, status quo analysis, and sensitivity analysis. In a coalition, two or more DMs believe
that their cooperation is more advantageous than individual moves. Status quo analysis is
used to indicate the evolution of a conflict from the starting state to the actual outcome.
A sensitivity analysis can be executed to test the robustness of the results in a conflict by
examining how these results are a↵ected by changing model input.
2.2 Formal Definition of Graph Model
A graph model is defined as a set of directed graphs to represent a strategic conflict. The
nodes in a graph represent possible status of the conflict, i.e. states. The directed arcs
connecting two states are called moves for a focal DM. The structure of a graph model is
defined as follows:
Assuming that N denotes the set of DMs and S represents the set of feasible states,
suppose that Di is DM i’s directed graph and Ai is the set of directed arcs in Di, a graph
model is defined as {Di = S,Ai : i 2 N}. The ordered pair of states (s, s0) for s, s0 2 S
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denotes a directed arc starting from its tail s to the head s0. Hence, the arcs for DM i
are the Cartesian product of two sets of states Ai ✓ S ⇥ S. Note that the moves may or
may not be reversible. The preference for DM i is defined as the ordinal relation between
each pair of states, i.e. more preferred ( i), less preferred ( i), or equally preferred (⇠i).
The preference relation in a graph model can be collectively denoted as %. Thus, a graph
model G can be defined as a set including N , S, A, and %, by G = {N,S,A,%}.
The reachable list is the set of all possible moves, called unilateral movements (UMs),
for a DM and does not depend on its preferences. Suppose s, s0 2 S, the reachable list for
i from state s is defined as
Ri(s) = {s0 2 S : (s, s0) 2 Ai}.
The unilateral improvement (UI) list is a reachable list containing all accessible states
from a starting state which are more preferred by the focal DM. Suppose s, s0 2 S, the UI
list for i from state s is defined as
R+i (s) = {s0 2 S : (s, s0) 2 Ai, s0  i s}.
2.3 Joint Movement and Joint Unilateral Improve-
ment
When making a move, a DM may wish to consider possible responses by other DMs in a
coalition, say H. In a graph model, unilateral moves for H are defined as follows:
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Definition 2.1 (Joint Unilateral Movement in G): Let s 2 S and H ⇢ N , H 6=  .
A unilateral move by H is a member of RH(s) ✓ S, defined inductively beginning with
i 2 H, then for all s0 2 Ri(s), s0 2 RH(s) and ⇧H(s, s0) = {i}. Now if s0 2 RH(s), j 2 H,
s00 2 Rj(s0), and s00 6= s, then provided ⇧H(s, s0) 6= {j}, s00 2 RH(s) and ⇧H(s, s00) = {j}.
Coalition H represents a group of DMs with no less than one DM. RH(s) denotes the
set of all states that can be accessed from s through any legal sequence of unilateral moves
by some or all of the DMs in H. Note that in a legal sequence of unilateral moves, no DM
can move twice consecutively. The state s0 represents any state reached from s by DMs in
H. The set ⇧H(s, s0) contains all the DMs in H whose UMs are in the legal sequence from
s to s0.
This definition constructs RH(s) by expanding the set of DMs who can move from s
to s0, which is initially assumed to be empty. States reachable from s are identified and
included in RH(s). Furthermore, for j 2 H, reachable states from s0 are identified and
added to RH(s). The process stops when no further state can be included in RH(s). Since
RH(s) ✓ S and S is finite, the process is completed in a finite number of steps.
A legal sequence of UIs for a group of DMs can be defined similarly. In the definition
below, R+H(s) denotes the set of states that can be accessed by a legal sequence of UIs, by
some or all DMs in H, starting at state s. If s0 2 R+i (s), then ⇧+H(s, s0) in the following
definition means the set of all DMs whose UIs are in the legal sequences from state s to
state s0.
The joint UIs in a graph model are defined analogously.
Definition 2.2 (Joint Unilateral Improvement in G): Let s 2 S and H 2 N,H 6=  . A
unilateral improvement by H is a member of R+H(s) ✓ S, defined inductively beginning
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with i 2 H. For all s0 2 R+i (s), one has s0 2 R+H(s) and ⇧+H(s, s0) = {i}. Now if s0 2 R+H(s),
j 2 H, s00 2 R+j (s0), s00 6= s, and ⇧+H(s, s0) 6= {j}, then s00 2 R+H(s) and ⇧+H(s, s0) = {j}.
Definition 2.2 di↵ers from Definition 2.1 in that the moves are required to be UIs. Each
state reached by a DM is strictly preferred to the starting state. Accordingly, ⇧+H(s, s
0)
represents all DMs in H whose UMs are UIs from state s to state s0.
2.4 Option Form and Option Prioritization
Option form proposed by Howard (1971) has been widely used to represent strategic con-
flicts. A graph model can be expressed in option form by listing all feasible states as the
selection of options for all DMs. Each state can be written as a list of “Y”s and “N”s.
A “Y” for an option means this option is selected and an “N” means the opposite. For
example, supposing a graph model contains a total of 2 options, the states in the graph
model can be written as (YY), (YN), (NY), (NN). Among them, state (YN) indicates an
outcome at which the first option is selected and the second is not.
Option prioritization is an e↵ective approach to represent preferences for a DM by
investigating its selection of options at each state. In this approach, the preference of a
DM is denoted by a list of preference statements ordered from the most preferred for the
DM at the top of a table to the least preferred at the bottom. A preference statement for a
DM can be expressed by option numbers connected by logical symbols, including negation
(“NOT” or “ ”), conjunction (“AND” or “&”), disjunction (“OR” or “|”), and conditions
(“IF” and “IFF”) (Fang et al., 2003a). In a graph model, the preference statements for
DM i can be denoted as ⌦ij, where 0 < j  h and h denotes the number of statements.
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Each preference statement can be either true (T) or false (F) at each particular state.
A score is assigned to each state for a focal DM to represent its truth values when the
statements are applied. Specifically, the score of state s 2 S for i can be written as  i(s),
where
 ij(s) =
8<: 2h j ⌦ij(s) = T0 otherwise
 i(s) =
hX
j=1
 ij(s).
Then, the preference relation for i between any two states s, s0 2 S can be determined
by comparing their scores  i(s) and  i(s0).
2.5 Matrix Representation of Graph Model
The matrix representation method, proposed by Xu et al. (2007; 2009a), can be used
for e↵ectively describing states, moves, and preferences in a graph model. This approach
is powerful in determining stabilities for DMs, as the calculation is performed by matrix
computation using a decision support system, MRSC, designed by Xu et al (2009a).
The reachable list and UI list for a DM are denoted by a reachable matrix and UI
matrix, respectively. The reachable list for DM i, denoted as Ri(s) = {s0 2 S, (s, s0) 2 Ai},
can be defined by an m ⇥m 0-1 matrix Ji with the entry Ji(s, s0) in the sth row and the
s0th column written as:
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Ji(s, s
0) =
8<: 1 if (s, s0) 2 Ai0 otherwise
Ji is called a reachable matrix for DM i. The preference matrix P
+
i for DM i represents
the preference relation between any pair of states, which can be written as
P+i (s, s
0) =
8<: 1 if s0  i s0 if s0 -i s
Note that s0 -i s means s0 is less or equally preferred to s for DM i. The symbol - contains
two relations between s0 and s, which are less preferred ( ) and equally preferred (⇠).
The unilateral improvement (UI) list from a state s 2 S for DM i 2 N is marked as
R+i (s) = {s0 2 Ri(s) : s0  i s}. The UI matrix for DM i can be denoted as the Hadamard
Product of Ji and P
+
i :
J+i = Ji   P+i (2.1)
where “ ” denotes the Hadamard Product, with J+i (s, s0) = Ji(s, s0) · P+i (s, s0).
In a graph model, the joint movement and improvement for DMs H ✓ N can be noted
as MH and M
+
H , for H 6=  . The expression of MH and M+H can be shown below:
MH =
 _
t=1
_
i2H
M<t>i (2.2)
and
M+H =
 0_
t=1
_
i2H
M<t,+>i (2.3)
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where
M<t>i = sign(Ji · (
_
i02H i
M<t 1>i0 )) (2.4)
with M (1)i = Ji and
M<t,+>i = sign(J
+
i · (
_
i02H i
M<t 1,+>i0 )) (2.5)
with M<1,+>i = J
+
i .
The sign function for m⇥ n matrix A is defined as
sign(A) =
0BBB@
sign[A(1, 1)] ... sign[A(1, n)]
...
. . .
...
sign[A(m, 1)] ... sign[A(m,n)]
1CCCA (2.6)
where A(m,n) is the entry in mth row and nth column, with
sign[A(m,n)] =
8>>><>>>:
1 if A(m,n) > 0
0 if A(m,n) = 0
 1 if A(m,n) < 0.
The operator “
W
” is defined as:
if M1, M2, ..., Ml are all h⇥h matrices, then
Wl
i=1Mi is the h⇥h matrix with (s, s0) entry
ind
 
lX
i=1
Mi(s, s
0)
!
when
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ind(x) =
8<: 1 if x > 00 if x = 0 (2.7)
In equations (2.2) and (2.3),   and  0 represent the number of iterations required to
form the joint movement and improvement, respectively.   and  0 have been proven to be
less than the number of UM and UI arcs |Si2N Ai| and |Si2N A+i | for all DMs, respectively,
i.e.    |Si2N Ai| and  0  |Si2N A+i | (Xu et al., 2009a).
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) denote the UM and UI matrices for a coalition of DMs H,
which are the aggregations of UMs and UIs for each DM in the coalition. In Equation
(2.4), M<1>i = Ji means the joint moves made in one step by DM i. Following this move,
other DMs in H, marked as H   i, move in sequence, while each of them cannot move
consecutively. For example, the two-step joint moves starting from DM i can be written
as
M<2>i = sign(Ji ·
_
i02H i
M<1>i0 ) (2.8)
where M<1>i0 = Ji0 . Equation (2.5) has analogous notation to Equation (2.4).
2.6 Solution Concepts
GMCR methodology is a powerful tool for predicting the outcomes of a conflict. The out-
comes that are more likely to happen are denoted by stable states in a graph model. These
states are stable under di↵erent solution concepts, reflecting di↵erent foresights of DMs
and their perception of risks. The four types of solution concepts are Nash stability (R),
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sequential stability (SEQ), general metarationality (GMR), and symmetric metarationality
(SMR). Detailed definitions for these solution concepts are given below.
(1) Nash Stability (R) (Nash 1950, 1951): A state is Nash Stable or Rational for a DM
if and only if there is no UI by the DM from this state to another. Nash stability can be
mathematically defined as: s 2 S is Nash stable for DM i 2 N i↵ R+i (s) =  .
(2) Unstable (u): A state is unstable for a DM if the DM has at least one UI which
cannot be credibly blocked by other DMs.
(3) Sequential Stability (SEQ) (Kilgour, 1985; Fang et al., 1993): A state is Sequentially
Stable for a DM when all of the DMs’ UIs are sanctioned by subsequent UIs by other DMs.
At an SEQ state, a DM’s UI will be blocked by other DMs’ UIs. The definition can be
written as: s 2 S is SEQ for DM i 2 N i↵ for every state s0 2 R+i (s), there exists at least
s00 2 R+N i(s0), such that s00 -i s, where R+N i(s0) is the set of UIs for all DMs except i at
state s0.
(4) In General Metarationality (GMR) (Howard 1971), all of a DM’s UIs are sanctioned
by subsequent unilateral moves by other DMs. GMR describes a DM who perceives his
possible moves conservatively by ignoring his own possible counteractions while considering
all potential sanctions to his move.
GMR di↵ers from SEQ in that a focal DM is afraid of being sanctioned by other DMs’
UMs. The definition is written as: s 2 S is GMR for DM i 2 N i↵ for every state
s0 2 R+i (s), there exists at least s00 2 RN i(s0), such that s00 -i s, where RN i(s0) is the set
of UMs for all DMs except i at state s0.
(5) At an Symmetric Metarational (SMR) (Howard 1971) state, a DM considers not only
its own possible moves and the reaction of the opponents, but also its own counteractions.
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The DM has a horizon of three moves, while GMR reflects its perception of two moves.
The formal definition is provided as: s 2 S is SMR for DM i 2 N i↵ for every state
s0 2 R+i (s), there exists at least s00 2 RN i(s0), such that s00 -i s, and s⇤ -i s for all
s⇤ 2 Ri(s00).
Note that a stable state under one solution concept may also be stable under other
solution concepts. A Nash stable state is also SEQ, GMR, and SMR, because the focal
DM cannot move away from this state. A SEQ or SMR state is also GMR, because there
must exist a sanctioning UM at an SEQ or SMR state. The interrelationship among these
solution concepts, shown in Fig. 2.1, has been discussed by Kilgour and Hipel (2010). For
a focal DM, a Nash state is also SEQ, GMR, and SMR. A Nash, SEQ, and SMR state is
also GMR for the focal DM.
Figure 2.1: Interrelationship of four solution concepts
For each DM, a state can be stable under di↵erent solution concepts. A stable state
under one solution concept for all DMs is an equilibrium and can be regarded as a possible
resolution for the conflict. A Nash or SEQ stable state for all DMs is a strong equilibrium
(SE), which can reflect an actual outcome that occurs in reality. A GMR or SMR state for
all DMs constitutes a weak equilibrium (WE), indicating an outcome which is less likely
to happen.
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2.7 Decision Support System: GMCR II
The decision support system for GMCR, GMCR II, is a user-friendly computer package
that encodes conflict modelling and can be used for calculating stabilities for DMs. Apart
from presenting stability results for either individual DM or overall DMs, GMCR II can
also be used to perform coalition analysis and status quo analysis.
The structure of GMCR II is shown in Fig. 2.2. GMCR II is divided into modelling
subsystem, analysis engine, and output interpretation subsystem. DMs, options, feasible
states, and preferences are the input in the modelling subsystem. Stability analysis, coali-
tion analysis, and status quo analysis can be carried out in the analysis engine. Individual
stability and equilibria are demonstrated in the output interpretation subsystem (Fang et
al., 2003a; b).
Figure 2.2: Structure of GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a)
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Chapter 3
A Lead-in Example: Water Diversion
Conflict in China
3.1 Introduction
A real world example regarding water diversion conflicts in China is given in this chap-
ter to show the hierarchical structure of these conflicts and the need for developing new
methodologies. Chapter 3 is based on a journal article written by He et al. (2014).
To address China’s large population and uneven distribution of water storage, the
South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP) aims at transferring water from the
Yangtze River (Changjiang) Basin to the North China Plain. This project is being im-
plemented over three di↵erent routes, referred to as the Eastern, Central, and Western
routes, each of which is giving rise to strategic conflicts. In this Chapter, the Graph Model
for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is used to systematically investigate these conflicts and
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obtain strategic insights into them. The Chinese Central Government is involved in each
conflict, together with local decision makers, making the entire conflict hierarchical. The
conflict is analyzed both as an overall graph model and as three local conflicts, and the
resulting equilibria are compared. The Central Government’s preferences, which can be
fully elaborated in the single or overall model, account for the di↵erences in equilibria
between the overall model and the three local models. The Central Government,which
utilizes various strategies in planning, modifying, and building these routes, may be able
to control the overall project as it wishes, thereby reaching separate agreements with the
relevant decision makers along each route.
China is one of the world’s largest countries and has abundant water resources. China’s
total renewable fresh water is about 2804 km3 and ranked the fifth in the world, following
Brazil, Russia, United States, and Canada. However, water availability per capita in China
amounts to only 1/5 of the world average (World Factbook, 2014). In the North China
Plain, severe droughts have been reported recently (United Nations News Report, 2012).
Human activities and crops in rural areas have been dramatically a↵ected. Meanwhile,
water demand is rocketing as a result of fast urbanization. As more of the population
moves to cities from rural areas, household demands, as well as demands in agricultural
and industrial sectors, grow year by year (Larson, 2012). Moreover, waste and ine cient
usage also contribute to the water scarcity. A 2009 World Bank report reveals that in
China only 45 percent of the water withdrawn for agriculture actually reaches the crops
(Cho, 2011). To tackle the aforementioned issues, new approaches are required to meet
the water demands and reasonably manage water resources in the North China Plain.
Water resources management has been studied in the area such as water pricing, water
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allocation, and water monitoring and assessment. In studies on water pricing, the trans-
action costs (Zhang et al., 2013) and e ciency of urban water use (Hung and Chie, 2013;
Garcia-Valinas, 2005; Harris, 2011) have been analyzed. An area-based pricing method
was introduced by Dono et al. (2012). With respect to water allocation, an Integrated-
Water Resource Management (IWRM) model for river basin water allocations has been
put forward (Silva-Hidalgo et al., 2009). Cooperative game theory has been applied to
transboundary water allocations (Sechi et al., 2013; Abed-Elmdoust and Kerachian, 2012;
Kucukmehmetoglu, 2009). To monitor and evaluate the impacts of climate change and
human activities on water resources, a Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) model
has been used to model water flows in the Xixian Watershed (Shi et al., 2011). The impact
of urbanization in the Ganga basin has also been revealed and measures to better utilize
water in this region have been proposed (Misra, 2011).
3.2 The South-NorthWater Diversion Projects in China
Water diversion projects are e↵ective in easing water shortages and have been adopted
in many countries. Various studies can be found on interbasin water diversions. The
interbasin water transfer project in Brazil was compared with two international cases by
de Andrade et al. (2011): the Colorado-Big Tompson Project in the US and an Australian
water diversion project. Their studies revealed the environmental, political, and economic
complexities associated with these large water diversion projects. Another water diversion
project in Brazil was examined for its suitability to supply the metropolitan area of Sao
Paulo, using a dynamic systems simulation model (Gonzalez et al., 2011). When possible
water diversions from the North American Great Lakes were analyzed within a game theory
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framework (Becker and Easter, 1995), states and provinces along the lakes would divert
water even it is unnecessary, because they would lose more by not diverting water. Their
decisions result in a Tragedy of the Commons.
The last decade has witnessed increasingly serious water shortages in North China due
to industrialization and population growth, while South China has su↵ered from frequent
flooding. The increasing water demand in the North China plain calls for more water
supplies. A possible solution is to divert water from regions with abundant water resources,
so the water rights are transferred from users in one basin to another. The theory of
water rights defines the total amount of available water and rules to divide it among users
(Speed, 2009a; Xie, 2008). Water rights are enforced, and tradable in markets (Productivity
Commission, 2003). In China, rights-based water allocation systems have not yet been
developed (WET, 2006). China’s 2002 water law marks a great e↵ort toward establishing
“an initial water distribution system” and “a water trading system” (State Council, 2006).
These systems are designed to transfer water within a given river basin (Speed, 2009b).
The Yellow River basin in the North China plain is already short of water, and it is planned
to transfer water to it from other river basins. This is currently feasible, as water is defined
in the constitution as public property shared by the people (Speed, 2009a). Thus, water
transfer projects in China are implemented by the Central Government.
The South-North Water Diversion Project (SNWDP), depicted in Fig. 3.1, was pro-
posed to ease the water scarcity in the North China Plain. This huge project includes
three main water transport routes: Eastern, Central, and Western. The eastern route is
being constructed following the Grand Canal, starting from Jiangdu, a town along the
lower Yangtze River, to the city of Tianjin. Along the eastern route are the most indus-
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trialized and highly populated areas of China. Tunnels carry the diverted water beneath
the Yellow River (Huang He). This route can meet industrial and urban demands in the
eastern part of the North China Plain, and provide water for agricultural use if necessary.
The central route starts from Danjiangkou Reservoir, China’s largest artificial freshwater
lake, located in Hubei Province. The water is to be diverted from the reservoir to Beijing
via canals and tunnels. The water will flow through Henan, Hebei, and Beijing, where
it will be used for urban and industrial purposes. During and after the construction of
the Danjiangkou Reservoir, large populated areas will be inundated, forcing residents to
relocate. Tunnels will divert the water across the Yellow River near Zhengzhou, the cap-
ital of Henan Province. The western route is planned to connect the Yangtze River and
the Yellow River in the Tibetan Plateau. Water shortages in the Yellow River can be
alleviated by transferring water from the Yangtze River. This project is controversial on
account of some unresolved technical di culties in construction. Moreover, as the headwa-
ters of many international rivers flow from this region, the project may a↵ect water usage
in neighboring countries. This megaproject could have significant impacts on local soci-
eties and their environment. Provincial governments, residents, and other stakeholders are
involved and their interests and rights may be dramatically a↵ected. Conflicts are arising
along all three routes. On the eastern route, there are disputes over water usage between
Beijing and eastern provinces along the Yangtze and Huai Rivers, such as Jiangsu and
Anhui provinces. Frequent droughts have also been reported in recent years in some east-
ern provinces (Buckley, 2011), intensifying the existing disputes. It is challenging for the
Central Government to satisfy all users while maintaining the profitability of this project
(Chen et al., 2013).
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Figure 3.1: The location of the South-North Water Diversion Project (Source: fran-
cistopia.edublogs.org, 2011)
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On the central route, many residents must be relocated, resulting in dissent from the
residents due to inadequate compensation. However, local governments may seek profits
through corruption while executing these policies, particularly in the distribution of funds
for compensation. They may even block the residents petitions from reaching the Central
Government. Nevertheless, corruption is risky for local governments, since they will be
harshly punished if the corruption is revealed to the public (McCormack, 2001; Gleick,
2009).
The western route will a↵ect water usage in neighbouring countries, as water will be
diverted from some international rivers in the Tibetan Plateau. A large number of dams
and reservoirs have been built in the upstream of the Yangtze River, significantly a↵ecting
water flows in the Tibetan Plateau (Zhang et al., 2012). Opposition has arisen in these
countries, where there have been calls for negotiations (Holslag, 2011).
Many studies have focused on issues and conflicts related to the SNWDP in China. The
risk of water shortages caused by this project in areas around the Danjiangkou Reservoir
has been determined and evaluated (Gu et al., 2012). Monthly flow data in the reservoir
were simulated for optimized operation at minimum risk; a case study in the Yellow River
Basin provides approaches to allocate water resources taking into account a flexible limit to
water storage (Shao et al., 2009). Accompanied by the approaches put forward to optimize
water usage, SNWDP is believed to be e↵ective in solving the water crisis in the Yellow
River Basin.
During the implementation of the project, conflicts have taken place among various
stakeholders. For the Central Government of China, ignorance of these conflicts is risky
because it may increase the dissatisfaction of other stakeholders. It is important to sys-
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tematically investigate these conflicts to obtain strategic resolutions.
3.3 GraphModel of Water Diversion Conflict in China
The hierarchical water diversion conflict in China is modelled using GMCR. This hierarchal
conflict contains two subconflicts. DMs and their options are identified. Feasible states
are obtained and ranked according to the preferences of each DM.
3.3.1 Decision Makers
DMs in the overall water diversion conflict are defined with respect to the three routes:
Chinese Central Government (CG) and eastern provincial governments (EPGs) on the
eastern route; Chinese Central Government (CG), central provincial governments (CPGs),
and local residents (LRs) on the central route; Chinese Central Government (CG) and
neighboring countries (NCs) on the western route. CG, which is involved with all three
routes, refers to the o cials in the Central Political Bureau and their subordinates. It also
includes a liated ministries such as the Ministry of Water Resources and the National
Development and Reform Commission.
The acronym EPGs refers to the governments in the eastern provinces including Jiangsu,
Anhui, and Jiangxi. LRs refer to the residents who are forced to relocate due to the con-
struction of the central route occupying the land on which they reside. CPGs represent the
local governments in and below provincial level on the central route in charge of relocating
residents and granting compensation, such as the governments in the municipal and county
levels in Hubei and Henan Provinces. NCs are the countries bordering southwestern China,
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Figure 3.2: The structure of the overall water diversion conflict in China
whose water usage is a↵ected by the construction of the western route. In this chapter, an
overall hierarchical conflict consisting of conflicts pertaining to three routes is analyzed,
where CG is the only DM involved in all three routes.
As shown in Fig. 3.2, the hierarchical water conflict consists of three routes. A black line
connecting two DMs represents an interaction between the two. CG is the only DM who
belongs to all three routes and interacts with all other DMs. There is also an interaction
between CPGs and LRs within the central route.
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3.3.2 Options
Options are possible actions that DMs expect to take in a conflict. In this conflict, CG
wishes to initiate all of the scheduled projects on the three routes if no opposition occurs.
However, it will face opposition from other DMs on the three routes. CG has two options
for each route. On the eastern route, it can either initiate the full projects or implement
modifications, such as changing the water prices and controlling the amount of water to be
transferred. EPGs can either agree with CG’s initiatives or oppose them. On the central
route, CG can similarly either initiate the full projects or grant further compensation to
appease the residents. The local residents can comply with CG’s policies or refuse to move.
They will not concede to CG’s plans unless their living conditions are maintained and job
opportunities are secured by CG. On paper, CPGs should fully execute CG’s policies
regarding the relocated residents. However, they are likely to misappropriate the funds
used for compensation and conceal the local residents’ oppositions from being known by
CG. On the western route, CG can either execute the original plan or modify the plan by
cancelling some dams and reservoirs that will a↵ect the water flow in neighboring countries.
NCs can agree with CG’s original plan or protest. The DMs and their options are listed
in Table 3.1. Each option is expressed with a number to facilitate further calculation. As
shown in Table 3.1, there are 14 options in total.
3.3.3 The Status Quo State
The status quo state (SQ) is the initial situation at the time for which a conflict study is
executed. In the overall conflict, the status quo state is listed as the column of Ys and
Ns in Table 3.1. An option marked with Y represents that it is taken in this state, while
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Table 3.1: Options of DMs and Status Quo State
DMs Option Numbers Options Status Quo
China Central Government (CG) 1 Fully initiate the eastern route Y
2 Modify the eastern route N
3 Fully initiate the central route Y
4 Modify the project and change compensation policies N
5 Original plan on the western route Y
6 Modified western plan N
Eastern Provincial Governments (EPGs) 7 Agree with CG’s initiative N
8 Oppose CG Y
Central Provincial Governments (CPGs) 9 Fully initiate CG’s policies N
10 Initiate CG’s policies in a corrupt and arbitrary manner Y
Local Residents (LRs) 11 Comply with CG’s policies N
12 Refuse to move Y
Neighboring Countries (NCs) 13 Agree with CG regarding the western route N
14 Protest and pressure CG Y
an option with N means the opposite. Initially, CG intends to implement the full projects
on all of the three routes, which results in opposition from EPGs, LRs, and NCs in each
route. CPGs are likely to engage in corruption if there is no possible sanction from other
DMs.
3.3.4 Removing Infeasible States
As each option can be either selected or rejected, there are 214 states that are mathemat-
ically possible. However, many of the combinations are logically infeasible. For example,
CG must choose exactly one option from the two for each route. Another infeasibility,
called option dependence, is caused by the importance of the three routes perceived by
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CG. Option dependence reflects CG’s discrepant view regarding the three routes and its
strategy of initiating each route in a preferred order. Specifically, CG considers the eastern
route as the most important route and the western route the least important. Therefore,
the full proposed central route cannot be adopted by CG until the full project on the east-
ern route is carried out. Likewise, CG will not initiate the full western route until both
the full eastern and central routes are implemented. Thus, the modified eastern route with
either full central or full western are infeasible. Similarly, states with modified central or
eastern route and full western should also be removed. After removing these infeasible
states, there are 64 feasible states left for further analysis. The di↵erent relative impor-
tances of each route, reflected by option dependence, results in analytical results that are
di↵erent from findings that would result from assuming the three routes are equally im-
portant. This di↵erence is discussed later by comparing the hierarchical conflict with the
three separate conflicts.
3.3.5 Ranking of Feasible States
For each DM, the feasible states are ranked according to the preferences of the DM using
the option prioritization method (Kilgour and Hipel, 2010). Preference statements written
in terms of option numbers are listed from the most preferred at the top to the least
preferred at the bottom, as shown in the right column of Table 3.2 for CG.
For example, as the eastern route is the most important for CG, it would construct
the full project (option 1) regardless of oppositions from EPGs. Following this, it expects
agreement from EPGs on its decision (1 IF 7). If EPGs oppose the full route, CG will
consider modifying the project (2 IF 8). CG would consider the central route after the
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eastern project has been implemented. It prefers to modify the project on account of strong
opposition from LRs (4). It would also like to see satisfaction from LRs (11). If there is no
significant opposition from LRs, CG would fully initiate the central project (3 IF 11). CG
also expects its compensation policies to be well executed by CPGs (option 9). The western
route is the last to be considered. CG’s first option is to change the western project if the
neighbouring countries protest (6 IF 14). Otherwise, it will initiate the original plan if NCs
acquiesce (5 IF 13). Note that the order of the three routes reflects option dependence
among the three routes, which forms a basis for removing certain infeasible states.
EPGs would agree on the eastern project if it is modified (2 then 7 IF 2). Otherwise,
they will pressure CG to modify (8 IF 1). CPGs will not fully execute CG’s policies until
being pressured by other DMs (10 then 9). In particular, they will execute the entirety of
CG’s policies if LRs oppose (9 IF 12). CPGs also wish to see CG change the policies (i.e.
increase compensation) so that they can confiscate more funds (4). LRs will be content
if CG changes policies (11 IF 4). They will refuse to move if CG insists on the original
central plan (12 IF 3). Moreover, LRs expect the compensation executed by CPG to be
transparent (9). They will move if properly compensated (11 IF 9). On the western route,
NCs would firstly protest (14 IF 5) if CG insists on the original plan. They can be satisfied
if the western plan is modified (13 IF 6).
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Table 3.2: Preference Statements for all DMs in Overall Conflict
Descriptions Preference Statements
Chinese Central Government (CG)
CG wishes to fully initiate the eastern route. 1
CG initiates the full eastern route if EPGs agree with CG. 1 IF 7
CG will modify the eastern route if EPGs oppose it. 2 IF 8
CG changes the compensation policies on the central route. 4
CG wishes to see contentment on the part of LRs. 11
CG initiates the full central route if LRs are satisfied. 3 IF 11
CPGs fully initiate CG’s policies. 9
CG will change the western plan if NCs oppose it. 6 IF 14
CG will initiate the original western plan if NCs agree to it. 5 IF 13
Eastern Provincial Governments (EPGs)
EPGs expect CG to modify the eastern route. 2
EPGs will agree with CG if it modifies. 7 IF 2
EPGs will oppose the eastern route if CG fully initiates it. 8 IF 1
Central Provincial Governments (CPGs)
CPGs initiate CG’s policies with corruption. 10
CPGs fully initiate CG’s policies. 9
CPGs fully initiate CG’s policies if LRs refuse to move. 9 IF 12
CPGs wish that CG changes compensation policies. 4
Local Residents (LRs)
LRs will be happy if CG changes compensation policies. 11 IF 4
LRs will refuse to move if CG initiates the full central route. 12 IF 3
LRs expect CPGs to fully initiate CG’s policies. 9
LRs will accept CG’s policies if CPGs are not corrupted. 11 IF 9
Neighbouring Countries (NCs)
NCs will protest and pressure CG if it initiates the original western plan. 14 IF 5
NCs will be satisfied with a modified western plan. 13 IF 6
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3.4 Stability Analysis of the Hierarchical Water Di-
version Conflict in China
A detailed stability analysis of the hierarchical conflict is conducted using GMCR II. Stabil-
ities are examined for each DM and the equilibrium states are discovered. These analytical
results are interpreted with respect to their strategic significance in the overall dispute.
3.4.1 Stability Calculation of the Hierarchical Conflict
All feasible states are examined for stabilities for each DM, using GMCR II. An outcome
with some types of stabilities for all DMs is considered an equilibrium or resolution. As
indicated previously, an SE is more likely to be an actual outcome; thus, it can be considered
as a possible resolution. As shown in Table 3.3, state 15 is an SE in this conflict because
it is Nash rational for all DMs. This equilibrium is also SEQ, GMR and SMR for all DMs.
State 47 is a WE; it is only GMR stable for all DMs. The options taken by all DMs in the
two equilibria are indicated in Table 3.3.
State 15 is the actual outcome that has been o cially reported (South-North Water
Diversion, 2011), in which CG initiates the full eastern route while modifying the central
and western projects. Its decision results in disagreement from EPGs and the corruption
of CPGs (Duggan, 2013). LRs accept CG’s decision since the compensation scheme has
been modified. NCs also agree with CG’s modified western plan. The o cial news reveals
that the eastern project based on the original schedule nears completion. As the most
developed region in China, the Yangtze Delta needs an increasing amount of water to
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Table 3.3: The Equilibria with Options of all DMs in the Stability Analysis
DMs Options State 15 (SE) State 47 (WE)
CG 1. Full Eastern Y Y
2. Modified Eastern N N
3. Full Central N N
4. Modify Compensation Y Y
5. Original Western N N
6. Modified Western Y Y
EPG 7. Agree with CG N N
8. Oppose the Eastern Y Y
CPG 9. Full Implementation N N
10. Corruption Y Y
LRs 11. Accept Compensation Y Y
12. Refuse to move N N
NCs 13. Agree with CG Y N
14. Protest N Y
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support its fast-growing economy. Opposition still persists due to recent seasonal droughts
in the Yangtze River and water pollution caused by the diversion.
3.4.2 Stability Analyses of the Separate Conflicts for the Three
Routes
The conflict on each route can also be modelled separately. In calculating the equilibria for
each route, the preference statements in the three separate conflicts are the same as those
in the overall conflict, as described in Table 3.2. In the separate modelling, CG considers
each route equally; thus, option dependence across di↵erent subconflicts does not exist.
Note that only strong equilibria (SEs) in separate conflicts are analyzed.
The DMs, options, Status Quo (SQ) states, and equiibria for the three single conflicts
are listed in Table 3.4. Note that the option numbers are consistent with those in Table
3.1, while the state numbers are only assigned within each single conflict. For example,
state 3 in the single eastern and western conflicts refers to di↵erent states. All equilibria
in Table 3.4 are SEs. There is one SE in each of the eastern and central routes. States 2
and 4 are two SEs on the western route.
3.5 Comparison of the Three Separate Conflicts with
the Overall Dispute
The stability results in the single conflicts are compared with those in the hierarchical
conflict. To make the results comparable, a combination of equilibrium states for the three
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Table 3.4: The DMs, Options, SQ states, and Equilibria in the Three Single Conflicts
Single Eastern Conflict SQ State Equilibrium
DMs Options State 3 State 3
China Central Government (CG) 1. Fully initiate the eastern route Y Y
2. Modify the eastern route N N
Eastern Provincial Governments (EPGs) 7. Agree with CG’s initiative N N
8. Oppose CG Y Y
Single Central Conflict SQ State Equilibrium
DMs Options State 7 State 4
China Central Government (CG) 3. Full Central Route Y N
4. Modify and Change Compensation N Y
Central Provincial Governments (CPGs) 9. Full Implementation N N
10. Corruption Y Y
Local Residents (LRs) 11. Accept Compensation N Y
12. Protest Y N
Single Western Conflict SQ State Equilibria
DMs Options State 3 State 2 State 4
Central Government 5. Fully Initiate the Western Project Y N N
6. Modify the Western Plan N Y Y
Neighbouring Countries 13. Agree with CG on the Western Route N Y N
14. Protest and Pressure CG Y N Y
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routes are obtained, as shown in Fig. 3.3. Each block on the left contains the SE(s)
with DMs’ options in the corresponding single conflict. Option numbers for each route
are displayed on the top of each block, followed by options in the SE(s) listed below. For
example, in the Eastern block located at the top left in Fig. 3.3, the numbers “1. 2. 7.
8.” refer to the options for CG and EPGs in the eastern conflict. Then “(Y N N Y)”
means that options 1 and 8 are selected while options 2 and 7 are not taken. Therefore,
two combined equilibria are generated on the right by including the selection of options
for all DMs in the three blocks. The combined equilibria are identical to states 15 and
47 in the hierarchical conflict, which are SE and WE, respectively. State 15 is an SE in
the hierarchical conflict which is composed of SEs in the single conflicts. Also constituted
by SEs in the single conflicts, state 47 is a WE in the hierarchical conflict. State 15 is
underlined in Fig. 3.3 to be distinguished from state 47.
Figure 3.3: Combination of the equilibria for the single conflicts
CG’s preferences can explain the di↵erences in equilibria. For example, state 4 is SEQ
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for NCs in the western conflict, which means NCs fear the possible sanctions from CG.
State 4 in the western conflict is contained in state 47 in the overall conflict. Because
the western route is of least importance for CG in the hierarchical conflict, CG will not
improve on the western route at the cost of a disimprovement on more important central
route. Thus, in the overall conflict, state 4 as a component state in the western subconflict
will not be sanctioned by CG, because CG overviews the conflicts at all locations. Thus,
NCs in state 47 cannot be sanctioned by CG’s UI. This can explain why state 47 is a WE
in the hierarchical conflict consisting of SEs in the subconflicts.
3.6 Summary
The conflicts in SNWDP are analyzed in a hierarchical structure with CG’s di↵erent pri-
orities over the three routes. GMCR II is used to obtain the comprehensive analytical
results. The SE (state 15) echoes the actual outcome and provides insights for DMs. This
result is compared with the two SEs, states 15 and 47, in Fig. 3.3, which are a combination
of the equilibria calculated in the single conflicts.
According to the findings, the modified western project may still result in opposition
from NCs, if the western route is treated equally with the other routes by CG. However,
CG could fully initiate the eastern project while easing the opposition to the central and
western routes by having di↵erent priorities towards the three routes. This also implies
that NCs could protest if the western route is simultaneously started with the other routes.
This result explains why the western project should not be initiated until completion of
projects on the other routes. It is rational for CG to first construct the original eastern
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project regardless of opposition from EPGs. Modifications to the central route can be
implemented as the second step. The western project should be suspended. Therefore, CG
may wish to strategically, rather than evenly, carry out a plan and distribute resources on
the three routes, such as time, capital, and human resources, to improve its prospects of
achieving a better outcome that will meet the desires of the various stakeholders as much
as possible.
Other DMs can also learn from the analytical results. As the opposition cannot change
CG’s plan on the eastern route, EPGs may wish to change their preferences or options to
increase their impact on the project. On the central route, LRs can expect a favourable
outcome as CG may change the project and increase the compensation. The only concern
comes from CPGs, who can still confiscate compensation without the knowledge of CG.
For NCs, the situation on the western route is acceptable as long as CG does not initiate
the western project immediately. As state 47 is GMR for NCs, their protests, although
currently not highly preferred, can be a possible solution in the future. In general, a
better outcome on the western route can be achieved if CG deals with all the conflicts
hierarchically.
The hierarchical structure of water diversion conflicts in China has been demonstrated
in this chapter. To study similar conflicts in the real world with a hierarchical structure,
di↵erent types of hierarchical graph models are developed within the graph model paradigm
in the following chapters. Applications of these models are also provided.
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Chapter 4
Basic Hierarchical Graph Model with
Lexicographic Preference
4.1 Introduction
A hierarchical graph model with the simplest structure, called the basic hierarchical graph
model with lexicographic preference, is constructed in this chapter. The basic hierarchical
graph model combines two component graph models. The theoretical framework of the
combined model is constructed. A simple approach to determine preferences in the hierar-
chical graph model, called lexicographic preference, is developed in this chapter. Theorems
are developed to relate stable states in the hierarchical model to stable states in the local
graph models. These theorems can be employed to calculate stabilities in the hierarchical
model by using stabilities in subconflicts. This methodology is applied to the water diver-
sion conflict in China, the same example that was used in Chapter 3, but with only two
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subconflicts. The analytical results show how DMs can obtain strategic resolutions for the
entire conflict. Chapter 4 is revised based on the journal article written by He et al (2013).
4.2 Formal Definitions
Recall that a graph model for a strategic conflict consists of a finite set of DMs, N ; a finite
set of feasible states, S; and, for each DM i 2 N , a preference relation on S. As well, a
directed arc connecting two states for each DM i, given as Ai ✓ S ⇥ S, is required. The
nodes of each DM’s graph are the states of the model, and possible moves for a given DM
are represented by directed arcs.
4.2.1 Framework of Basic Hierarchical Graph Model
A hierarchical graph model for a strategic conflict contains smaller graph models, called
local graph models. These smaller graph models feature one or more common DMs (CDMs)
who appear in each of the local graphs. DMs appearing in only one local graph are called
local DMs (LDMs).
The basic hierarchical graph model contains two smaller graph models with only one
CDM. Besides CDM, each local graph has one LDM. The hierarchical graph model, G, has
local graphs G(1) and G(2), with LDMs, LDM1 and LDM2, respectively. The interactions
of the three DMs are shown in Fig. 4.1. CDM has interactions with both LDMs, separately
with each in its local graph. No interaction is assumed between the two LDMs. States in G
are specified using two entries, representing states in G(1) and G(2). CDM can move either
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Figure 4.1: Interactions of DMs in the basic hierarchical graph model
locally within G(1) or G(2), or in both local graphs simultaneously. The basic hierarchical
graph model is defined as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Basic Hierarchical Graph Model): There are three DMs, consisting of
CDM, LDM1, and LDM2, and two local graph models,
G(1) = h{CDM,LDM1}, S(1), {AC(1), AL(1)}, {%(1)C ,%(1)L1 }i
where AC(1) ✓ S(1) ⇥ S(1), AL(1) ✓ S(1) ⇥ S(1), and %(1)C and %(1)L1 are preference relations
on S(1) for CDM and LDM1 respectively.
G(2) = h{CDM,LDM2}, S(2), {AC(2), AL(2)}, {%(2)C ,%(2)L2 }i
where AC(2) ✓ S(2) ⇥ S(2), AL(2) ✓ S(2) ⇥ S(2), and %(2)C and %(2)L2 are preference relations
on S(2).
Then the graph modelG = h{CDM,LDM1, LDM2}, S = S(1)⇥S(2), {AC,AL1, AL2}, {%C
,%L1 ,%L2}i is a basic hierarchical graph model based on G(1) and G(2), provided that the
following conditions hold:
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(C1) For s
(k)
a , s
(k)
b 2 S(k) (k = 1, 2) and (s(1)a , s(2)a ), (s(1)b , s(2)b ) 2 S, AC ✓ S⇥S is defined by⇣
(s(1)a , s
(2)
a ), (s
(1)
b , s
(2)
b )
⌘
2 AC i↵ either (s(1)a , s(1)b ) 2 AC(1) and s(2)a = s(2)b , or (s(2)a , s(2)b ) 2
AC(2) and s(1)a = s
(1)
b .
(C21) AL1 ✓ S ⇥ S is defined by
⇣
(s(1)a , s
(2)
a ), (s
(1)
b , s
(2)
b )
⌘
2 AL1 i↵ (s(1)a , s(1)b ) 2 AL(1)1 and
s(2)a = s
(2)
b
(C22) AL2 ✓ S ⇥ S is defined by
⇣
(s(1)a , s
(2)
a ), (s
(1)
b , s
(2)
b )
⌘
2 AL2 i↵ (s(2)a , s(2)b ) 2 AL(2)2 and
s(1)a = s
(1)
b
(C31) The preference relation%L1 is defined on S by (s(1)a , s(2)a ) %L1 (s(1)b , s
(2)
b ) i↵ s
(1)
a %(1)L1 s
(1)
b
(C32) The preference relation%L2 is defined on S by (s(1)a , s(2)a ) %L2 (s(1)b , s
(2)
b ) i↵ s
(2)
a %(2)L2 s
(2)
b
(C41) The preference relation %C on S is related to the preference relation %(1)C on S(1) as
follows:
If s(1)a , s
(1)
b 2 S(1) and s(1)a %(1)C s(1)b , then (s(1)a , s(2)0 ) %C (s(1)b , s(2)0 ) for all s(2)0 2 S(2)
(C42) The preference relation %C on S is related to the preference relation %(2)C on S(2) as
follows:
If s(2)a , s
(2)
b 2 S(2) and s(2)a %(2)C s(2)b , then (s(1)0 , s(2)a ) %C (s(1)0 , s(2)b ) for all s(1)0 2 S(1)
Definition 4.1 describes the structure of the basic hierarchical graph model, G, which
constitutes two local graph models (G(1) and G(2)) sharing a common DM, called CDM.
Other DMs are local decision makers (LDMs) and participate only in one local graph. The
set of states in G is the Cartesian Product of the sets of states in the two local models.
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CDM can participate in either or both of the two local models, while a LDM can move
only within one local model.
Note: If G(1) and G(2) are given, then all components of G are determined by Definition
4.1 except for CDM’s preference relation %C . This relation must satisfy (C41) and (C42);
these conditions restrict %C but do not determine it. In general, basic hierarchical graph
models based on G(1) and G(2) di↵er only in %C .
In Definition 4.1, {CDM,LDM1} is the set of DMs and S(1) is the set of states in G(1).
AC(1) is the set of moves in one step controlled by CDM in G(1), while AL(1) is the set of
moves under the control of LDM1 in G(1). Similarly, AC represents the set of moves by
CDM in G and AL1 the set of moves by LDM1 in G. The preference relations in G for
CDM and LDM1 are expressed by %C and %L1 , respectively.
In particular, CDM’s preference between two states in the basic hierarchical model is
determined by C41 and C42 if, and only if, the states are identical in one local graph model.
Thus, more than one basic hierarchical graph model based on G(1) and G(2) can be found
satisfying the conditions listed above.
4.2.2 Lexicographic Preference
An illustration of CDM’s preferences in a basic hierarchical graph model based on G(1)
and G(2) is given next. Suppose that there are three states in G(1): S(1) = {a, b, c} and
two states in G(2): S(2) = {A,B}, and write S = S(1) ⇥ S(2) = {aA, aB, bA, bB, cA, cB}.
The preference relations of CDM in G(1) and G(2) are defined as %(1)C = a   b   c and
%(2)C = A   B. Accordingly, the preference relation of CDM in G must satisfy
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Figure 4.2: Preference tree of a basic hierarchical graph model for the CDM
(1) aA   bA   cA
(2) aB   bB   cB
(3) aA   aB
(4) bA   bB
(5) cA   cB
The above five relations are generated according to conditions C41 and C42. A preference
tree that describes CDM’s preferences on all states in G is shown in Fig. 4.2. A directed
arrow points to a state that is less preferred than the starting state by CDM. Preferences
between states without connection are not determined.
According to Fig. 4.2, there are 5 possible rankings of states in G:
(i) aA   bA   cA   aB   bB   cB
(ii) aA   bA   aB   cA   bB   cB
(iii) aA   bA   aB   bB   cA   cB
51
(iv) aA   aB   bA   cA   bB   cB
(v) aA   aB   bA   bB   cA   cB
Note that state aAmust be CDM’s most preferred state and state cB the least preferred.
The second-best state for CDM can be either bA or aB. Ranking (i) demonstrates a possible
ranking in which cA   aB, but cA   aB in rankings (ii) to (v).
To further determine preference relations on all states in G for CDM, additional rules
for comparing states in G can be introduced. A possible way to rank all states in G is
called Lexicographic Ordering, which depends on the importance of local graphs.
Definition 4.2 (Lexicographic Order): Given two sets A and B with a1, a2 2 A and b1,
b2 2 B, the lexicographical order on the Cartesian product A ⇥ B is defined as (a1, b1) <
(a2, b2) if and only if
(1) a1 < a2
(2) a1 = a2 and b1 < b2
The lexicographic order provides an e cient way of comparing two states in G. To
establish a general rule for comparison, pairwise importance between two local graphs
is introduced. For two local graphs G(1) and G(2), the CDM’s attitude on which local
graph is more important is called local graph importance. CDM always prefers to achieve
a better outcome in the more important local graph, regardless of the situation in the
other local graph. Between two combined states with equally preferred components in
the more important local graph, the CDM prefers the combined state that has the more
preferred component in the less important local graph. Thus, G(1) > G(2) and G(1) < G(2)
respectively denote that the CDM considers G(1) more important and less important than
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G(2). The pairwise importance between the two local graphs is defined as follows.
Definition 4.3 (Pairwise Importance): Let G(1) and G(2) denote two local graphs in
G. Then G(1) > G(2) denotes that CDM considers G(1) more important than G(2), and
G(1) < G(2) indicates the reverse.
Based on the pairwise importance between the two local graphs, preference relations
in G for CDM are completely determined. For two states in G, s1 = (s
(1)
1 , s
(2)
1 ) 2 S and
s2 = (s
(1)
2 , s
(2)
2 ) 2 S, CDM’s preferences between s1 and s2 are defined as follows:
If G(1) > G(2) for CDM,
(a) s1  C s2, if either s(1)1  (1)C s(1)2 or (s(1)1 ⇠(1)C s(1)2 and s(2)1  (2)C s(2)2 );
(b) s1 ⇠C s2, if s(1)1 ⇠(1)C s(1)2 and s(2)1 ⇠(2)C s(2)2 ; and
(c) s1  C s2, if either s(1)1  (1)C s(1)2 or (s(1)1 ⇠(1)C s(1)2 and s(2)1  (2)C s(2)2 ).
CDM’s preference in G is similar if G(1) < G(2).
Pairwise importance acts as extra information to determine the preference ranking of all
states in the basic hierarchical model. Among the five possible rankings of states demon-
strated from (i) to (v), (i) is concluded by assuming G(1) < G(2) and (v) by considering
G(1) > G(2). If G(1) < G(2), then cA  C aB due to A  (2)C B even though c  (1)C a. There-
fore, a strict local graph importance relation corresponds to a unique ranking of states.
The remaining three rankings from (ii) to (iv) suggest approximately equal importance of
the two local graphs for CDM.
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4.3 Moves and Improvements
Movements and preferences of DMs are defined within the framework of the hierarchical
graph model. Only CDM can participate in both local graph models, while LDMs’ moves
can only a↵ect their own subconflict. The preferences of LDMs in their local graphs, %(1)L1
and %(2)L2 , are essentially the same as their preferences in the hierarchical graph model, %L1
and %L2 . However, CDM’s preference relations between states in the hierarchical graph are
constrained by conditions C41 and C42 shown in Definition 4.1, and completely determined
if there is an importance relation between two local graphs.
As introduced in Chapter 2, the reachable list is the set of all possible moves for a DM
and does not depend on its preferences. For CDM, possible moves from s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S
can occur from either s(1) or s(2). In comparison, LDM1 can only move within its own
local graph, i.e. from s(1) 2 S(1).
Definition 4.4 (Reachable List): Suppose s1 = (s
(1)
1 , s
(2)
1 ), s2 = (s
(1)
2 , s
(2)
2 ) 2 S. The
reachable list for CDM from state s1 is defined as
RC(s1) = {s2 2 S : (s1, s2) 2 AC}.
Note that (s1, s2) 2 AC if and only if either (s(1)1 , s(1)2 ) 2 AC(1) and s(2)1 = s(2)2 or (s(2)1 , s(2)2 ) 2
AC(2) and s(1)1 = s
(1)
2 or (s
(1)
1 , s
(1)
2 ) 2 AC(1) and (s(2)1 , s(2)2 ) 2 AC(2). The reachable list for
LDM1 is defined as
RL1(s1) = {s2 2 S : (s1, s2) 2 AL1}
Note that (s1, s2) 2 AL1 if and only if (s(1)1 , s(1)2 ) 2 AL(1)1 and s(2)1 = s(2)2 . The reachable
list for LDM2 is defined similarly.
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Note that (s1, s2) 2 AL2 if and only if (s(2)1 , s(2)2 ) 2 AL(2)2 and s(1)1 = s(1)2 .
4.4 Interrelationships of Stabilities between Basic Hi-
erarchical Graph Model and Local Graph Models
Relative relationships between stabilities in the basic hierarchical graph model and sta-
bilities in the local graph model are now investigated. Theorems following the definitions
for each stability type are proposed to reveal the connection between the overall stability
and the individual stabilities in smaller graphs. Four stabilities, Nash, sequential stabil-
ity (SEQ), general metarationality (GMR), and symmetric metarationality (SMR), are
discussed. Representative proofs of some theorems can be seen in Appendices.
The four types of stabilities reflect di↵erent foresights for DMs (Kilgour and Hipel,
2010). Nash rationality has the lowest foresight, as the focal DM perceives only displace-
ments of one step. It is the strongest stability. Sequential stability (SEQ) and general
metarationality (GMR) have a foresight of two steps. In sequential stability (SEQ), the
focal DM considers only unilateral improvements by other DMs as responses to his initial
move.
In general metarationality (GMR), the focal DM expects that other DMs will sanction
its UIs, even if the only available sanctions are disimprovements. Compared with GMR,
symmetric metarationality (SMR) extends the foresight of the focal DM one step further.
The focal DM takes into account not only sanctions from other DMs, but also its own
counteractions.
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In a graph model, a state is an equilibrium if it is stable for all DMs. For example, an
SEQ equilibriumm is a state that is SEQ stable for all DMs. Equilibria in a graph model
suggest possible outcomes of the conflict or resolutions for DMs as courses of action to
follow.
The interrelationship of these four stabilities is shown in Fig. 4.3. For example, if a
combined state is Nash stable, it is also SEQ, GMR, and SMR. A state with any other
form of stability is also GMR (Kilgour and Hipel, 2010).
Figure 4.3: The interrelationship of four stabilities
4.4.1 Nash (R)
The standard definition for Nash stability in the graph model is given by Nash (1951):
Definition 4.5: Let i 2 N and s1 2 S. State s1 is Nash stable or rational (R) for DM i if
and only if R+i (s1) =  .
Thus, a state s = (s(1), s(2)) in the hierarchical model is Nash stable for a DM if and
only if no UI can be found for the DM from this state. For CDM, this means no UI can
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be found for CDM from either s(1) in G(1) or s(2) in G(2), while for LDMk there can be no
UI within G(k) from s(k) (k = 1, 2).
Theorems to determine the Nash stable states are discussed for CDM and LDMs sep-
arately. To determine Nash stability for a DM, every state must be examined for whether
there is a UI. A UM for CDM in the hierarchical model may lead to a less preferred state
if this UM includes a local UM to a less preferred state within one local graph. For an
LDM, an analysis is focused only on his or her own local graph. Note that R+C represents
the list of UIs for the CDM in the hierarchical model and R(1)+C the list of UIs in G
(1). R+L1
denotes the list of UIs for LDM1 and R
+
L the list of UIs by the coalition of LDM1 and
LDM2.
Theorem 4.1 (Nash for CDM in G): If s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are Nash stable for CDM
in G(1) and G(2), respectively, then (s(1), s(2)) is Nash stable for CDM in G.
Theorem 4.2 (Nash for LDMs in G): If s(1) 2 S(1) is Nash stable for LDM1 in G(1), then
(s(1), s(2)) is Nash stable for LDM1 in G for any s(2) 2 S(2).
All Nash stable states for LDM2 can be determined analogously by Theorem 4.2. The-
orems 4.1 and 4.2 can be used for determining Nash stability for all DMs in G if the Nash
stable states in each local graph are known.
4.4.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ)
Sequential Stability is analyzed for the CDM and LDMs separately. For CDM, a state in
the basic hierarchical model is sequentially stable if and only if sanctions by LDMs can be
found for each possible UI for CDM. Theorems are proposed to identify the SEQ states
57
in the basic hierarchical model. A combined state is sequentially stable if its component
states are both sequentially stable in the local graph, as demonstrated in Theorem 4.3. If
the combined state is sequentially stable for CDM, the stabilities of its components are
presented in Theorem 4.4 for G(1) > G(2). The SEQ states for LDMs are determined in
Theorem 4.6. Note that the importance relations between two local graphs for CDM are
strict, and are denoted as G(1) > G(2) and G(1) < G(2).
Definition 4.6: Recall that R+C(s) is the set of UIs from state s = (s
(1), s(2)) 2 S for CDM
and that R+L (q) is the set of UIs from state q 2 S for the LDMs as a coalition. State s is
sequentially stable for CDM if and only if, for every state q 2 R+C(s), there exists at least
one state r 2 R+L (q) such that r -C s.
Definition 4.7: Recall that R+L1(s) is the set of UIs for LDM1 from state s 2 S and that
R+C(q) is the set of UIs from state q 2 S for the CDM. The state s is SEQ for LDM1 if
and only if for every state q 2 R+L1(s), there exists at least one state r 2 R+C(q) such that
r -L1 s.
Theorem 4.3 (SEQ for CDM): Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are sequentially
stable for CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively. Then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G.
Theorem 4.3 indicates that a combined state in G is SEQ for CDM if both of its
component states are SEQ in the corresponding local graphs. This theorem does not
require a particular importance relation between the two local graphs. In Theorem 4.3,
sequential stability for both s(1) and s(2) in the component model is a su cient condition
to imply the sequential stability for the combined state (s(1), s(2)).Reversely, if (s(1), s(2)) is
sequentially stable for CDM, the stabilities of its components are investigated in Theorems
4.4 and 4.5. Strict sequential stability for CDM, which occurs in the two theorems, is
58
defined in Remark 1. At a strict SEQ state, CDM is only sanctioned by less preferred
states.
Remark 4.1 (Strict SEQ): Recall that R+C(s) is the set of UIs from state s = (s
(1), s(2)) 2 S
for CDM and that R+L (q) is the set of UIs from state q 2 S for the LDMs as a coalition.
State s is strictly sequentially stable for CDM i↵, for every state q 2 R+C(s), there exists
at least one state r 2 R+L (q) such that r  C s.
Theorem 4.4: Assume G(1) > G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) both s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are SEQ for CDM, or
(2) s(1) 2 S(1) is strictly sequentially stable for CDM in G(1) and, for all q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1))
and q(1) = s(1), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1), where R(1)+,=C (s(1)) is
the set of UMs for CDM from s(1) which are no less preferred to s(1).
A small example makes situation (2) of Theorem 4.4 easy to understand. Suppose
the sets of states in G(1) and G(2) are written as S(1) = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S(2) = {5, 6, 7, 8},
respectively. Let R(1)+C (1) = 3; R
(1)+
L1
(3) = 2 with 2  (1)C 1; R(1)+L1 (1) = 4 with 4  (1)C 1, and
R(2)+C (5) = 6; R
(2)+
L2
(6) = 7 with 7  (2)C 5. We investigate whether state (1, 5) 2 S is SEQ
for CDM in G, where S = S(1)⇥S(2). According to situation (2) of Theorem 4.4, s(1) = 1;
s(2) = 5, then, q(1) can be state 1 or 5.
It can be concluded that state 1 is SEQ for CDM in G(1), while state 5 is not SEQ for
CDM in G(2). All UIs for CDM from state (1, 5) are
(a) (3, 5)
(b) (1, 6)
(c) (3, 6)
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State (1, 5) is SEQ for CDM in G i↵ at least one sanction can be found on each of (a),
(b), and (c). For (a), there exists R+L1(3, 5) = (2, 5), such that (2, 5)  C (1, 5). For (b),
there exists R+L1(1, 6) = (4, 6), such that (4, 6)  C (1, 5) because G(1) > G(2). For (c), there
exists R+L1(3, 6) = (2, 6), such that (2, 6)  C (1, 5) because G(1) > G(2). Then, at least a
sanction can be found for each of (a), (b), and (c). Thus, one can conclude state (1, 5) is
SEQ for CDM in G.
Similarly, Theorem 4.5 is proposed by assuming G(1) < G(2).
Theorem 4.5: Assume G(1) < G(2), if (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) both s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are SEQ for CDM, or
(2) s(2) 2 S(2) is strictly SEQ for the CDM in G(2) and for all q(2) 2 R(2)+,=C (s(2)) and
q(2) = s(2), there exists r(2) 2 R(2)+L2 (q(2)) such that r(2)  (2)C s(2)
The proof of this theorem is analogous to Theorem 4.4. According to Theorems 4.4
and 4.5, (s(1), s(2)) can be sequentially stable for CDM in G if the component state in the
more important local graph is sequentially stable for CDM. If both component states are
sequentially stable in the corresponding local graph for CDM, the combined state is SEQ,
as indicated in Theorem 4.3. If the component state in the less important local graph is
not sequentially stable, (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM provided the conditions in situation (2)
of Theorem 4.4 and 4.5 are satisfied.
The sequential stability for LDMs in the hierarchical graph can be determined by
Theorem 4.6.
Theorem 4.6 (SEQ for LDM1 in G): A state (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for
LDM1 in G i↵ either
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(1) s(1) 2 S(1) is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G(1), or
(2) for every q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)), there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+{C,L2}(q(1), s(2)), such that r(1) -
(1)
L1
s(1).
The SEQ for LDM2 is analogous.
4.4.3 General Metarationality (GMR)
General metarationality (GMR) is a weaker stability than sequential stability (SEQ) in
that a focal DM considers not only UIs by the opponents as possible sanctions but also
their UMs. The focal DM is afraid of being sanctioned by other DMs’ UMs even if these
UMs are less preferred for them. Similar to sequential stability, general metarational states
in G for the CDM and LDMs are identified by Theorems 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9.
Definition 4.8: Recall that R+C(s) is the set of UIs from state s = (s
(1), s(2)) 2 S for CDM
and RL(q) is the set of UMs from state q 2 S for LDMs as a coalition. State s is GMR
for CDM if and only if, for every state q 2 R+C(s), there exists at least one state r 2 RL(q)
such that r -C s.
Definition 4.9: Recall that R+L1(s) is the set of UIs for LDM1 from state s 2 S and RC(q)
is the set of UMs from state q 2 S for the CDM. State s is GMR for LDM1 if and only if
for every state q 2 R+L1(s), there exists at least one state r 2 RC(q) such that r -L1 s.
The GMR stability for LDM2 can be analogously defined.
Similar to Theorem 4.3, GMR can be concluded for CDM in the combined state if both
component states are GMR in the local graphs, as shown in Theorem 4.7.
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Theorem 4.7 (GMR for CDM): Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are GMR for
CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively. Then (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G.
Besides the case mentioned in Theorem 4.7, (s(1), s(2)) can be GMR in other possibilities.
The stabilities of component states in a combined GMR state for CDM are discussed in
Theorems 4.8 and 4.9. Strict GMR that appears in the two theorems is defined in Remark
4.2.
Remark 4.2 (Strict GMR): Recall that R+C(s) is the set of UIs from state s = (s
(1), s(2)) 2
S for CDM and RL(q) is the set of UMs from state q 2 S for LDMs as a coalition. State
s is GMR for CDM if and only if, for every state q 2 R+C(s), there exists at least one state
r 2 RL(q) such that r  C s.
Theorem 4.8 Assume G(1) > G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G i↵ either
(1) both s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are GMR for CDM, or
(2) s(1) 2 S(1) is strictly GMR for the CDM in G(1) and, for all q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1)) and
q(1) = s(1), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1).
Theorem 4.9 is similarly proposed by assuming G(1) < G(2).
Theorem 4.9 Assume G(1) < G(2), if (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) both s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are GMR for CDM, or
(2) s(2) 2 S(2) is strictly GMR for the CDM in G(2) and for all q(2) 2 R(2)+,=C (s(2)) and
q(2) = s(2), there exists r(2) 2 R(2)L2 (q(2)) such that r(2)  (2)C s(2)
The proof of this theorem is analogous to Theorem 4.8.
Similar to sequential stability, (s(1), s(2)) can be GMR for CDM in G if the component
state in the more important local graph is GMR. According to case (2) in Theorems 4.7 and
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4.8, additional sanctions should exist so that (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM if the component
state in the less important local graph is not GMR for CDM.
The general metarationality for LDMs can be examined by Theorem 4.10 indicated
below. Only component states in the LDM’s own local graph need to be investigated.
Theorem 4.10 (GMR for LDM1 in G): Suppose s(1) 2 S(1) is a state in G(1). A state
(s(1), s(2)) 2 S is GMR for LDM1 in G if s(1) is GMR for LDM1 in G(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) is
any state in G(2).
The general metarationality for LDM2 can be determined analogously.
According to Theorem 4.10, general metarationality for a given LDM can be identified
if the component state is GMR for the LDM in its own local graph.
4.4.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR)
Symmetric metarationality is a more restrictive stability reflecting the vision of the focal
DM one step further than general metarationality. In the basic hierarchical model, the
combined states are SMR for CDM if every type of his or her UIs is sanctioned by an
LDM’s UM and also by CDM’s subsequent UM. (s(1), s(2)) is investigated for symmetric
metarationality for CDM based on the relationship between SMR and GMR, as depicted
in Fig. 4.3.
Definition 4.10 Recall that R+C(s) is the set of UIs from state s = (s
(1), s(2)) 2 S for CDM
and RL(q) is the set of UMs from state q 2 S for LDMs as a coalition. State s is SMR for
CDM if and only if, for every state q 2 R+C(s), there exists at least r 2 RL(q) such that
r -C s and t -C s for all t 2 RC(r).
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Definition 4.11 Recall that R+L1(s) is the set of UIs for LDM1 from state s 2 S and
RC(q) is the set of UMs from state q 2 S for CDM. State s is SMR for LDM1 if and only
if for every state q 2 R+L1(s), there exists at least r 2 RC(q) such that r -L1 s and t -L1 s
for all t 2 RL1(r).
If both component states are SMR for CDM in the corresponding local graph, the
symmetric metarationality for CDM is discussed in Theorem 4.11.
Theorem 4.11 (SMR for CDM in G): Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are states
in G(1) and G(2), respectively. Assume that s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is SMR
for CDM in G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G.
One can determine whether (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G using Theorem 4.12 for
G(1) > G(2) and Theorem 4.13 for G(1) < G(2). Strict SMR that occurs in the two theorems
is defined in Remark 4.3.
Remark 4.3 (Strict SMR): Recall that R+C(s) is the set of UIs from state s = (s
(1), s(2)) 2 S
for CDM and RL(q) is the set of UMs from state q 2 S for LDMs as a coalition. State s
is SMR for CDM i↵, for every state q 2 R+C(s), there exist at least r 2 RL(q) such that
r  C s and t  C s for all t 2 RC(q).
Theorem 4.12: Assume G(1) > G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is SMR for CDM in G(2), or
(2) s(1) is strict SMR for CDM in G(1) and, for all for all q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1)) and q(1) = s(1),
there exist r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1) and t(1)  (1)C s(1) for all t(1) 2 R(1)C (r(1)).
According to Theorem 4.12, (s(1), s(2)) can be SMR for CDM in G if it contains a
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component state which is SMR in the more important local graph. The additional condition
is required for s(1) so that (s(1), s(2)) is SMR. Similarly, if (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM and
assume G(1) < G(2), the stabilities of the component states are discussed in Theorem 4.13.
Theorem 4.13: Assume G(1) < G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is SMR for CDM in G(2), or
(2) s(2) is strict SMR for CDM in G(2) and, for all q(2) 2 R(2)+,=C (s(2)) and q(2) = s(2),
there exists r(2) 2 R(2)L2 (q(2)) such that r(2)  (2)C s(2) and t(2)  (2)C s(2) for all t(2) 2 R(2)C (r(2)).
The SMR states for a LDM can be examined by Theorem 4.14 indicated below. Only
states in the local graph where the LDM participates need to be investigated.
Theorem 4.14 (SMR for LDM1 in G): Suppose s(1) 2 S(1) is a state in G(1). A state
(s(1), s(2)) 2 S is SMR for LDM1 in G if s(1) is SMR for LDM1 in G(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) is
any state in G(2).
The symmetric metarationality for LDM2 can be determined analogously.
According to Theorem 4.14, symmetric metarationality for a given LDM can be iden-
tified if the component state is SMR for the LDM in its own local graph.
4.5 Water Diversion Conflicts in China
The basic hierarchical graph model with lexicographic preference is applied to the water
diversion conflicts in China, the same example that was investigated in Chapter 3. In
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Chapter 3, the subconflicts at three locations were investigated. In this section, the water
diversion conflicts have been simplified to contain two subconflicts.
As the eastern project is already complete, only the subconflicts at the central and the
western locations are discussed in this section. Moreover, the example in this section is
analyzed using the basic hierarchical graph model developed in this Chapter.
The preferences in the hierarchical conflict and subconflicts in Chapter 3 have been
determined using the option prioritization method. In comparison, the preferences in
the hierarchical conflict are not required in calculating the stability results. To calculate
these stability results, only the preferences in subconflicts and the relative importance of
local graphs are required. Despite di↵erent assumptions and modelling approaches, some
comparisons can still be made between the case study in Chapter 3 and this section.
As the eastern route is already complete, the conflicts along the remaining central
and western routes need to be properly handled before the implementation of the projects.
Thus, the two subconflicts are modelled in this case study. At each location, China Central
Government (CG) disputes with one DM: local residents (LRs) in the central subconflict,
and neighbouring countries (NCs) in the western subconflict.
At the central location, local residents (LRs) are forced to relocate to make way for
the construction, which ignites their opposition against CG. The western route aims at
transferring water from the upper Yangtze River, situated on the Tibet Plateau, to the
Yellow River Basin. Neighboring countries (NCs) such as India and Bangladesh are protest-
ing against this plan since their water usage will be greatly a↵ected once the project is
constructed.
66
4.5.1 Conflict Modeling
In this hierarchical conflict, disputes on each route are represented by a local graph. CG is
the CDM in the overall conflict, who has one option in each local graph: to fully initiate the
central project and to resume the western project. LRs and NCs are LDMs on the central
and western route, respectively. LRs and NCs could either agree or disagree. Note that
the disagreement is expressed by not selecting the corresponding option, which is opposite
to “agree”.
Table 4.1: DMs, Their Options, and States in the Central Conflict
DM Option
CG 1) Full Central Y Y N N
LRs 3) Agree Y N Y N
1 2 3 4
Table 4.2: DMs, Their Options, and States in the Western Conflict
DM Option
CG 2) Resume Western Y Y N N
NCs 4) Consent Y N Y N
5 6 7 8
These two local graphs in option form are illustrated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The option
form of the overall conflict is shown in Table 4.3. Note that the states in the overall conflict
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Table 4.3: DMs, Their Options, and States in the Overall Conflict
CG 1) Full Central N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
2) Resume Western N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
LRs 3) Agree N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y
NCs 4) Consent N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
(4,8) (2,8) (4,6) (2,6) (3,8) (1,8) (3,6) (1,6) (4,7) (2,7) (4,5) (2,5) (3,7) (1,7) (3,5) (1,5)
Figure 4.4: UMs for CG in the central conflict
can also be expressed in two dimensions. For example, state 1 in the overall conflict can
also be represented as state (4, 8), in which the first entry is state 4 in the central conflict
and the second entry is state 8 in the western conflict.
The unilateral moves for CG in the two individual conflicts and the overall conflict are
shown in Figs. 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. In the central conflict, CG can move between state 1 and
3 by changing its option selection on the central route. Similarly, it can also move between
Figure 4.5: UMs for CG in the western conflict
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Figure 4.6: UMs for CG in the overall conflict
state 2 and 4. The UMs for CG in the overall conflict can take place on both entries of
a state. For example, in Fig. 4.6, CG can either move between state (1, 5) and (1, 7) by
switching its option on the western route, or between (1, 5) and (3, 5) on the central route.
In addition, it can change options on both central and western routes, resulting in moves
between (1, 5) and (3, 7). States in the overall conflict are connected by CG’s UMs, as
depicted in Fig. 4.7. Note that these UMs are reversible.
The stability analyses are carried out in each local graph separately. The preference
for each DM is given by the ranking of states from the most preferred on the left to the
least preferred on the right. In the central conflict, states are ranked as “1   2   3  
4” for CG. The preferences for LRs are “3   4   2   1”. In the western conflict, the
preferences for CG and NCs are “5   7   6   8” and “7   8   6   5”, respectively.
CG’s preferences indicate that it favours the full central plan and reaching an agreement
with LRs on the central route. In the western disputes, CG wishes to see the consent
from NCs. LRs and NCs have the same preferences in each local graph. They would
not stop protesting until CG changes the original plan on each route. The results of four
69
types of stabilities, Nash (R), sequential stability (SEQ), general metarationality (GMR),
and symmetric metarationality (SMR) in the central and western conflicts are presented
in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. According to the interrelationship among the four
stabilities in Fig. 4.3, a Nash rational state is also sequentially stable. For each DM, the
SEQ states are marked in bold if they are also Nash stable. For example in Table 4.4,
states 2 and 3 are Nash stable for LRs. They are automatically sequential stable and are
thus written in bold. Similarly, some GMR and SMR states are also marked in bold in
Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Table 4.4: Stability Results in the Central Conflict
Nash SEQ GMR SMR
CG 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2
LRs 2, 3 2,3, 4 2, 3, 4 2, 3, 4
Table 4.5: Stability Results in the Western Conflict
Nash SEQ GMR SMR
CG 5, 6 5,6, 7 5, 6, 7 5, 6, 7
NCs 6, 7 6,7, 8 6, 7, 8 6, 7, 8
The central and western conflicts can be represented by two local graphs G(1) and G(2).
The stabilities for the overall conflict are obtained by assuming that CG considers the
central route more important than the western, namely G(1) > G(2). Assume s(1), s(2) 2 S
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are two states in G, where sa = (s
(1)
a , s
(2)
a ) and sb = (s
(1)
b , s
(2)
b ). Since G
(1) > G(2) for CG,
CG’s preferences are determined as follows:
(1) sa  CG sb i↵ either s(1)a  (1)CG s(1)b or (s(1)a ⇠(1)CG s(1)b and s(2)a  (2)CG s(2)b );
(2) sa ⇠CG sb i↵ s(1)a ⇠(1)CG s(1)b and s(2)a ⇠(2)CG s(2)b ; and
(3) sa  CG sb i↵ s(1)a  (1)CG s(1)b or (s(1)a ⇠(1)CG s(1)b and s(2)a  (2)CG s(2)b )
As a result, all the states in G can be ranked as (1, )  CG (2, )  CG (3, )  CG
(4, ), where “-” denotes any state in the western conflict.
4.5.2 Stability Analysis
Four types of stabilities, Nash (R), sequential Stability (SEQ), general metarationality
(GMR), and symmetric metarationality (SMR), are identified by the theorems demon-
strated in Chapter 4.4. Acronyms of these theorems are used in the analysis. For example,
Th 4.3 is short for Theorem 4.3 in Table 4.6. Stabilities in the hierarchical graph are
identified using corresponding theorems and illustrated by Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8.
(1) Nash (R)
As indicated in Th 4.1, the combined states in the hierarchical graph are Nash stable
for CDM if both components are Nash stable in the corresponding local graphs. According
to Tables 4.4 and 4.5, the Nash states for CG are states (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5), and (2, 6).
The Nash states are (2, -) and (3, -) for LRs, and (-, 6) and (-, 7) for NCs. The “-” denotes
any state in the corresponding entries. The Nash stable state for all DMs is (2, 6).
(2) Sequential Stability (SEQ)
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Sequential stability is investigated for CG by Ths 4.3 and 4.4. The analysis is demon-
strated in Table 4.6. As G(1) > G(2), the combined states can be SEQ for CDM in G only
if s(1) is SEQ for CDM in G(1). These possibilities are denoted as (s, s) and (s, s), where s
represents the SEQ states for CDM in the corresponding subconflict and s the states that
are not SEQ.
In (s, s), the set of component states in G(1) and G(2) are {1, 2} and {5, 6, 7}, respec-
tively. They are called the candidate sets. Note that Nash states are also included in
“s”, according to the interrelationship between Nash and SEQ depicted in Fig. 4.3. Each
state in the candidate sets is tested for eligibility of being a component SEQ states in the
hierarchical graph, based on corresponding theorems. A “
p
” is marked behind each state
if it is qualified. Otherwise, an “⇥” is shown behind to denote the opposite. A combined
state in the hierarchical graph is sequentially stable if both of its components are marked
with “
p
”s. The last column in Table 4.6 shows the theorems used for this identification.
In situation (s, s), all states in the candidate sets are eligible to constitute combined
sequentially stable states in G for CG. Nash rational states are distinguished with “r”s in
Table 4.6. Thus, states (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5), (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7) are SEQ for CG in G. In
(s, s), states 1 and 2 are candidate states in G(1) and state 8 in G(2), according to case (2)
in Th 4.4. In G(1), only state 1 is eligible because there exists r(1) = {2} for s(1) = {1},
r(1) 2 R(1)+{LRs,NCs}(q(1)), and q(1) 2 R(1)+CG (s(1)). Thus, state (1, 8) is also SEQ for CG in G.
The SEQ states for CG in the overall conflict are states (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5), (2, 6), (1, 7),
(2, 7), and (1, 8). According to Th 4.6, states (2, -), (3, -), and (4, -) are SEQ for LRs and
(-, 6), (-, 7), and (-, 8) for NCs.
(3) General Metarationality (GMR)
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Table 4.6: Identification of SEQ States in the Overall Conflict for CG
Situations Candidate Sets Eligibilities of s(1) and s(1) SEQ States Theorems Used
(s, s) G(1) : {1, 2} {1}: r p (1, 5), (1, 6) Th 4.3
{2}: r p (2, 5), (2, 6)
G(2) : {5, 6, 7} {5}: r p (1, 7), (2, 7)
{6}: r p
{7}: p
(s, s) G(1) : {1, 2} {1}: exist R(1)+LRs (1) = {2}  (1)CG {1}
p
(1, 8) Th 4.4
{2}: R(2)+LRs (2) =   ⇥
G(2) : {8} {8}: p
Similar to SEQ, general metarationality (GMR) in the overall conflict is identified by
theorems from 4.7 to 4.10. A combined state could be GMR for CDM in G only if its
component in G(1) is GMR for CDM. Thus, situations (g, g) and (g, g) are discussed, for
which “g” represents general metarationality and “g” the opposite. As shown in Table 4.7,
state 1 in G(1) and state 8 in G(2) qualify for GMR according to Th 4.8. Thus, state (1,
8) is GMR for CDM in the overall conflict. The GMR states for CG in the overall conflict
are states (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5), (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7), and (1, 8). States (2, -), (3, -), and (4,
-) are also GMR for LRs and (-, 6), (-, 7), and (-, 8) are GMR for NCs, according to Th
4.10.
(4) Symmetric Metarationality (SMR)
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Table 4.7: Identification of GMR States in the Overall Conflict for CG
Situations Candidate Sets Eligibilities of s(1) and s(2) GMR States Theorems Used
(g, g) G(1) : {1, 2} {1}: p (1, 5), (1, 6) Th 4.7
{2}: p (2, 5), (2, 6)
G(2) : {5, 6, 7} {5}: p (1, 7), (2, 7)
{6}: p
{7}: p
(g, g) G(1) : {1, 2} {1}: exist R(1)LRs(1) = {2}  (1)C {1}
p
(1, 8) Th 4.8
{2}: RLRs(2) =   ⇥
G(2) : {8} {8}: p
According to Fig. 4.3, SMR states for CDM in G are also GMR for CDM. Hence, the
GMR states for CG in G are identified for symmetric metarationality. According to Th
4.11, states (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5), (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7) are SMR for CDM in G. According
to Th 4.12, state (1, 8) is investigated for symmetric metarationality for CDM in G. State
1 is tested for whether r(1) and t(1) exist, for t(1) 2 R(1)CG(r(1)), according to case (2) in Th
4.12. As demonstrated in Table 4.8, for s(1) = {1}, there exists r(1) = {2}, which is a
sanction for CG. In addition, R(1)CG(2) = {4} and state 4 is less preferred for CDM. Hence,
state (1, 8) is SMR for CG in G. Note that ( ,  ) in Table 4.8 means the combined states
with two SMR component states, while in ( ,  ), the second component is not SMR for
CG in G(2).
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Table 4.8: Identification of SMR States in the Overall Conflict for CG
Situations Candidate Sets Eligibilities of s(1) and s(2) SMR States Theorems Used
( ,  ) G(1) : {1, 2} {1}: p (1, 5), (1, 6) Th 4.11
{2}: p (2, 5), (2, 6)
G(2) : {5, 6, 7} {5}: p (1, 7), (2, 7)
{6}: p
{7}: p
( ,  ) G(1) : {1, 2} {1}: exist R(1)LRs(1) = {2}  (1)C {1} (1, 8) Th 4.12
and {4}  (1)CG {1} for R(1)CG(2) = {4}
p
G(2) : {8} {8}: p
As a result, the symmetric metarational states in the overall conflict for CG are (1, 5),
(1, 6), (2, 5), (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7), and (1, 8). States (2, -), (3, -), and (4, -) are symmetric
metarational for LRs and (-, 6), (-, 7), and (-, 8) for NCs, according to Theorem 4.14.
4.5.3 Outcome Interpretation
The stability results of four types of stabilities for all DMs in the overall conflict are listed
in Table 4.9. The SEQ, GMR, and SMR states for CG are the same. The rational state for
all DMs is (2, 6). States (2, 6) and (2, 7) are SEQ, GMR, and SMR for all DMs. Among
them, state (2, 7) is the status quo state, which indicates the start of the conflict. State (2,
6) can be reached from the starting state by DMs’ UIs. Therefore, it could theoretically
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occur.
Table 4.9: Stability Results in the Overall Conflict
Nash SEQ GMR SMR
CG (1, 5), (1, 6) (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5) (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5) (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5)
(2, 5), (2, 6) (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7) (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7) (2, 6), (1, 7), (2, 7)
(1, 8) (1, 8) (1, 8)
LRs (2, -), (3, -) (2, -), (3, -), (4, -) (2, -), (3, -), (4, -) (2, -), (3, -), (4, -)
NCs (-, 6), (-, 7) (-, 6), (-, 7), (-, 8) (-, 6), (-, 7), (-, 8) (-, 6), (-, 7), (-, 8)
Overall (2, 6) (2, 6), (2, 7) (2, 6), (2, 7) (2, 6), (2, 7)
State (2, 7), which is sequentially stable for all DMs, is historically recorded (The-
Economic-Times, 2012; The-Hindu, 2013). CG can be assertive in initiating the central
project while compromising with NCs on the western route. The counteractions from LRs
cannot stop the implementation of the central project. This state is stable for all DMs due
to their fears of potential sanctions. LRs cannot move to a better outcome from state 2
according to Table 4.4 and state 7 is the best outcome for NCs indicated in Table 4.5. CG
will not move away from state 7 to 5 although the latter one is more preferred, because
state 7 is sequentially stable. Although state (2, 6) can be reached from (2, 7), it could
not occur unless CG is short-sighted. If CG is tempted to take advantage of its UI to state
5, NCs will in response levy a sanction by protesting. This will result in state 6 on the
western route, which is the first equilibrium (2, 6). No DM can improve from this state on
the western route and this state is less preferred by both CG and NCs. This justifies CG’s
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current decision of suspending the western project. Therefore, the only possible resolution
for all DMs is state (2, 7), in which CG fully initiates the central project and suspends
the western project. The rational strategy for LRs is to oppose, while it is wise for NCs to
consent with CG.
4.5.4 Comparison of the Two Case Studies in Chapter 3 and
Section 4.5
The water diversion conflicts in China discussed in Chapter 3 have been analyzed using the
basic hierarchical graph model methodology in this section. There are several di↵erences
between the case studies in Chapter 3 and Section 4.5. Firstly, the hierarchical conflict
in Chapter 3 contains subconflicts at three locations, while only the central and western
subconflicts are considered in Section 4.5. Secondly, the water diversion conflicts in Chapter
3 are investigated using classical GMCR methodology. In Section 4.5, the hierarchical
conflicts are modelled by a basic hierarchical graph. The stability results are concluded by
stabilities in subconflicts. Moreover, the central conflict in Chapter 3 contains three DMs,
while only two DMs, CG and LRs, are included in Section 4.5.
The stability results obtained by the two modelling approaches are also di↵erent. In
Chapter 3, the equilibria in the hierarchical conflict indicate that CG will insist on building
the eastern project while compromising at the central and western locations. This outcome
is caused by CG’s priority on the eastern project. Although relative importance of local
graphs is not defined in Chapter 3, the preference statements regarding the eastern project
are placed on the top of Table 3.2, indicating that the eastern project is the most important
for CG. In Section 4.5, as the eastern project is complete, CG considers the central project
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more important, which results in the equilibria in Section 4.5. The equilibrium state, state
(2, 7), suggests that CG will initiate the central project and suspend the western project.
Therefore, the lead-in example in Chapter 3 is a complete version of the water diversion
conflicts by assuming the eastern project is the most important for CG. The change of
CG’s priority from the eastern to the central location results in di↵erent stability results.
The conflicts at three locations in Chapter 3 can be considered as the conflicts at an earlier
stage, while the conflicts modelled in Section 4.5 take place after the eastern project is
complete. The central government then transfers its attention from the eastern to the
central project.
4.6 Summary
A basic hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution is constructed to handle complex
conflicts containing two subconflicts with a common decision maker in both subconflicts.
Preference relations in this hierarchical model are defined in lexicographic order. The
relation between the stabilities in the basic hierarchical graph model and stabilities in the
local graph models is investigated. Theorems for each type of stability are proposed to
reveal this relation. The stabilities in the basic hierarchical model can be obtained using
these theorems and stability results in the local graph models.
The resolution obtained in the water diversion conflicts in China indicate that the Chi-
nese Central Government should consider both smaller conflicts and prioritize the central
route to achieve a desired outcome. As illustrated in this example, the identification of
stability results does not require calculation executed on each state in the basic hierarchical
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graph. Therefore, the simplicity of the calculation in the basic hierarchical model can be
preserved when more than one conflict in this model is investigated.
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Chapter 5
Basic Hierarchical Graph Model in
Matrix Form with Weighted
Preference
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a basic hierarchical graph model with weighted preference is developed.
Weighted preference is a preference structure that is more general than the lexicographic
preference. The basic hierarchical graph model is represented by matrices to facilitate the
calculation for stability results. Theorems reveal the relationship between the stability
results in matrix form in the hierarchical graph and in each local graph. Algorithms are
designed to capitalize on these relationships in the calculation of stability. The same
example as in Chapters 3 and 4, water diversion conflicts in China, is investigated in this
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chapter to show the e↵ectiveness of the newly designed algorithms and the connection
between the new methodology in this chapter and the basic hierarchical model in Chapter
4. The weighted hierarchical graph model improves the modeling of hierarchical conflicts
by providing more flexibility in describing the preference of CDM.
5.2 Formal Definition
As defined in Chapter 4, a hierarchical graph model for a strategic conflict contains smaller
graph models, called local graph models. These local models feature one or more common
DMs (CDMs) who appear in each of the local graphs. Local DMs (LDMs) appear only in
one local graph. A basic hierarchical graph model has been constructed in Definition 4.1.
A basic hierarchical graph model contains two smaller graph models with only one CDM.
5.2.1 Weighted Preference
If all the features of the two local graphs are known, the preference relations for LDMs
in the basic hierarchical graph model can be determined. A new preference structure,
called weighted preference, is constructed in this chapter. Di↵erent from the lexicographic
preference, the relative importance of local graphs for CDM is represented by weight.
Weighted preference is a more general way of describing preferences in basic hierarchical
graph model.
The preference structure for CDM can be obtained as follows:
Suppose two states sa, sb 2 S in a basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1)
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and G(2), where sa = (s
(1)
a , s
(2)
a ) and sb = (s
(1)
b , s
(2)
b ). The preferences for CDM in each local
graph can be depicted by the option prioritization method (Fang et al., 2003a;b).
Let {⌦(k)1 ,⌦(k)2 , ...,⌦(k)hk } be the set of preference statements in G(k), k = 1, 2. In local
graph G(k) (k = 1, 2), a score  (k)jk (s
(k)
a ) is assigned to state s
(k)
a according to its true values
when the statements are applied (Peng et al., 1997), 0 < jk < hk. Then,
 (k)jk (s
(k)
a ) =
8<: 2hk jk if ⌦
(k)
jk
(s(k)a ) = T
0 otherwise
(5.1)
and
 (k)(s(k)a ) =
hkX
jk=1
 (k)jk (s
(k)
a ) (5.2)
The importance of each local graph for CDM is denoted by a weight w(k) (w(k) > 0).
Thus, the score for state sa in G is defined as:
 (sa) =  
(1)(s(1)a )w
(1) + (2)(s(2)a )w
(2) (5.3)
The score on sb for CDM can be similarly obtained as  (sb). Then, sa and sb can be
compared:
sa   sb if  (sa) >  (sb);
sa   sb if  (sa) <  (sb);
sa ⇠ sb if  (sa) =  (sb).
82
5.2.2 Connection with Lexicographic Preference
The connection between the weighted preference and lexicographic preference is investi-
gated. Lexicographic preference is a special case of weighted preference. Their connections
are indicated in Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1: Suppose that ⌦(k)C = {⌦(k)C1, ...,⌦(k)Cjk , ...,⌦
(k)
Chk
} (k = 1, 2; jk = 1, ..., hk)
is the set of preference statements for CDM in G(k), and ⌦C = {⌦C1, ...,⌦Cj, ...,⌦Ch}
(j = 1, ..., h) is the set of preference statements for CDM in G, with ⌦Cj = ⌦
(k)
Cjk
, and state
s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S for s(k) 2 S(k), for the weighted preference,
 (s) =  (1)(s(1))w(1) + (2)(s(2))w(2) (5.4)
Then, lexicographic preference is a special case of weighted preference for
(1) If w(1) > w(2),
w(1) = 2h2 and w(2) = 1;
(2) If w(1) < w(2),
w(2) = 2h1 and w(1) = 1.
Note that w(1) 6= w(2), because equal importance is not considered in the lexicographic
preference. The weight w(k) can be further normalized as |w(k)|, where |w(k)| = w(k)
w(1)+w(2)
and |w(1)| + |w(2)| = 1. For sa, sb 2 S, the relation between  C(sa) and  C(sb) does not
change when substituting w(k) with |w(k)|. Thus, to facilitate the calculation for stabilities,
simply let
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 (s) =  (1)(s(1))|w(1)|+ (2)(s(2))|w(2)|. (5.5)
5.2.3 Reachable Matrix
Matrix representation is an e↵ective way of describing graph models and calculating sta-
bility results (Xu et al., 2007; 2009a). The weighted basic hierarchical graph model is
represented by matrices to facilitate the calculation for stabilities. The reachable matrix
is constructed to denote the reachable list for a given DM in the hierarchical model. The
reachable matrix for CDM in the hierarchical model is a Tensor product of the reachable
matrices in the two local graphs.
Theorem 5.2: Suppose J (1)C is the m ⇥ m reachable matrix for CDM in G(1) and J (2)C
the n⇥ n reachable matrix for CDM in G(2), In is an identity matrix of n scale, then the
mn⇥mn hierarchical reachable matrix for CDM JC in G is written as:
JC = J
(1)
C
N
R J
(2)
C
=
0BBB@
J (1)C (1, 1)⌦r J (2)C ... J (1)C (1,m)⌦r J (2)C
...
. . .
...
J (1)C (m, 1)⌦r J (2)C ... J (1)C (m,m)⌦r J (2)C
1CCCA (5.6)
where J (1)C (s
(1), q(1)) is an entry in J (1)C (s
(1), q(1) = 1, ..., m) and
J (1)C (s
(1), q(1))⌦r J (2)C
=
8<: J
(2)
C s
(1) = q(1)
J (1)C (s
(1), q(1))(In + J
(2)
C ) s
(1) 6= q(1)
(5.7)
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The reachable matrix for an LDM in the hierarchical graph is the Kronecker Product
of the reachable matrix in the local graph and an identity matrix.
Theorem 5.3: Suppose that states s, q 2 S are two states in G where s = (s(1), s(2))
and q = (q(1), q(2)) (s(1), q(1) = 1, ..., m; s(2), q(2) = 1, ..., n). Let J (1)L1 denote the m ⇥m
reachable matrix for LDM1 in G(1) and J
(2)
L2
the n⇥n reachable matrix for LDM2 in G(2),
Im and In represent identity matrices of m and n scales, respectively, and
N
mean the
Kronecker Product of two matrices. Then the mn ⇥ mn hierarchical reachable matrices
JL1 and JL2 for LDM1 and LDM2 are expressed as
JL1 = J
(1)
L1
O
In =
0BBB@
J (1)L1 (1, 1)In ... J
(1)
L1
(1,m)In
...
. . .
...
J (1)L1 (m, 1)In ... J
(1)
L1
(m,m)In
1CCCA (5.8)
JL2 = Im
O
J (2)L2 =
0BBB@
J (2)L2
. . .
J (2)L2
1CCCA (5.9)
The proof of Theorem 5.3 is analogous to Theorem 5.2.
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5.2.4 UI Matrix
The UIs for DMs are also expressed in matrix form. In particular, suppose s, q 2 S for
s = (s(1), s(2)) and (q(1), q(2)). The entries for CDM in the UI matrix J+C can be written as
J+C (s, q) =
8<: 1 s  C q0 other. (5.10)
The entries for LDMs in their UI matrices JL1 and JL2 can be expressed as
JL1(s, q) =
8<: 1 s(1)  
(1)
L1
q(1) and s(2) = q(2)
0 other
and
JL2(s, q) =
8<: 1 s(2)  
(2)
L2
q(2) and s(1) = q(1)
0 other
(5.11)
5.2.5 Joint Movement and Improvement Matrices
The joint movement and improvement matrices have been constructed by Xu et al. (2009a)
to represent joint movements and joint improvements. The joint movement and improve-
ment matrices have been introduced in Chapter 2. For example, the joint movement and
improvement for LDMs in the hierarchical model can be expressed as:
ML =
 _
t=1
_
L
M<t>L (5.12)
where L = {L1, L2} and
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M+L =
 0_
t=1
_
L
M<t,+>L (5.13)
where
8<: M<t>L1 = sign(JL1 ·M<t 1>L2 )M<t>L2 = sign(JL2 ·M<t 1>L1 )
and 8<: M
<t,+>
L1
= sign(JL1 ·M<t 1,+>L2 )
M<t,+>L2 = sign(JL2 ·M<t 1,+>L1 )
The joint movement and improvement matrices for CDM and LDM1 and for CDM and
LDM2 can be obtained analogously.
5.3 Stability Definitions
The matrix form of stability definitions in a basic hierarchical graph model can be rewritten
based on the definitions proposed by Xu et al (2009a). Note that E is a matrix with the
same size as J+C and all of its entries are 1.
(1) Nash Stability (R)
In a basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and G(2), a state s 2 S is Nash
stable for CDM i↵ eTs · J+C = 0T , where T denotes the transpose of matrix. The state s is
Nash stable for LDM1 i↵ eTs · JL1 = 0T .
(2) Sequential Stability (SEQ)
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A state s 2 S in G is sequentially stable for CDM i↵ MSEQC (s, s) = 0, where
MSEQC = J
+
C ·{E sign[M+L ·(P ,=C )T ]}, andM+L is the joint improvement matrix by LDMs.
State s is sequentially stable for LDM1 i↵ M
SEQ
L1
(s, s) = 0, where
MSEQL1 = JL1 · {E   sign[M+N L1 · (P ,=C )T ]} and M+N L1 is the joint improvement matrix
by CDM and LDM2.
(3) General Metarationality (GMR)
A state s 2 S in G is general metarational for CDM i↵ MGMRC (s, s) = 0, where
MGMRC = J
+
C · {E   sign[ML · (P ,=C )T ]}, and ML is the joint movement matrix by LDMs.
State s is general metarational for LDM1 i↵ MGMRL1 (s, s) = 0, where
MGMRL1 = JL1 · {E   sign[(MN L1 · (P ,=C )T ]} and MN L1 is the joint movement matrix by
CDM and LDM2.
(4) Symmetric Metarationality (SMR)
A state s 2 S in G is symmetric metarational for CDM i↵ MSMRC (s, s) = 0, where
MSMRC = J
+
C · [E   sign(ML ·WC)], and WC = (P ,=C )T   [E   sign(JC · (P+C )T )] and   is
the Hadamard Product of the two matrices.
State s is symmetric metarational for LDM1 i↵ MSMRL1 (s, s) = 0, where
MSMRL1 = J
+
L1
· [E   sign(MN L1 ·WL1)], and WL1 = (P ,=L1 )T   [E   sign(JL1 · (PL1)T )].
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5.4 Interrelationship Between Stabilities in the Hier-
archical Graph and the Local Graphs
The four types of solution concepts for DMs in matrix form in the hierarchical model are
linked with those in each local model. The interrelationship between the stabilities in the
hierarchical model and the local models is investigated in theorems. Di↵erent from the the-
orems in Chapter 4, they are presented and proven in matrix form. Representative proofs
of some theorems are provided in Appendices. The algorithms for calculating stabilities in
the hierarchical graph model are designed based on these theorems. Note that the vectors
appeared in this thesis are written in bold.
5.4.1 Nash Stability (R)
Theorem 5.4: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and G(2),
a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is Nash stable for CDM in G i↵ s(k) (k = 1, 2) is Nash stable
for CDM in G(k).
Theorem 5.5 (Nash for LDM): In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting
of G(1) and G(2), a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is Nash rational for LDM1 in G i↵ s(1) is Nash
rational for LDM1 in G(1).
Theorem 5.5 indicates that a state in a hierarchical graph model is Nash stable for a
LDM if and only if the component state is Nash stable for the LDM in the local graph in
which it participates.
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5.4.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ)
Theorem 5.6: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and
G(2), a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G if s(k) (k = 1, 2) is
sequentially stable for CDM in G(k).
Theorem 5.7: Suppose G is a weighted basic hierarchical graph model consisting of G(1)
and G(2), if a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G, then
(1) s(k) is sequentially stable for CDM in G(k) for both k = 1 and 2, or
(2) when s(k) is not sequentially stable for CDM in G(k) (k = 1 or 2, but not both), there
exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 S, such that  (r)   (s), where state r 2 S corresponds to the
entries in vector r:
r = r(1) ⇥ r(2)   eq(1) ⇥ eq(2) , for ⇥ symbolizes Cartesian Product;
r(1) = (J (1)+L1 )
T · eq(1) + eq(1) and r(2) = (J (2)+L2 )T · eq(2) + eq(2) for all (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s);
eq(k) is a 0-1 vector with the q
(k)th entry being 1 and others 0.
State r(1) can be either a UI for LDM1 from q(1), referred to as entries in (J
(1)+
L1
)T ·eq(1) ,
or just q(1), written as entries in eq(2) .
A small example makes Theorem 5.7 easier to understand. Let the sets of state in G(1)
and G(2) written as S(1) = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S(2) = {5, 6, 7, 8}, respectively. Suppose
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J (1)+C =
1 2 3 40BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 0
J (2)+C =
5 6 7 80BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
5 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
and
J (1)+L1 =
1 2 3 40BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
J (2)+L2 =
5 6 7 80BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
5 0 0 1 0
6 0 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
We analyze when state 1 is not SEQ for CDM in G(1), whether state (1, 5) is SEQ for CDM
in G.
As can be seen from J (1)+C and J
(2)+
C , (q
(1), q(2)) can be written as
(a) (q(1), q(2)) = (2, 6);
(b) (q(1), q(2)) = (2, 5);
(c) (q(1), q(2)) = (1, 6), where (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+(s(1), s(2)), s(1) 2 S(1), and s(2) 2 S(2).
Then q(1) = 1 or 2; q(2) = 5 or 6. Thus, eq(1) = (1 0 0 0)
T or (0 1 0 0)T ;
eq(2) = (1 0 0 0)
T or (0 1 0 0)T .
For (a), eq(1) = (0 1 0 0)
T and eq(2) = (0 1 0 0)
T . Note that state 6 is actually
the second entry of eq(2) .
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One can calculate (J (1)+L1 )
T ·eq(1) = (0 0 1 0)T , which is the transpose of the second
row of J (1)+L1 . Then, r
(1) = (0 1 1 0)T . Analogously, r(2) = (0 1 0 1)T . Then, the
non-zero entries in r correspond to states (2, 8), (3, 6), (3, 8). Thus, state (1, 5) is SEQ
for CDM if it is more preferred to at least one of the three states.
Analogously for (b) and (c), state (1, 5) can also be SEQ for CDM in G.
Sequential stability for CDM in G is also a↵ected by the weights of local graphs. The
relation between the weights and sequential stability for CDM is indicated by Corollary
5.1.
Corollary 5.1: State (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G i↵ |w(k)| 2 (↵,  )
for either ↵ = 0 or   = 1.
According to the corollary, a state is SEQ for CDM in G if and only if each weight wk
(k = 1,2) ranges from either side of the interval (0, 1), i.e., the range of |w(k)| should be
either (0,  ) or (↵, 1).
The stabilities for LDMs are investigated in Theorem 5.8.
Theorem 5.8: Suppose there exists a weighted basic hierarchical graph modelG consisting
of G(1) and G(2), and the number of states in G(1) is |S(1)| = m and |S(2)| = n in G(2). If a
state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G, then
(1) s(1) is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G(1) or
(2) s(1) is general metarational for LDM1 in G(1),
eT
s(2)
· J (2)+C 6= 0 and eTs(2) ·M
(2)+
{C,L2} 6= 0
where M (2)+{C,L2} is the joint improvement matrix for CDM and LDM2 in G
(2) and eT
s(2)
is
the vector with s(2)
th
element 1 and others 0, and
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9r 2 S, such that  (r) >  (q) for CDM and the rth element in 0-1 vector r is 1,
where r =
⇣
eT
q(1)
· J (1)C
⌘
⇥
⇣
eT
s(2)
·M (2)+{C,L2}
⌘
6= 0 8q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)), and q = (q(1), s(2)).
5.4.3 General Metarationality (GMR)
Theorem 5.9: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and G(2),
a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is general metarational for CDM in G if s(k) (k = 1, 2) is general
metarational for CDM in G(k).
Theorem 5.10: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and
G(2), if a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is general metarational for CDM in G, then
(1) s(k) is general metarational for CDM in G(k) for both k = 1 and 2, or
(2) if s(k) is not general metarational for CDM in G(k) (k = 1 or 2, but not both), there
exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 S, such that  (r)   (s), where state r 2 S corresponds to entries
in vector r:
r = r(1) ⇥ r(2)   eq(1) ⇥ eq(2) ;
r(1) = (J (1)L1 )
T · eq(1) + eq(1) and r(2) = (J (2)L2 )T · eq(2) + eq(2) for all (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s);
eq(k) is a 0-1 vector with the q
(k)th entry being 1 and others 0.
Theorem 5.11: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and
G(2), a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is general metarational for LDM1 in G, i↵ s(1) 2 S(1) is
general metarational for LDM1 in G(1).
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As suggested in Theorem 5.11, a state is GMR for an LDM in G if and only if the
component state in its local graph is GMR.
5.4.4 Sequential Metarationality (SMR)
Theorem 5.12 (SMR): In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1)
and G(2), a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is symmetric metarational for CDM in G if s(k) (k =
1, 2) is symmetric metarational for CDM in G(k).
Theorem 5.13: Suppose G is a weighted basic hierarchical graph model consisting of G(1)
and G(2), if a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is symmetric metarational for CDM in G, then
(1) s(k) is symmetric metarational for CDM in G(k) for both k = 1 and 2, or
(2) if s(k) is not symmetric metarational for CDM in G(k) (k = 1, 2, but not both),
there exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 S, such that  (r)   (s) and  (t)   (s) for all t =
(t(1), t(2)) 2 S, where r, t correspond to vectors r and t, respectively:
t = t(1) ⇥ t(2)   er(1) ⇥ er(2) ;
t(1) = (J (1)C )
T · er(1) + er(1) and t(2) = (J (2)C )T · er(2) + er(2) for er(k) (k = 1, 2) represents a
0-1 vector with r(k)
th
entry being 1 and others 0;
r = r(1) ⇥ r(2)   eq(1) ⇥ eq(2) ;
r(1) = (J (1)L1 )
T · eq(1) + eq(1) and r(2) = (J (2)L2 )T · eq(2) + eq(2) for all (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s).
Note that er(k) is di↵erent from r
(k). The entries in er(1) refer to state r
(1), which is
the component of (r(1), r(2)). Vector r(1) contains not only state r(1), but also state q(1).
Thus, r(1) can be written as r(1) = er(1) + eq(1) . In other words, er(1) = (J
(1)
L1
)T · eq(1) .
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Theorem 5.14: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and
G(2), a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is symmetric metarational for LDM1 in G i↵ s(1) 2 S(1) is
symmetric metarational for LDM1 in G(1).
Theorems 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 are analogous to the Theorems 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11,
respectively.
5.5 Algorithms for Calculating Stability
The algorithms for calculating stability results in the hierarchical model are designed ac-
cording to the theorems demonstrated in Section 5.4. Each algorithm is described in steps.
5.5.1 Nash Stability (R)
According to Theorem 5.4, a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is Nash stable for CDM in G if and
only if s(k) 2 S(k) is Nash stable for CDM in G(k) (k = 1, 2). As demonstrated in Theorem
5.5, state s is Nash stable for LDMk in G(k) if and only if s(k) is Nash stable for LDMk in
G(k).
5.5.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ)
The sequential stable (SEQ) states in the hierarchical graph model can be calculated
according to Theorems 5.6 and 5.7. The algorithm for this calculation for CDM is shown
in Fig. 5.1. The detailed steps for the calculation are shown as follows.
Step 1: For (s(1), s(2)) 2 S, if s(k) is SEQ for CDM for both k = 1 and 2,
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Figure 5.1: Algorithm to determine SEQ states for CDM in G
then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G according to Theorem 5.6; otherwise go to step 2.
Step 2: Calculate r; if the non-zero element r in r satisfies  (r)   (s),
then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G according to Theorem 5.7.
The algorithm to determine sequential stability (SEQ) for LDM1 in the hierarchical
model can be depicted in Fig. 5.2. The procedure for this calculation is demonstrated as:
Step 1: For (s(1), s(2)) 2 S, if s(1) is GMR for LDM1 for G(1),
then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for LDM1 in G according to Theorem 5.8; otherwise go to step 2.
Step 2: If s(1) is GMR for LDM1 in G(1) and s(2) satisfies eTs(2) · J
(2)+
C 6= 0 and eTs(2) ·
M (2)+{C,L2} 6= 0 according to Theorem 5.8,
then go to step 3.
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Figure 5.2: Algorithm to determine SEQ states for LDM1 in G
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Figure 5.3: Algorithm to determine GMR states for CDM in G
Step 3: Calculate r; if there exists non-zero element r in r such that  (r) >  (q),
then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for LDM1 in G.
5.5.3 General Metarationality (GMR)
The GMR states for CDM in the hierarchical model can be determined analogously to
calculating SEQ for CDM. The algorithm is shown in Fig. 5.3.
According to Theorem 5.11, (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for LDMk in G if and only if s(k) is
GMR for LDMk in G(k).
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5.5.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR)
SMR states for CDM in the hierarchical model can be determined according to Theorems
5.12 and 5.13. As depicted in Fig. 5.4, the calculation is described in the following steps.
Step 1: For (s(1), s(2)) 2 S, if s(k) is SMR for CDM for both k = 1 and 2,
then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G according to Theorem 5.12; otherwise go to step 2.
Step 2: Calculate r, if  (r)   (s),
then go to step 3.
Step 3: Calculate t; if  (t)   (s) for all t 2 R+C(r),
then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G according to Theorem 5.13.
According to Theorem 5.14, the SMR states for LDMs can be calculated analogously
to obtaining GMR states for LDMs.
5.6 Reinvestigation of Water Diversion Conflicts in
China
The water diversion conflicts in China are reinvestigated to show the e↵ectiveness of the
basic hierarchical graph model using weighted preference in calculating stabilities. The
DMs, options, and preferences in each subconflict are the same as those in Chapter 4. The
preferences in the overall conflict are expressed in the weighted structure. The calculation
for stabilities in the overall conflict is carried out using matrices.
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Figure 5.4: Algorithm to determine SMR states for CDM in G
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The DMs, options, and states in the water diversion conflict have been shown in Tables
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
The preferences for DMs in the local graphs are consistent with those in Section 4.5.
These preferences are represented here using the option prioritization method, listed in
Table 5.1. In G(1), preference statements for CG are written in the left column. Option
1) is the first statement for CG, which means that the original construction plan at the
central location is the most important issue for CG. The next preference statement, option
3), is written below option 1), which denotes that the agreement from LRs has the second
importance for CG. According to Equation (5.1), the scores for the two statements are
22 1 and 22 2, respectively. As a state in G can be written as a selection of options, each
state is investigated for whether the option selection matches a given preference statement.
In the third column, a true value is assigned at each state for each preference statement.
For example, state 2 in G can be expressed as “YN”. Because option 1) is selected and
option 3) is not, the truth value of state 2 is “T” on option 1) and “F” on option 3).
According to Equation (5.1), the score for each state is aggregated. For state 2, the score
is 1 · 21 + 0 · 20 = 2. Thus, the scores for states 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 3, 2, 1, 0. The four
states can be ranked according to the scores from state 1, the most preferred, to state 4,
the least preferred. This ranking is also consistent with the preferences for CG expressed
by the UI matrix. Note that all state numbers are in bold. The preferences for CG in G(2)
can be analyzed analogously.
The UI matrices for DMs in the local graphs are shown as J (1)+CG , J
(2)+
CG , J
(1)+
L1
, and J (2)+L2 .
Note that all moves are assumed reversible for each DM.
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J (1)+CG =
1 2 3 40BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0
4 0 1 0 0
J (2)+CG =
5 6 7 80BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 0
8 0 1 0 0
J (1)+L1 =
1 2 3 40BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 1 0
J (2)+L2 =
5 6 7 80BBBBBB@
1CCCCCCA
5 0 1 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 1 0
The stability results in the local graphs can be seen in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The stability
results in the hierarchical conflict are calculated using the algorithms introduced in Section
5.5. Taking SEQ for CDM as an example, as shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, states 1 and
2 are SEQ for CG in G(1) and states 5, 6, and 7 are SEQ for CG in G(2). According to
Theorem 5.6, states (1, 5), (1, 6), (2, 5), (2, 6), (1, 7), and (2, 7) are SEQ for CG in the
hierarchical conflict.
To determine the rest of the SEQ states for CDM in G, states 3 and 4 in G(1) and
state 8 in G(2) are investigated according to Fig. 5.1. For example, let s(1) = 1 and
s(2) = 8; then q(1) = 1 and q(2) = 6, which can be written as eq(1) = (1 0 0 0)
T
and eq(2) = (0 1 0 0)
T . Then, r(1) = (1 1 0 0)T , and r(2) = (0 1 0 1)T .
In r, the non-zero elements correspond to states (1, 8), (2, 6), and (2, 8). Since CG
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considers the central subconflict more important, the weights for the two subconflicts are
assumed as |w(1)| = 0.9 and |w(2)| = 0.1. According to Equation (5.5) and Table 5.1,
 (s) = 3 · 0.9 + 0 · 0.1 = 2.7. When r = (2, 6),  (r) = 2 · 0.9 + 1 · 0.1 = 1.9. Thus,
 (r) <  (s) for s = (1, 8) and r = (2, 6). Then state (1, 8) is an SEQ state for CG in G.
Other stable states in G can be determined analogously. The stability results calculated
in this chapter are the same as those in Table 4.9.
The weighted preference is more flexible for expressing CDM’s assessment on the im-
portance of each local graph. The stability results for CG can change according to di↵erent
value of weights assigned to the local graphs. To carry out further analysis, these stability
results with a complete range of |w(1)| in the water diversion conflicts are investigated.
According to Theorem 5.4, Nash states for CG are not a↵ected by the weights for the
local graphs. The SEQ and GMR states for CG with di↵erent normalized weights are
shown in Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6. The relationship between SMR and |w(1)| for CG are the
same with that between GMR and |w(1)| shown in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.5: SEQ states for CDM in the hierarchical graph changed with normalized weights
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Table 5.1: Preferences for CG in Two Subconflicts Obtained by Option Prioritization
Method
G(1)
Preference Score of States
Statements Each Statement 1 2 3 4
1) 21 T T F F
3) 20 T F T F
Score of Each State 3 2 1 0
Ranking of States 1 2 3 4
G(2)
Preference Score of States
Statements Each Statement 5 6 7 8
4) 21 T F T F
2) 20 T T F F
Score of Each State 3 1 2 0
Ranking of States 5 7 6 8
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Figure 5.6: GMR and SMR states for CDM in the hierarchical graph changed with nor-
malized weights
In Fig. 5.6, the horizontal axis denotes the value of |w(1)| ranging from 1 to 0. The 16
states in the overall conflict are listed in the vertical axis. Each bar represents the range
of |w(1)| within which the corresponding state is SEQ for CDM. For example, state (4, 5)
is SEQ for CDM when |w(1)| 2 (0, 1/3]. Note that the left end of the bar is round and the
right end is flat, since |w(1)| can equal 1/3 but never reach 0.
According to Fig. 5.6, states (1, 5), (1, 6), (1, 7), (2, 5), (2, 6), (2, 7) are sequentially
stable for CG regardless of the change of |w(1)|. State (1, 8) is SEQ for CG when |w(1)| is
no less than 0.5. States (3, 5) and (4, 5) are SEQ for CG if |w(1)| is no larger than 0.5 and
1/3, respectively. Taking state (1, 8) as an example, CG’s UI is sanctioned by a LRs’ UI if
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CG considers the central project more important, which means |w(1)| 2 [0.5, 1). Thus, the
counteraction from LRs will be highly valued. As |w(1)| is below 0.5, the central project
will be less important. This countermove from LRs would fail to sanction CG when CG
has a view of both central and western projects.
The sequentially stable states for LDMs in the hierarchical conflict are the same when
the weights for local graphs are changed. For LRs, states (2, -), (3, -), (4, -) are SEQ since
the corresponding component states 2, 3, and 4 are SEQ. Although the states can be SEQ
for REs when the corresponding component states are not SEQ, no SEQ state is found
among states (1, -) in this example.
The results calculated in the weighted hierarchical graph model indicate resolution for
DMs in this conflict. Equilibrium (2, 7) suggests that the project at the central location can
be successfully constructed despite opposition from LRs. CG will suspend the construction
plan at the western project to appease NCs. For CG, the central projects should be
constructed first. Although the dissatisfaction from LRs cannot a↵ect the course of the
construction, more action plans are advised to better accommodate LRs after relocation.
As the western project is likely to cause transboundary disputes, CG should fully negotiate
with NCs before resuming the project. As LRs do not have much impact in this conflict,
they can still express their concerns by communicating with local governments. According
to Figs. 5 and 6, the results of this conflict may change if CG adjusts the importance of each
local graph. Therefore, CG can be provided with a wide range of resolutions depending on
which outcome it desires to achieve.
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5.7 Comparison of Weighted Hierarchical GraphModel
and Former Methodologies
The advantage of the weighted hierarchical graph model is explained by comparing it with
the basic hierarchical model with lexicographical preferences in Chapter 4. The weighted
hierarchical graph model has a more flexible preference structure compared with the ba-
sic hierarchical graph model with lexicographic preferences. The lexicographic preference
structure is a crisp approach of determining preference relations for CDM. A local graph
can be either more important, less important, or equally important than the other local
graph. In the weighted preference structure, the relative importance between the two local
graphs is expressed by numbers between 0 and 1. Thus, such importance can be described
more flexibly.
The calculation for stabilities in the weighted hierarchical graph model is also more ef-
fective than the former calculation method. The stabilities in the basic hierarchical model
with lexicographic preferences are determined by theorems describing the interrelationship
between stabilities in the hierarchical model and local models. In comparison, the sta-
bilities in the weighted hierarchical model are obtained by matrix computation based on
the algorithms. As demonstrated in the case study, the new calculation approach is more
simplified and easier to implement.
The stabilities in the weighted hierarchical graph model are more sensitive to the relative
importance of local graphs, compared with the stabilities in the hierarchical graph model
with lexicographic preferences. As depicted in Fig. 5.6, state (3, 5) is not GMR for
CG if |w(1)| is greater than 2/3. However, in the hierarchical model with lexicographic
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preferences, this state is still GMR for CG when it considers G(1) more important, which
is interpreted as |w(1)| 2 (0.5, 1) in the weighted hierarchical model.
5.8 Summary
In this chapter, a basic hierarchical graph model has been proposed with a weighted pref-
erence structure. The UMs and UIs in this model have been expressed in matrices. Al-
gorithms have been constructed for calculating stability results in the hierarchical model
based on the theorems which link stability definitions of the hierarchical graph with the lo-
cal graphs. The water diversion conflicts in China have been reinvestigated to demonstrate
the e↵ectiveness of the new basic hierarchical model in representing hierarchical conflicts
and calculating stabilities.
The hierarchical graph model can e↵ectively solve strategic conflicts that contain several
related subconflicts. Instead of focusing on one single conflict, DMs can have a comprehen-
sive understanding of all related conflicts. The structure of the hierarchical graph model
can be extended. The following two chapters demonstrate di↵erent types of hierarchical
graph models: a model containing two CDMs, called a duo hierarchical graph model, and
a general hierarchical graph model containing any number of CDMs.
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Chapter 6
Duo Hierarchical Graph Model
6.1 Introduction
A duo hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution containing two CDMs and two LDMs
is presented in this chapter. The preferences for DMs in the new model are constructed
in lexicographic order. A fast approach for calculating stabilities is developed based on
the option prioritization method. The duo hierarchical graph model is applied to a sales
competition between Airbus and Boeing in the Asia Pacific region. The two manufacturers
compete in both wide and narrow body models for purchase by airlines. Two types of
Asian airlines with di↵erent operating strategies plan to purchase new aircraft to profit
from the booming air travel in this region. The wide and narrow body markets constitute
two subcompetitions and are modelled using the hierarchical graph model. The stability
results indicate how the aircraft manufacturers and their customers may act strategically in
the process of reaching a resolution. Thus, this model can provide decision makers with a
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Figure 6.1: Structure of duo hierarchical graph model
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of this competition, and guidance for taking
beneficial actions.
6.2 Formal Definitions
6.2.1 Definition of Duo Hierarchical Graph Model
A duo hierarchical graph model consists of two local graphs. Two CDMs appear in both
local graphs. Each local graph contains an LDM. The structure of the duo hierarchical
graph model is depicted in Fig. 6.1.
The formal definition of the duo hierarchical graph model is provided below.
Definition 6.1 (A Hierarchical Graph Model with two CDMs): Suppose there are four
DMs, consisting of CDM1, CDM2, LDM1, and LDM2. The two local graph models can
be written as
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G(1) = h{CDM1, CDM2, LDM1}, S(1), {AC(1)1 , AC(1)2 , AL(1)1 },
{%(1)C1 ,%(1)C2 ,%(1)L1 }i
G(2) = h{CDM1, CDM2, LDM2}, S(2), {AC(2)1 , AC(2)2 , AL(2)2 },
{%(2)C1 ,%(2)C2 ,%(2)L2 }i
where S(k) denotes the set of states in G(k) (k = 1, 2); AC(k)1 , AC
(k)
2 , AL
(k)
1 , AL
(k)
2 ✓ S(k) ⇥
S(k) means the sets of arcs between all pairs of states in S(k) for CDM1, CDM2, and
LDMk, respectively; %(k)C1 , %
(k)
C2
, %(k)lk are preference relations on S(k) for the respective
DMs, where, for instance, %(k)C1 represents the following relations between s
(k)
1 and s
(k)
2 for
s(k)1 , s
(k)
2 2 S(k):
(1) CDM1 prefers s
(k)
1 to s
(k)
2 in G
(k), i.e. s(k)1  (k)C1 s(k)2 ;
(2) CDM1 prefers s
(k)
2 to s
(k)
1 in G
(k), i.e. s(k)1  (k)C1 s(k)2 ;
(3) s(k)1 is equally preferred to s
(k)
2 for CDM1 in G
(k), i.e. s(k)1 ⇠(k)C1 s(k)2 ;
(4) s(k)1 is no less preferred to s
(k)
2 for CDM1 in G
(k), i.e. s(k)1 %(k)C1 s
(k)
2 ;
(5) s(k)2 is no less preferred to s
(k)
1 for CDM1 in G
(k), i.e. s(k)1 -(k)C1 s
(k)
2 .
Then the graph model:
G = h{CDM1, CDM2, LDM1, LDM2}, S = S(1) ⇥ S(2), {AC1, AC2, AL1, AL2}, {%C1 ,%C2
,%L1 ,%L2}i
is a hierarchical graph model based on G(1) and G(2), where AC1, AC2, AL1, AL2 ✓ S ⇥ S
are sets of arcs in S for CDM1, CDM2, LDM1, and LDM2, respectively, and %C1 , %C2 ,
%L1 , %L2 are the preference relations for the respective DMs in G.
Several properties can be concluded from Definition 6.1.
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(i) For s(k)1 , s
(k)
2 2 S(k) (k = 1, 2) and (s(1)1 , s(1)1 ), (s(1)2 , s(2)2 ) 2 S, AC1 ✓ S ⇥ S is defined by
((s(1)1 , s
(2)
1 ), (s
(1)
2 , s
(2)
2 )) 2 AC1 i↵ either (s(1)1 , s(1)2 ) 2 AC(1)1 and s(2)1 = s(2)2 , or s(1)1 = s(1)2 and
(s(2)1 , s
(2)
2 ) 2 AC(2)1 , or (s(1)1 , s(1)2 ) 2 AC(1)1 and (s(2)1 , s(2)2 ) 2 AC(2)1 .
(ii) AL1 ✓ S ⇥ S is defined by ((s(1)1 , s(2)1 ), (s(1)2 , s(2)2 )) 2 AL1 i↵ (s(1)1 , s(1)2 ) 2 AL(1)1 and
s(2)1 = s
(2)
2
(iii) AL2 ✓ S ⇥ S is defined by ((s(1)1 , s(2)1 ), (s(1)2 , s(2)2 )) 2 AL2 i↵ (s(2)1 , s(2)2 ) 2 AL(2)2 and
s(1)1 = s
(1)
2
(iv) The preference relation %L1 is defined on S by (s(1)1 , s(2)1 ) %L1 (s(1)2 , s(2)2 ) i↵ s(1)1 %(1)L1 s
(1)
2
(v) The preference relation %L2 is defined on S by (s(1)1 , s(2)1 ) %L1 (s(1)2 , s(2)2 ) i↵ s(2)1 %(2)L2 s
(2)
2
(vi) The preference relation %C1 on S is related to the preference relation %(1)C1 on S(1) as
follows:
if s(1)1 , s
(1)
2 2 S(1) and s(1)1 %(1)C1 s(1)2 , then (s(1)1 , s(2)0 ) %C1 (s(1)2 , s(2)0 ) for all s(2)0 2 S(2)
(vii) The preference relation %C1 on S is related to the preference relation %(2)C1 on S(2) as
follows:
if s(2)1 , s
(2)
2 2 S(2) and s(2)1 %(2)C1 s(2)2 , then (s(1)0 , s(2)1 ) %C1 (s(1)0 , s(2)2 ) for all s(1)0 2 S(1).
6.2.2 Lexicographic Preference Structure
In this chapter, the preferences in local graphs are represented in the option prioritization
method. The preferences in the duo hierarchical model are constructed by the preferences in
the local graphs. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, weighted preference is a general way
of expressing preferences in the hierarchical graph model, while lexicographic preference is
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more e cient in calculating stabilities. Thus, the preferences in the duo hierarchical graph
model are presented in lexicographic order.
Recall that in the option prioritization approach, a preference statement for a DM can
be expressed by option numbers connected by logical symbols, including negation (“NOT”
or “ ”), conjunction (“AND” or “&”), disjunction (“OR” or “|”), and conditions (“IF”
and “IFF”). Preference statements are ordered from the most preferred for a given DM at
the top of a table to the least preferred at the bottom. As an example, the set of preference
statements for CDMi (i = 1, 2) in G can be marked as {⌦Ci1, ⌦Ci2, ..., ⌦Cij, ..., ⌦Cih},
where 0 < j  h and h denotes the number of statements.
The preference structure in lexicographical order for CDMi in G can be expressed by
the preference statements in G(1) and G(2), as demonstrated in Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 6.1: In a hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and G(2), suppose G(1)
is more important than G(2) for CDMi (i = 1, 2). Let {⌦(k)Ci1, ⌦(k)Ci2, ..., ⌦(k)Cihk} be the set of
preference statements in G(k) (k = 1, 2). Then the set of preference statements for CDMi
in G can be written as {⌦(1)Ci1, ⌦(1)Ci2, ..., ⌦(1)Cih1 , ⌦(2)Ci1, ⌦(2)Ci2, ..., ⌦(2)Cih2}.
The proof of theorem 6.1 is given in the Appendices. Theorem 6.1 can be used to
calculate stabilities in the duo hierarchical graph model. The preference statements for
CDM in G can be determined based on the preference statements in the local graphs. The
stabilities are then calculated using GMCR II, the decision support system introduced in
Chapter 2.
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6.3 Sales Competition between Airbus and Boeing
6.3.1 Background Introduction
Airbus and Boeing, the two largest commercial aircraft manufacturers, have forecasted a
huge demand for both wide body and narrow body planes (Airbus, 2014; Boeing 2014). The
former refers to the double-aisle aircraft having a capacity of 200 to 850 passengers, while
the latter can carry passengers of approximately 200 with a single-aisle layout (Doganis,
2002).
Eager to grab a greater share of the Asia Pacific market, both aircraft makers have
launched a vigorous sales campaign in this region by promoting their most competitive
models. Airbus and Boeing wish to market their new generation models as well as advocate
their best selling planes. The European Aerospace Consortium wishes to grab deals from
some major Asian airlines for its two-deck jumbo aircraft A380. The existing long haul
model A330 can also be an alternative (Hepher, 2013a). Boeing competes with Airbus
in the wide body market in the Asia Pacific by promoting the B787 Dreamliner, a next
generation model with better performance and higher e ciency. Confronted with a delay in
delivering the B787s, Boeing also plans to promote the existing B777 model to compensate
for this disadvantage (Forbes, 2013). Potential buyers in the Asia Pacific region include
flag carriers such as Cathy Pacific, Japan Airlines, Korean Air, and Singapore Airlines.
In the narrow body aircraft market, the low budget carriers in this region, such as
Air Asia, Spring Airlines, and Tigerair, provide flexible air travel by operating services
between non-hub cities in the region. As their business grows, these airlines can upgrade
and expand their fleets by purchasing new planes. To meet these demands, Airbus has
115
started to develop the A320neo model, an upgraded version of the existing A320 (Hepher,
2013b). Meanwhile, the upgrade for B737, called B737MAX, is also underway (Boeing,
2011).
6.3.2 Decision Makers and Their Options
The competition between Airbus and Boeing in the wide and narrow body aircraft market
can be modelled using a hierarchical graph, represented as G. The competition in each
market is represented by a local graph: the wide body competition is denoted by G(1)
and narrow body by G(2). Airbus (A) and Boeing (B) are two CDMs in the hierarchical
graph model and are labelled as CDM1 and CDM2, respectively. The two types of airline
carriers are the LDMs, each of which appears in one local graph. In the wide body market,
customer X, denoted simply as X, is a flagship carrier airline in the region. Customer Z
(Z) represents a low cost airline in southeast Asia, which operates some short haul flights
between major cities in this region. Several assumptions are part of the model:
(1) X plans to purchase one type of wide body jet from either A or B.
(2) X will not choose two models from the same manufacturer. Negotiation with one
manufacturer can only result in ordering one of its aircraft types.
(3) Z can choose from A or B, but not both, because the manufacturer of Z’s fleet should
be consistent to reduce costs. As with (2), Z will consider only one model from the selected
manufacturer.
The hierarchical structure of the market competition is shown in Fig. 6.2. The options
for each DM are shown in Table 6.1. To simplify the modelling process, there are 7 options
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Figure 6.2: Hierarchical structure of the overall competition
for all DMs shown in Table 6.1. Each option is assigned a number. The negation of each
option for A and B is written after the slash in the same line with the given option.
In the wide body market, Airbus can either promote the new jumbo jet A380 to X or
persuade X to buy the A330, which is written as option 1 on the right in Table 6.1. The
negation of option 1, which is to promote A330, is written after the slash in option 1. In
the narrow body market, A can advertise the existing A320 (option 2). The other option
for A in selling the narrow body aircraft is to promote A320neo, which is the negation of
option 2. The A320neo is designed with new technology that can improve the performance
and save operating costs (Airbus, 2014). Despite the previous issue of delivery delay,
Boeing still attempts to sell the B787 to X, or attract the carrier to buy B777s. The two
alternatives are combined as option 3. Analogously, B can either advertise the B737, or
117
Table 6.1: DMs and Their Options in the Overall Competition
DMs: Options
Airbus (A) 1. Promote A380/ Promote A330
2. Promote A320/ Promote A320neo
Boeing (B) 3. Promote B787/ Promote B777
4. Promote B737/ Promote B737MAX
Customer X (X) 5. Choose A
6. Choose B
Customer Z (Z) 7. Choose A/ Choose B
market B737MAX to Z (option 4).
As the buyer in the wide body market, X can choose one aircraft model from either A
or B. Hence, options 5 and 6 represent the selection of A and B for X, respectively. Note
that X can also purchase two aircraft models, one from each manufacturer. In this case,
both options 5 and 6 are selected by X. However, as a budget airline carrier, Z could buy
aircraft from only one manufacturer. Thus, option 7 means the selection of A by Z, while
the contract with B is denoted by the negation of this option.
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6.3.3 States in the Sales Competition
The 7 options in the model indicate 27 possible states in total. Some infeasible states
are removed because they are illogical in the context of the market competition. X should
select at least one option, either option 5 or 6, since this carrier will definitely purchase one
model from at least one manufacturer. In the narrow body market, Z will only select one
model from one manufacturer considering the budget and the smaller scale of the company.
After eliminating the infeasible states, 96 states are left for analysis.
The DMs and their options in the two local models are given in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
As shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, states in the two local models are assigned with decimal
numbers. The states are numbered from 1 to 12 in the wide body market competition and
from 13 to 20 in the narrow body competition. According to Definition 6.1, the states in
the overall competition are the Cartesian Product of the states in the two local models.
Hence, each state in the hierarchical model is expressed by a two-dimension number. Each
dimension denotes a component state in the local model. For example, state (1, 14) in
the market competition is composed of state 1 and state 14 in the wide and narrow body
competitions, respectively.
6.3.4 Preferences of Decision Makers
Preference relations for DMs are determined using the option prioritization method. In this
approach, preference statements are written in option numbers from the most preferred at
the top to the least preferred at the bottom. The preference statements in each local model
are listed in Tables 6.4 and Tables 6.5. The preference statements in the hierarchical model
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Table 6.2: DMs and Their Options in the Wide Body Competition
DMs Options States
A 1. A380/ A330 N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
B 3. B787/ B777 N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
X 5. Choose A Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y
6. Choose B N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Table 6.3: DMs and Their Options in the Narrow Body Competition
DMs Options States
A 2. A320/A320neo N Y N Y N Y N Y
B 4. B737/B737MAX N N Y Y N N Y Y
Z 7. Choose A Y Y Y Y N N N N
State Number 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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for CDMs are combined according to Theorem 6.1. Because Airbus has a slight advantage
in the narrow body market due to a shorter delivery period of the A320neo, the European
manufacturer considers the campaign of selling the models to the low budget carrier more
important. In comparison, the American company is more interested in selling planes to
the wide body customer due to the strong competitiveness of B787s and B777s. Thus,
the narrow body market is more important for Airbus and the wide body market more
important for Boeing in the hierarchical model, i.e. G(1) < G(2) for Airbus and G(1) > G(2)
for Boeing.
The preference statements for CDMs in the overall competition are demonstrated in
Table 6.6. As shown in Table 6.6, the first preference statement for Airbus is written as
(-2) & 7, which means the purchase of the A320neo by Z is the most desired scenario for
the European company. The selling of the existing A320 model, denoted as option 7, would
also be acceptable for A. The next preference statement, 1 & 5, reflects the expectation
of A of sealing the deal with X who only chooses the A380 model. According to the last
three statements, 1, 5, and -6, the European company does not wish to see the successful
deal between its rival and X. This outcome is not the worst for A as long as X also buys
A380s.
As Boeing values the wide body market more than the narrow body one, the American
manufacturer wishes to sign a deal with X on any type of model (option 6). If X plans to
sign a deal with Airbus, B will advocate the B777 ((-3) IF 5). In the following preference
statement, 3 IFF 6, B prefers to promote the B787 model to X if and only if the American
company has gained the interest from X. The deal between A and X is not favoured by B
due to the rivalry between the two manufacturers (-5). In the narrow body market, Boeing
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Table 6.4: Preference Statement for A in the Wide and Narrow Body Competition
Wide Body Market Narrow Body Market
1 & 5 (-2) & 7
1 7
5
-6
prefers to promote the B737 model regardless of the reaction of Z (4). The order from Z
will be a preferred outcome. However, as the B737MAX will not be available in the near
future, the current version of this model, the B737, would be more competitive (4 & -7).
6.3.5 The Uncertainty of Preferences for LDMs
In reality, the selection of commercial aircraft for airlines is often a↵ected by various factors,
such as retail prices, operation costs, and the relationship with the two manufacturers. The
selection of these factors has been carried out using decision making approaches (Dozic
and Kalic, 2014; Flouris, 2010; Ozdemir et al., 2011). Some representative variables for
selecting aircraft for an airline company include retail price, fuel cost per seat per nautical
mile, and the number of seats. In Table 6.7, these variables are listed for each type of
aircraft mentioned in this case study. An ideal aircraft model for the airline companies
should be cheaper in retail price, more fuel e cient, and have a larger seating capacity. As
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Table 6.5: Preference Statement for B in the Wide and Narrow Body Competition
Wide Body Market Narrow Body Market
6 4
(-3) IF 5 4 & (-7)
3 IFF 6
-5
Table 6.6: Preference Statements for DMs in the Overall Competition
A B
(-2) & 7 6
7 (-3) IF 5
1 & 5 3 IFF 6
1 -5
5 4
-6 4 & -7
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can be seen from Table 6.7, none of the models is predominately better than others under
these criteria in either the wide or narrow body category. In the real world scenario, airline
companies need to weight these variables before making reasonable decisions. In some cases,
these decisions could also be a↵ected by other factors that are hard to predict or measure,
such as the relationship with the two manufacturers and the results of negotiation. Thus,
it is di cult to determine the preferences for the two LDMs a↵ected the aforementioned
factors.
The relationships between the various factors and the preferences for the LDMs are
demonstrated in Fig. 6.3. These factors are considered as inputs, and the preferences are
outputs. The mechanism regarding how these factors a↵ect the preferences is unknown,
and thus denoted by a black box. Although this mechanism is hard to investigate, some
preference patterns can be concluded: the preference for an LDM is either “pro-Airbus”
or “pro-Boeing”. The two preference patterns for each LDM will generate four di↵erent
preferences in the overall competition, demonstrated in Table 6.8. Stabilities in the overall
competition are calculated under the four preferences. The similarities in these stabilities
are investigated. Common stable states can be used to predict the outcome of the overall
competition, or suggest possible resolutions for DMs.
For airline X, the “pro-Airbus” preference can be represented by the following preference
statements, from most to least important: 5 IF 1, 6 IFF -3, and -3, which mean that A380
is the ideal model for X and B777 can be the second choice. The pro-Boeing preference can
be written in reverse: 6 IFF -3, -3, and 5 IF 1. For airline Z, the “pro-Airbus” preference
is written from most to least important as: 7, -7. The “pro-Boeing” preference is denoted
in reverse as: -7, 7. The 4 preference patterns for all DMs are marked as I, II, III, and IV
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Table 6.7: Variables for Selecting Commercial Aircraft (Axlegeeks, 2015; Leeham, 2015)
Wide Body
X Retail Price (Million USD) Fuel Cost Per Seat Per Nautical Miles Typical Seating
A380 318 11.38 ¢ 525
A330 245 8.19 ¢ 295
B787 157 11.68 ¢ 210
B777 281 9.93 ¢ 365
Narrow Body
Z Retail Price (Million USD) Fuel Cost Per Seat Per Nautical Miles Typical Seating
A320 70 7.76 ¢ 150
A320neo 103 20% less fuel per seat than A320 195
B738 79 8.17 ¢ 162
B737MAX 8 104 14% less than B738 162
in Table 6.8. Pattern I indicates the situation in which both X and Z are “pro-Airbus”.
Pattern II di↵ers from pattern I in that Z is “pro-Boeing” rather than “pro-Airbus”. In
pattern III, X is “pro-Boeing” and Z is “pro-Airbus”. Pattern IV is the situation in which
both X and Z are “pro-Boeing”. Note that the preferences for A and B are not listed
because they are the same in all of the 4 patterns.
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Figure 6.3: Generation of preference patterns for customers
6.3.6 Stability Calculation
The stability results in the market competition are calculated using GMCR II. Four types
of solution concepts, Nash stability (R), sequential stability (SEQ), general metarationality
(GMR), and symmetric metaratonality (SMR), are investigated for each preference pattern.
The stable states for each DM under four solution concepts in the overall competition
are listed in Table 6.9. The state numbers are listed in the first and second columns. The
state numbers in the two columns are identical, but represented in di↵erent forms. The
state numbers in the second column are denoted by two entries. Each entry represents a
state number shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The 96 states in total in the overall competition
are also numbered from 1 to 96 in the first column. Nash, SEQ, GMR, and SMR stabilities
are denoted as “r”, “s”, “g”, and “ ”, respectively. These stabilities are investigated for
each DM and all DMs under 4 di↵erent preferences, referred to as I, II, III, and IV. At each
state, the stabilities for each DM are marked. A column entitled “Ovr” demonstrates the
stabilities for all DMs, i.e. equilibria, under a preference pattern. The states with the same
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Table 6.8: Preference Patterns in the Overall Competition
I II III IV
X: 5 IF 1 5 IF 1 6 IFF -3 6 IFF -3
6 IFF -3 6 IFF -3 -3 -3
-3 -3 5 IF 1 5 IF 1
Z: 7 -7 7 -7
-7 7 -7 7
equilibria under all preference patterns, called common equilibria, are marked in bold.
Table 6.9: Stabilities for DMs in the Overall Competition in Di↵erent Preference Patterns
State State I II III IV
Num. Num.
A B X Z Ovr A B X Z Ovr A B X Z Ovr A B X Z Ovr
1 (1,17) s,  g s,  g r s,  g s ,  g r
2 (2,17) r s,  g r s,  g r g r s,  g r s,  g r g
3 (1,18) s,  g r s,  g r s,  g r s,  g r
4 (2,18) r s,  g r g r s,  g r g r s,  g r g r s,  g r g
5 (3,17) r r r r r r
6 (4,17) r r r r r r r r r r
7 (3,18) r r r r r r r r
8 (4,18) r r r r r r r r r r r r
9 (1,19) r g r g r g r g
10 (2,19) r r g r r g r r g r r g
11 (1,20) r g s,  r g s r g s,  r g s
12 (2,20) r r g s,  g r r g s g r r g s,  g r r g s g
13 (3,19) r r r r
14 (4,19) r r r r r r r r
15 (3,20) r s,  r s r s,  r s
16 (4,20) r r s,  r r s r r s,  r r s
17 (5,17) s,  r s,  r r s,  r s,  r r
18 (6,17) r s,  r s,  r r s,    r s,    r  
19 (5,18) s,  r r s,  r r s,  r r s,  r r
20 (6,18) r s,  r r s,  r r s,    r   r s,    r  
21 (7,17) s,   s,  r s,  s,  r
22 (8,17) r s,  r s,  r r s,  r s,  r
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23 (7,18) s,   r s,  r s,  r s,  r
24 (8,18) r s,  r r s,  r r s,  r r s,  r
25 (5,19) s,  r s,  r s,  r s,  r
26 (6,19) r s,  r s,  r s,    r s,   
27 (5,20) s,  r s,  s,  r s s,  r s,  s,  r s
28 (6,20) r s,  s,  r s,  s r s,    s,    r s,    s g
29 (7,19) r r r r
30 (8,19) r r r r r r r r
31 (7,20) r s,  r s r s,  r s
32 (8,20) r r s,  r r s r r s,  r r s
33 (9,17) r r r r r r
34 (10,17) r r r r r r r r r r
35 (9,18) r r r r r r r r
36 (10,18) r r r r r r r r r r r r
37 (11,17) r r
38 (12,17) r r r r r r
39 (11,18) r r r r
40 (12,18) r r r r r r r r
41 (9,19) r r r r r r r r
42 (10,19) r r r r r r r r r r r r
43 (9,20) r r   r r g r r   r r g
44 (10,20) r r r     r r r g g r r r     r r r g g
45 (11,19)
46 (12,19) r r r r
47 (11,20) g s,  s s,  s
48 (12,20) r s,  r s r s,  r s
49 (1,13)   s,  g r g s,  s,  g s g   s,  g r g s,  s,  g s g
50 (2,13) r s,  g r g r s,  g s g r s,  g r g r s,  g s g
51 (1,14)   s,  g s g s,  s,  g s g   s,  g s g s,  s,  g s g
52 (2,14)   s,  g s g s,  s,  g s g   s,  g s g s,  s,  g s g
53 (3,13)   r r s,  r s   r r s,  r s
54 (4,13) r r r r r s r r r r r s
55 (3,14)   r s s,  r s   r s s,  r s
56 (4,14)   r s s,  r s   r s s,  r s
57 (1,15)   r g r g   r g r g   r g r g s,  r g r g
58 (2,15) r r g r g r r g r g r r g r g r r g r g
59 (1,16)   r g r g   r g r g   r g r g s,  r g r g
60 (2,16)   r g r g   r g r g   r g r g s,  r g r g
61 (3,15)   r r s,  r r   r r s,  r r
62 (4,15) r r r r r r r r r r r r
63 (3,16)   r r s,  r r   r r s,  r r
64 (4,16)   r r s,  r r   r r s,  r r
65 (5,13)   s,  r r   s,  s,  r s s   s,  r r   s,  s,  r s s
66 (6,13) r s,  r r s,  s r s,    r   r s,    s g
67 (5,14)   s,  r s g s,  s,  r s s   s,  r s g s,  s,  r s s
68 (6,14)   s,  s s,  s,  s   s,    s g s,  s,    s g
69 (7,13)   s,  r s,  s,  s   s,  r s,  s,  s
70 (8,13) r s,  r r s,  s r s,  r r s,  s
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71 (7,14)   s,  s s,  s,  s   s,  s s,  s,  s
72 (8,14)   s,  s s,  s,  s   s,  s s,  s,  s
73 (5,15)   s,  r r   s,  s,  r r s,    s,  r r   s,  s,  r r s, 
74 (6,15) r s,  r r s,  r r s,    r   r s,    r  
75 (5,16)   s,  r r   s,  s,  r r s,    s,  r r   s,  s,  r r s, 
76 (6,16)   s,  r s,  s,  r   s,    r   s,  s,    r  
77 (7,15)   r r s,  r r   r r s,  r r
78 (8,15) r r r r r r r r r r r r
79 (7,16)   r r s,  r r   r r s,  r r
80 (8,16)   r r s,  r r   r r s,  r r
81 (9,13)   r r s,  r g   r r s,  r s
82 (10,13) r r r r r g r r r r r s
83 (9,14)   r s s,  r g   r s s,  r s
84 (10,14)   r s s,  r g   r s s,  r s
85 (11,13)   r s,  g   r s,  s
86 (12,13) r r r g r r r s
87 (11,14)   s s,  g   s s,  s
88 (12,14)   s s,  g   s s,  s
89 (9,15)   r r r     r r r     r r r     r r r  
90 (10,15) r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r
91 (9,16)   r r r     r r r     r r r     r r r  
92 (10,16)   r r r     r r r     r r r     r r r  
93 (11,15)   r s,  r   r s,  r
94 (12,15) r r r r r r r r
95 (11,16)   r s,  r   r s,  r
96 (12,16)   r s,  r   r s,  r
According to Table 6.9, state (10, 15), also written as state 90, is the strong equilibrium
in the market competition because it is Nash stable for all DMs. Among the common
equilibria, there are 10 GMR and 3 SMR equilibria. No state is sequentially stable for
all DMs under all preference patterns. State (10, 15) indicates a possible outcome that is
most likely to happen because each DM has no incentive to move away from this state.
The GMR and SMR equilibria suggest the outcomes that are also possible but are less
likely to happen than state (10, 15).
The equilibria indicate possible outcomes for DMs in the market competition. At the
Nash equilibrium, X signs deals with both A and B by purchasing A380s and B777s.
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Customer Z selects A320neo as its next generation fleet. Airbus and Boeing have reached
a draw in the wide body campaign, while the European Consortium has gained the upper
hand in the narrow body battle. As a large airline carrier with a su cient budget, Customer
X can expand their fleets with both A380s and B777s. The two-deck jumbo jets will
be used for carrying more passengers along transcontinental routes, while the B777s can
supplement the existing fleets. This outcome has been validated by press release (Airbus,
2012; Planespotters, 2015), as Singapore Airlines intends to purchase both types of aircraft.
The advantage of Airbus in the narrow body market results from the availability of the
newly introduced A320neo. In comparison, B737MAX is also a next generation model to
compete with A320neo. However, this model is still under development. The long delivery
time of B737MAX and the high fuel e ciency of the A320neo drives the narrow body
customer to select the next generation Airbus model. This outcome echoes the reality that
Air Asia, a budget airline company, ordered A320neo aircraft (Sepang, 2014).
Other equilibria can also be considered as possible resolutions for DMs. For instance,
a GMR equilibrium, state (2, 16), indicates the selection of A380s by X and the order of
A320s by Z. No DM will move away from this state because each DM will sanction UIs
for other DMs at the cost of disadvantaging itself. For example, Airbus will not promote
the A320neo model, because it fears Z’s subsequent move which is the selection of the
American aircraft, although this move is unfavorable for Z.
It is worth noting that the di↵erence in the LDMs’ preference, reflected by the 4 pref-
erence patterns, does not a↵ect the strong equilibria, and some of the other equilibria. In
other words, state (10, 15) is the outcome most likely to happen regardless of whether each
LDM is “pro-Airbus” or “pro-Boeing”.
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6.3.7 Comparison with the Results in Separate Competitions
Stability results in the overall competition are compared with the stable states in each local
model to investigate their interrelations. The stable states for each DM and the equilibria
in each local model are listed in Tables 6.10, 6.11, and 6.12. In each table, the stabilities for
an LDM being “Pro-Airbus” and “Pro-Boeing” are both listed. The bolded states indicate
the common equilibria in both tables. Note that in Table 6.12, the equilibria are listed
under the solution concepts in “narrow sense”, which means the interrelationships among
the solution concepts are not considered. For example, the Nash equilibrium, state 10, in
the wide body market is also SEQ, GMR, and SMR for all DMs, but it is only listed as
the Nash equilibrium in Table 6.12.
The common Nash equilibrium (10, 15) in Table 6.9 is constituted by the common Nash
equilibria in the local models: state 10 in the wide body competition and state 15 in the
narrow body competition. However, the equilibria in the local models cannot predict all the
equilibria in the hierarchical model. For example, a GMR equilibrium in the hierarchical
model may contain a component state that is not a GMR equilibrium in a local model.
At a common GMR equilibrium, state (2, 18), state 18 is not a GMR equilibrium in the
narrow body competition under any preference pattern.
Moreover, a stable state for a given DM in the hierarchical model may also contain
an unstable component for the focal DM in a local model. Taking Boeing as an example,
state (2, 13) in Table 6.9 is both SEQ and SMR for the American manufacturer under
all preference patterns. However, state 13 is not a stable component for B under any
preference pattern in the narrow body competition, according to Table 6.11.
The UIs and possible sanctions for a given DM in the overall competition are analyzed
131
under a particular preference pattern. For example, under pattern I, in which both X
and Z are “pro-Airbus”, state (7, 13) indicates the situation where the B787 beats the
A330 in the wide body competition and Z intends to choose the A320neo. To regain Z’s
interest, Boeing plans to change its strategy by advocating the existing B737 model. As a
subsequent UI, X can purchase the A330 instead of the B787. Although B can benefit in
the narrow body market by reaching state (7, 15) from state (7, 13), the subsequent UI by
X to state (3, 15) is less desired by the American manufacturer. As B considers the wide
body market more important, it does not wish to benefit in the narrow body market at
the cost of reaching a worse situation in its more valued market.
Still under pattern I, as a component in state (7, 13), state 13 is unstable for B in the
narrow body model. The American company will move away from this state because it
cannot recognize the sanction levied by X if it considers the two subcompetitions sepa-
rate. The CDM will misjudge the situation in the two competitions due to ignorance of
this sanction. Thus, the stability results in the hierarchical graph model can reflect the
situations in the overall competition more precisely than those in the local models.
6.4 Summary
The sales competition between Airbus and Boeing in the wide and narrow body aircraft
markets is investigated by employing the Hierarchical Graph Model for Conflict Resolution.
The theoretical structure of this model containing two CDMs is defined such that the overall
competition is modelled using the hierarchical graph model. The preference structure for
CDMs in lexicographical order was constructed using the option prioritization method.
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Table 6.10: Stability Results in the Wide Body Competition
Pro-Airbus Pro-Boeing
A B X Equilibria A B X Equilibria
1 r g g s,  r g g
2 r r g g r r g g
3   r s,  r
4 r r r r
5 r s,  r s,  r s,  r s, 
6 r s,  r s,     
7 r r r r
8 r r r r
9   r r     r r  
10 r r r r r r r r
11     s,   
12 r   r  
133
Table 6.11: Stability Results in the Narrow Body Competition
Pro-Airbus Pro-Boeing
A B Z Overall A B Z Overall
13 r r r s
14   s s,  s
15 r r r r r r r r
16   r r     r r  
17 r r r
18 r r r r
19 r r r r
20 r r     r r g g
Table 6.12: Equilibria in the Two Local Models
Equilibria Wide Body Narrow Body
Nash 10 15
SEQ 5
GMR 1, 2
SMR 9 16, 20
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Furthermore, stability results calculated using the hierarchical model were compared with
the results obtained by modelling separate competitions. The di↵erence in stability results
suggests that CDMs can have an enhanced understanding of the overall competition when
it is analyzed using the hierarchical graph model methodology.
In the commercial aircraft competition, the duo hierarchical graph model can provide
strategic insights and advice for DMs, without the requirement of various quantitative data
such as retail price, operation costs, and other factors a↵ecting DMs’ actions. Instead, these
data have been reflected by DMs’ preferences, or preference patterns when some part of
the preference relations are uncertain. It is worth noting that time is not considered in
modelling the market competition. The hierarchical graph model only indicates what DMs
should do by giving DMs’ options and preferences. The resolutions for DMs can either be
consistent with the reality or suggest a future outcome. Thus, these resolutions are more
valuable if considered as a guidance of actions to follow when making strategic decisions.
The hierarchical graph model methodology can be further extended to having more
DMs and more complex structures. A general hierarchical graph model, containing any
number of DMs and local graph models, will be introduced in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 7
General Hierarchical Graph Model
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a general hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution has been proposed.
A general hierarchical graph model contains any number of CDMs, who supervise all the
related conflicts, and LDMs, who only participate in one conflict. Di↵erent preference
structures in the general hierarchical graph model are discussed. Theorems are provided
to investigate the relationship between the stabilities in the hierarchical model and the
stabilities in the component graph models. The hierarchical graph mode is applied to
greenhouse gas emissions disputes between the USA and China. The stability results
suggest how the two countries can obtain strategic resolutions for the bilateral disputes.
136
7.2 Formal Definitions
Recall that a graph model is defined as a 4-tuple set, written as {N,S,A,%}, where N , S,
A, and % represent DMs, states, arcs of moves, and preference relations, respectively.
A general hierarchical graph model consists of several smaller graph models, called local
graphs. There are two types of DMs in a general hierarchical graph model. The DMs who
participate in all local graphs are called common decision makers (CDMs). Other DMs
that only appear in one local graph are defined as local decision makers (LDMs).
7.2.1 Definition of General Hierarchical Graph Model
A formal definition of a general hierarchical graph model is given below.
Definition 7.1 Suppose K graph models are written as
G(k) = {NC , N (k)L , S(k), AC(k), AL(k),%(k)C ,%(k)L },
for k = 1, ..., K.
Let NC denote the set of CDMs; N
(k)
L the set of LDMs in G
(k); S(k) the set of states in
G(k); AC(k) and AL(k) the sets of arcs for CDMs and LDMs, respectively in G(k); %(k)C and
%(k)L the preference relations for CDMs and LDMs, respectively, in G(k).
Then, the graph model
G = {NC , NL, AC,AL, S,%C ,%L} is called a general hierarchical graph model, where
NL =
K[
k=1
N (k)L ;
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K[
k=1
AC(k) ✓ AC;
AL =
K[
k=1
AL(k);
S = S(1)...⇥ S(K),
denoting the set of states in G is a Cartesian Product of the sets of states in local graphs.
State s 2 S can be written as s = (s(1), ..., s(K)), where s(K) 2 S(K).
The moves and preferences for DMs in the general hierarchical model satisfy the fol-
lowing properties.
(i) For s(k)a , s
(k)
b 2 S(k) and sa = (s(1)a , ..., s(K)a ) 2 S, sb = (s(1)b , ..., s(K)b ) 2 S, AC ✓ S ⇥ S is
defined by (sa, sb) 2 AC i↵ there exists k = 1, ..., K for (s(k)a , s(k)b ) 2 AC(k) and s(k
0)
a = s
(k0)
b
for all k0 = 1, ..., K except k.
(ii) Moves for LDM (k)l 2 N (k)L in G, short for lk 2 N (k)L , ALlk ✓ S ⇥ S, is defined by
(sa, sb) 2 ALlk i↵ (s(k)a , s(k)b ) 2 AL(k)l and s(k
0)
a = s
(k0)
b for all k
0 = 1, ..., K except k.
(iii) The preference relation for lk, %lk , in G is defined by sa %lk sb i↵ s
(k)
a %(k)lk s
(k)
b .
(iv) The preference relation (%C) for a CDM, CDMi 2 NC , in G is related to the preference
relation %(k)C as follows:
If s(k)a , s
(k)
b 2 S(k) and s(k)a %(k)Ci s(k)b , then sa %Ci sb for all k0 = 1, ..., K except k, such that
s(k
0)
a = s
(k0)
b .
Property (iv) can be used to determine the relative preferences for CDMs for some
states in G, but not all of them. In Property (iv), suppose s(k)a %(k)Ci s
(k)
b , the relation
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between states sa and sb for CDMi is unknown when s
(k0)
a  (k0)Ci s(k
0)
b for some k
0 6= k.
Hence, to determine the preference relation between states sa and sb for CDMs in G, extra
information is required.
The structure of the general hierarchical graph model is depicted in Fig. 7.1. The
nodes in Fig. 7.1 represent CDMs and LDMs. The boundary of a local graph is expressed
by a dashed circle. An ellipsis (“...”) between two DMs in a local graph model means the
number of DMs in the local graph can vary. An ellipsis between two dashed circle denotes
that there can be any number of local graphs in the general hierarchical graph model.
Figure 7.1: Structure of general hierarchical graph model
7.3 Preference Structures based on Option Prioriti-
zation
Due to the incompleteness of preference information for CDMs in G, relative importance
of local graphs is defined for each CDM. The relative importance reflects the focal CDM’s
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perception of the importance of each local graph. The importance relations between two
local graphs are defined in Definition 7.2.
Definition 7.2: (Pairwise Importance) In a hierarchical graph model G, the relative
importance between two local graphs, G(k) and G(k
0) (k, k0 = 1, ..., K), for CDMi 2 NC is
indicated by the relation >i (strictly more important than) as G(k) >i G(k
0).
Note that weakly ordered importance, which means “no less important than”, is not
considered for the sake of model simplicity.
If all local graphs in G can be ordered as G(⌧1) >i G(⌧2)... >i G(⌧K) for ⌧k = 1, 2, ..., K,
thenG is said to be transitive for CDMi. Note thatG(⌧1), ..., G(⌧K) is identical toG(1), ..., G(K),
except that they are ordered by the relative importance for CDMi. The transitive impor-
tance is defined in Definition 7.3.
Definition 7.3: (Transitive Importance) In the general hierarchical graph model G, a
transitive ordering of the local graphs by importance for CDMi (CDMi 2 NC) can be
written as G(⌧1) >i G(⌧2)... >i G(⌧K), where >i is the importance relation between local
graphs satisfying:
G(⌧k 1) >i G(⌧k) and G(⌧k) >i G(⌧k+1) implies G(⌧k 1) >i G(⌧k+1).
The preferences for DMs in G are determined using the option prioritization method,
which has been demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6. Weighted preference and lexicographic
preference in the general hierarchical graph model are defined below.
Definition 7.4: (Weighted Preference) Let ⌦(k)Ci (k = 1, ..., K) be the set of preference
statements for CDMi in G(k), and ⌦
(k)
Cijk
2 ⌦(k)Ci for 0 < jk < hk. Suppose a state s =
(s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S where s(K) 2 S(K). A score  (k)Ci (s(k)) is assigned to state s(k) for CDMi.
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Then,
 (k)Ci (sk) =
hkX
jk=1
sgn
⇣
⌦(k)Cijk(sk)
⌘
2hk jk (7.1)
where
sgn
⇣
⌦(k)Cijk(sk)
⌘
=
8<: 1 ⌦
(k)
Cijk
(sk) = T
0 otherwise
The relative importance of G(k) for CDMi is denoted by a weight w
(k)
Ci
(w(k)Ci > 0). Then
G(k) >i G(k
0) indicates w(k)Ci > w
(k0)
Ci
for k0 = 1, ...K and k 6= k0.
Thus, the aggregated score for state s 2 S in G is defined as:
 Ci(s) =
KX
k=1
w(k)Ci  
(k)
Ci
(sk) (7.2)
Equation (7.2) is a general expression of  Ci(s) as an aggregation of scores for the
component states,  (k)Ci (s
(k)) (k = 1, ..., K), and the weights for local graphs, w(k)Ci .
Definition 7.5 (Lexicographic Preference) Suppose G(k) >Ci G
(k0) for k, k0 = 1, ..., K, then
the lexicographic preference for CDMi is defined as
(1) Suppose s = (s(1)..., s(K)) 2 S and t = (t(1)..., t(K)) 2 S for s(k⇤) = t(k⇤) (k⇤ = 1, 2, ...,
K except k and k0). If s(k)  (k)Ci t(k), then s  Ci t
(2) If s(k) ⇠(k)Ci t(k), then
1) s  Ci t if s(k0)  (k
0)
Ci
t(k
0);
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2) s ⇠Ci t if s(k0) ⇠(k
0)
Ci
t(k
0);
3) s  Ci t if s(k0)  (k
0)
Ci
t(k
0).
The relation between weighted preference and lexicographic preference is investigated
in Theorem 7.1.
Theorem 7.1: Suppose in a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1), ..., G(K),
w(k1)Ci and w
(k2)
Ci
denote the weight of G(k1) and G(k2) for CDMi (k1, k2 = 1, 2, ..., K) and
G(k1) >Ci G
(k2). Let the preference statements in G(k1) and G(k2) be ⌦(k1)Cijk1
2 ⌦(k1)Ci and
⌦(k1)Cijk2
2 ⌦(k1)Ci , for 0 < jk1 < hk1 and 0 < jk2 < hk2 . Then, the weighted preference is a
lexicographic preference when
w
(k1)
Ci
w
(k2)
Ci
> 2hk2   1.
Theorem 7.1 presents the condition for the weighted preference to become a lexico-
graphic preference. For a pair of local graphs G(k1) and G(k2), the ratio of their weights for
a CDM,
w
(k1)
Ci
w
(k2)
Ci
, is related with the number of its preference statements in G(k2).
The relation between CDMi’s preference statements in G, ⌦Cij for 0 < j < h, and its
preference statements in local graphs, ⌦(k)Cijk for 0 < jk < hk, is discussed in Theorem 7.2.
Theorem 7.2: (Preference statements) In a hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1)
..., G(K), let ⌦(k)Cijk 2 ⌦
(k)
Ci
(k = 1, 2, ..., K; jk = 1, 2, ..., hk) be the preference statements
for CDMi 2 N (k)C in G(k), and ⌦Cij 2 ⌦Ci (j = 1, 2, ..., h) be the set of preference
statements for CDMi in G, with ⌦Cij = ⌦
(k)
Cijk
. If CDMi’s preference is lexicographic in G
with G(⌧1)... >Ci G
(⌧K) (⌧k = 1, ..., K), then
⌦Ci =
⌧K[
k=⌧1
⌦(k)Ci (7.3)
and ⌦Cij 2 ⌦Ci can be written in order as:
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⌦Ci = {⌦(⌧1)Ci1 , ...,⌦(⌧1)Cih1 ,⌦(⌧2)Ci1 ...,⌦(⌧2)Cih2 , ...,⌦(⌧K)Ci1 , ...,⌦(⌧K)CihK} for h = h1...+ hK .
The proof of Theorem 7.2 is analogous to Theorem 6.1. Corollary 7.1 is given to discuss
the weight w(k)Ci in the two types of preference.
Corollary 7.1: Recall that ⌦(k)Cijk 2 ⌦
(k)
Ci
(k = 1, 2, ..., K; jk = 1, ..., hk) represents the
preference statements for Ci 2 N (k)C in G(k), and ⌦Cij 2 ⌦Ci (j = 1, ..., h) represents the set
of preference statements for CDMi in G, with ⌦Cij = ⌦
(k)
Cijk
, and state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2
S for s(k) 2 S(k),
(1) For the weighted preference,
 Ci(s) =
KX
k=1
 (k)Ci (s
(k))w(k)Ci (7.4)
where
 (k)Ci (s
(k)) =
hkX
jk=1
 (k)Cijk(s
(k)).
and
 (k)Cijk(s
(k)) =
8<: 2hk jk ⌦
(k)
Cijk
(s(k)) = T
0 otherwise
(2) For the lexicographic preference, Equation (7.4) exists, plus
w(k)Ci = 2
hk+1+...+hK (7.5)
and
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h =
KX
k=1
hk (7.6)
As indicated in Corollary 7.1, the lexicographic preference is a special case of the
weighted preference when Equations (7.5) and (7.6) are satisfied.
Preferences for a CDM in G can be determined in Theorem 7.2. Thus, to simplify
the calculation for stabilities in G, the preferences for all DMs in G are assumed to be
lexicographic in the case study as mentioned in Section 7.5.
7.4 Interrelationships of Stabilities between General
Hierarchical Graph Model and Local Graph Mod-
els
As demonstrated in Section 4.2, stabilities in the general hierarchical graph model cannot
be totally predicted from the stabilities in each local graph. However, several connections
can be concluded under each solution concept. Theorems are proposed to demonstrate the
interrelation between stabilities in G and those in each local graph. Representative proofs
for some theorems are provided. Proofs for other theorems are omitted because they are
analogous.
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7.4.1 Nash (R)
Theorem 7.3: A state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S in general hierarchical graph model G is
Nash stable for CDMi 2 NC if for all k = 1, ..., K, s(k) 2 S(k) is Nash stable for CDMi in
G(k).
According to Theorem 7.3, a state in the general hierarchical graph model is Nash
stable for a CDM if all of its component states are Nash stable in the corresponding local
graphs. Note that state s is Nash stable for CDMi in G does not imply that s(k) 2 S(k) is
Nash in G(k) for all k = 1, ..., K, but for at least one of them.
Theorem 7.4: A state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S in general hierarchical graph model G is
Nash stable for lk 2 N (k)L i↵ s(k) 2 S(k) is Nash stable for lk in G(k).
Theorem 7.4 indicates that Nash stability for an LDM in the general hierarchical graph
model is only determined by the Nash stability in the LDM’s local graph.
7.4.2 Sequential Stability (SEQ)
Theorem 7.5: A state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S in general hierarchical graph model G is
sequentially stable for CDMi if for all k = 1, ..., K, s(k) 2 S(k) is sequentially stable for
CDMi in G(k).
Theorem 7.5 is similar to Theorem 7.3: a state in the general hierarchical graph model
is SEQ for a CDM if all of its component states are SEQ in the corresponding local graphs.
Theorem 7.6 (SEQ for CDM): Suppose G is a general hierarchical graph model consisting
of G(k) for k = 1, ..., K, if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDMi in
G, then
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(1) either s(k) is sequentially stable for CDMi in G(k) for every k = 1, ..., K or
(2) if s(k) is not sequentially stable for CDMi in G(k) for some k = 1, ..., K, but not all,
there exists state r 2 R+N Ci(q) for every q 2 R+Ci(s), such that r -Ci s, where R+N Ci(q) is
the set of UIs from state q by all DMs in G except CDMi.
Situation (1) in Theorem 7.6 is identical to Theorem 7.5. Situation (2) in Theorem 7.6
indicates that a state in the general hierarchical graph model can be SEQ for the focal
CDM if some component states are not SEQ in the corresponding local graphs.
Theorem 7.7 (SEQ for LDMs): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is sequentially stable for lk 2 N (k)L in G, then
(1) either s(k) is SEQ for lk in G(k), or
(2) s(k) is GMR for lk in G(k) and there exist r(k
0) 2 RN(k0)(s(k0)) for k0 = 1, ..., K except k,
such that r = (r(1), ..., r(k), ..., r(K)) 2 R+N lk(s) and r -lk s, where RN(k0) denotes the set
of joint UMs by all DMs in G(k
0) and R+N lk the set of UIs by all DMs in G except lk.
A state in the general hierarchical graph model is SEQ for an LDM if the component
state describing the LDM’s actions is SEQ in its local graph. If the component state is
not SEQ for the LDM, the conditions indicated in situation (2) in Theorem 7.7 should be
satisfied.
7.4.3 General Metarationality (GMR)
Theorem 7.8 (GMR for CDM): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), G(2), ..., G(k), ..., G(K), if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is general metarational for
CDMi in G, and q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 R+Ci(s), then
146
(1) either s(k) is general metarational for CDMi in G(k) for every k = 1, 2, ..., K or
(2) if s(k) is not GMR for CDMi in G(k) (k = 1, 2, ..., K, but not all), there exists r 2
RN Ci(q) for every q 2 R+Ci(s), such that r = (r(1), ..., r(K)) -Ci s.
Theorem 7.8 is analogous to Theorem 7.6. The di↵erence between the two theorems is
that in Theorem 8, the UMs from DMs in G other than the focal CDM are considered.
Theorem 7.9 (GMR for LDM): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is general metarational for lk in G if and only
if s(k) is general metarational for lk in G(k).
Theorem 7.9 is simpler than Theorem 7.7 in that, to determine GMR states for lk in
G, only the GMR states in G(k) for lk need to be considered.
7.4.4 Symmetric Metarationality (SMR)
Theorem 7.10 (SMR for CDM): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is symmetric metarational for CDMi in G,
and q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 R+Ci(s), then
(1) either s(k) is symmetric metarational for CDMi in G(k) for every k = 1, ..., K or
(2) if s(k) is GMR but not SMR for CDMi in G(k) (k = 1, ..., K, but not all), for ev-
ery q 2 R+Ci(s), there exists t 2 RCi(r), such that t = (t(1), ..., t(K)) -Ci s, where
r = (r(1), ..., r(K)) -Ci s and r 2 RN Ci(q).
Theorem 7.10 indicates that a state in the hierarchical graph model is SMR for a CDM
if every component state in the local graph is SMR. A state in the hierarchical graph model
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can be SMR for the focal CDM if some component states are GMR but not SMR in local
graphs.
Theorem 7.11 (SMR for LDM): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is symmetric metarational for lk in G if and
only if s(k) is symmetric metarational for lk in G(k).
7.5 Steps for Calculating Stabilities
The steps for calculating stabilities in the general hierarchical graph model are given for
CDMs and LDMs. To model hierarchical conflicts, each subconflict is considered as a local
graph. DMs and their options in each local graph are identified. Preference statements for
DMs in a local graph are provided.
For CDMs, the preference statements in G can be determined according to Theorem
7.2. For LDMs, the preference statements in local graphs are the same as those in the hi-
erarchical graph. The calculation for stabilities under di↵erent solution concepts is carried
out using the decision support system GMCR II. Stable states for each DM and equilibria,
defined as the stable states for all DMs, can be obtained. A stable state indicates a status
in the real world conflict, at which a focal DM will stop under a particular solution concept.
Stable states for all DMs, also called equilibria, indicate outcomes that are more likely to
happen than others. The steps for stability calculation are listed below.
Step 1: Divide G into G(1), ..., G(K);
Step 2: Identify CDMs and LDMs (N (k)C and N
(k)
L ), options, and preference statements
⌦(k)Ci in each G
(k) (k = 1, ..., K);
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Step 3: For CDMs: determine preference statements ⌦Ci in G according to Theorem 7.2;
For LDMs: preference statements for lk in G and G(k) are the same: ⌦
(k)
lk
= ⌦lk ;
Step 4: Calculate stabilities in G using GMCR II.
7.6 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Disputes between China
and USA
7.6.1 Conflict Background
The general hierarchical graph model is applied to disputes between USA and China over
adhering to the bilateral climate change agreement. On November 11th, 2014, the two
superpowers reached a deal to curb carbon emissions in the next few decades (Goldenberg
et al., 2014). According to the treaty, China committed to limiting carbon emissions by
2030 and increase the percentage of clean energy use to 20%. Meanwhile, the US agreed
to emit 26% to 28% less than the 2005 carbon levels by 2025.
This agreement has shown the determination of the two nations in reducing carbon
emissions by cooperation. However, challenges and disputes take place in both nations.
In the US Congress, the Republicans threatened to block this deal, because many of the
representatives have connections with traditional energy industries. They believed that this
agreement would result in fewer jobs and higher energy prices. Although the White House
claimed that the abatement target for the US is achievable under the existing environmental
laws, experts have pointed out that these goals are hard to meet without new legislation
(Levi, 2014). However, as the Republicans have held the majority of seats in Congress,
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the new climate laws are likely to be blocked by them. Furthermore, the emissions targets
need a few decades to be achieved. Because the actions for the next administration are
unknown, the future of this agreement is in doubt.
In China, large e↵orts should be made by the government to reach the abatement goal.
As China still relies heavily on traditional energy, the energy industry needs to be reformed
by stricter environmental laws. For fear of losing profits, stakeholders such as state-owned
energy companies would actively oppose these laws by lobbying the government using their
political influence.
Despite the fact that the two countries have successfully cooperated in handling many
global issues in the 21st century, they may still be suspicious about whether their counter-
part would fully adhere to the climate change agreement, due to the unpleasant memory
of decades of antagonism in the Cold War. The Republicans attacked the current treaty
by accusing it of being a mere strategy of buying time on the part of China (Yuhas, 2014).
Dubious sentiment is also widespread in China. Many consider the agreement to be a US
conspiracy to undermine social and economic development in China.
7.6.2 Conflict Modeling
The disputes regarding the climate change agreement are analyzed using the general hi-
erarchical graph model to predict likely outcomes and provide each DM with possible
resolutions. The disputes among DMs in the US and China are represented by two local
graph models, called US graph and China graph. The Chinese government and the White
House are the two CDMs, marked as CG and WH, respectively. In the US graph, denoted
as G(1), the Republicans (GOP) and the Democrats (USS) are two LDMs. In the China
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graph, denoted as G(2), state owned energy companies (ECs) is the only LDM. The DMs
and their options in the climate change conflict are shown in Table 7.1.
In Table 7.1, each option is marked with a number followed by a half parenthesis.
WH has two options in the climate change conflict. To reach the abatement goals, it
will propose new environmental laws and expect the approval of these laws in Congress,
which is denoted as option 1). Note that an option in Table 7.1 represents two possible
actions for a focal DM. The negation of option 1) means that WH does not propose any
environmental law. WH will also decide whether to comply with the climate agreement,
marked as option 2). The option for the Republicans to block the approval of these laws is
represented as option 3). Option 4) denotes the support of the Democrats for the current
Obama administration. The Chinese government (CG) will reform the energy industry and
force ECs to comply if they pose any opposition (option 5)). CG will also consider whether
to adhere to the climate agreement (option 6)). Option 7) indicates the compliance of ECs
to CG’s reform instructions.
The climate change conflict can be divided into two component conflicts, in the US and
China, respectively. The DMs and their options in two local graph models are listed in
Tables 7.2 and 7.3. The two CDMs are marked in bold.
The preferences for DMs in each local graph model are expressed using the option
prioritization method. In Tables 7.4 and 7.5, the preference statements for WH and CG
are listed. Taking Table 7.4 as an example, the first statement for WH in the US subconflict
is option 6), which means WH expects CG to adhere to the agreement. The next statement,
written as 1 & -3, indicates that WH plans to propose new environmental laws that will
not be blocked by GOP. To follow up, WH does not wish to see any opposing actions from
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Table 7.1: DMs and Options in the Overall Conflict
DMs Options
The White House (WH) 1) Propose extra environmental laws
2) Comply with the climate agreement
Republicans (GOP) 3) Block the laws in Congress
Democrats (USS) 4) Support the WH
Chinese Government (CG) 5) Pressure ECs to reform the energy industry
6) Comply with the climate agreement
State Owned Energy Companies (ECs) 7) Follow the reform instructions
Table 7.2: DMs and Options in the US Subconflict
DMs Options
WH 1) New Laws N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
GOP 3) Block N N Y N Y N N Y N Y
USS 4) Support N N N Y Y N N N Y Y
CG 6) Comply N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y
State Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Table 7.3: DMs and Options in the China Subconflict
DMs Options
WH 2) Comply N N N Y Y Y
CG 5) Pressure ECs Y N Y Y N Y
ECs 7) Follow CG N Y Y N Y Y
State Number 11 12 13 14 15 16
GOP (-3). In particular, the support from USS is desired ((-3) & 4). If GOP blocks the
passing of new laws, WH still expects support from USS (4). In Table 7.4, the statements
for WH in the China subconflict are analogously listed in the right column. The preference
statements for the three LDMs in the subconficts, GOP, USS, and ECs, are shown in Table
7.6.
The preferences for WH and CG in the overall conflict are obtained by combining pref-
erence statements in the two subconflicts according to Theorem 7.1. Because WH considers
the US subconflict more important, the preference statements in the US subconflict are
listed before the statements in the China subconflict, shown in Table 7.7. The preference
statements for CG in the overall conflict are described in Table 7.8. As CG regards the
China subconflict as more important, the preference statements for CG in the China sub-
conflict are placed first. The preferences for LDMs in the overall conflict can be represented
with the same statements in the corresponding subconflicts.
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Table 7.4: Preference Statements for WH in Each Subconflict
US Subconflict China Subconflict
6 5
1 & -3 7
-3 2 IF 5
(-3) & 4 -(2&-5)
4
Table 7.5: Preference Statements for CG in Each Subconflict
US Subconflict China Subconflict
1 2
-3 (-5) & 7
4 7
6 IF 1 5 IF -7
-(6 & -1)
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Table 7.6: Preference Statements for GOP, USS, and ECs
GOP USS ECs
-1 4 -5
3 IF 1 -3 -7
-4 (-7) IF 5
Table 7.7: Preference Statements for WH in the Overall Conflict
The Overall Conflict
6
1 & -3
-3
(-3) & 4
4
5
7
2 IF 5
-(2&-5)
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Table 7.8: Preference Statements for CG in the Overall Conflict
The Overall Conflict
2
(-5) & 7
7
5 IF -7
1
-3
4
6 IF 1
-(6 IF -1)
156
7.6.3 Removal of Infeasible States
The four options in the US subconflict (G(1)) and three options in the China subconflict
(G(2)) result in 24 and 23 states in the respective local graphs. Some states are removed
because they are logically or preferentially infeasible in practice. The infeasibility in each
local graph can also be described by preference statements. In the US subconflict, it is
logically impossible for GOP to block (option 3) when WH does not propose any new
environmental legislation (-1), expressed as “(-1) & 3”. Additionally, the support from
USS (option 4) cannot happen when no new law is proposed by WH, marked as “(-1) &
4”. In the China subconflict, it is preferentially impossible for ECs to oppose CG when
it does not exert pressure. Thus, “(-5) & -7” is infeasible. By removing these infeasible
states, there are 10 states in G(1) and 6 states in G(2). The states in G(1) are numbered
from state 1 to state 10, and the states in G(2) are marked from state 11 to state 16, shown
in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, respectively.
7.6.4 Stability Analysis
The stabilities for DMs in the overall conflict are calculated using GMCR II. This decision
support system provides an e↵ective way of stability calculation using the option prioritiza-
tion method. DMs and their options in G are the important inputs in the “Decision Maker
and Options” Panel, shown in Fig. 7.2. Preference statements for each DM are inputed
in the “Option Prioritization” Panel in Fig. 7.3. By clicking the “Analysis” button listed
on the top of Fig. 7.2, stabilities can be calculated. Fig. 7.4 is a screen to show some
equilibria in G under di↵erent solution concepts. For example, state 3, which can be also
written as state (1, 14), is GMR, SEQ, and SMR equilibria in G.
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Figure 7.2: Decision makers and options panel in GMCR II
Figure 7.3: Option prioritization panel in GMCR II
Figure 7.4: Stability results panel in GMCR II
The stability results for individual DMs and all DMs are contained in Table 7.9. By
excluding infeasible states, the 60 states in the overall conflict are numbered from state 1
to 60 in the 9th column of Table 7.9. Each state is also expressed as a pair of numbers
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contained by parentheses, shown in the 10th column in the same table. Each number
represents a state number in the corresponding local graph. For example, state 3 can also
be written as state (1, 14), in which the first entry denotes state 1 in the US subconflict
and the second entry represents state 14 in the China subconflict. The selection of options
for DMs in each state is also presented. Four types of solution concepts, Nash stability (R),
sequential stability (SEQ), general metarationality (GMR), and symmetric metarationality
(SMR), are investigated for each DM and all DMs. They are abbreviated as “r”, “s”, “g”,
and “ ”, respectively, to save space in Table 7.9. The stabilities for all DMs, listed in the
last column with “Overall” on top, indicate the equilibria of the conflict. States 20 and 49
are two Nash equilibria. SEQ equilibria include states 3, 13, 21, and 43, all of which are
also SMR equilibria. Other SMR equilibria are states 9, 10, 19, 29, 30, and 50. State 1 is
the only GMR equilibrium.
The two Nash equilibria, states 20 and 49, indicate outcomes that are likely to happen.
At state 20, which can be written as state (10, 14), both governments will adhere to the
agreement. GOP would block WH’s proposal of new environmental laws that are supported
by USS. The pressure from CG on reforming the energy industry would be resisted by ECs.
Another Nash equilibrium, state 49 (state (10, 12)), suggests that WH cannot reach the
abatement goals. ECs will follow CG’s instruction to reform even when CG does not exert
pressure. Although the two equilibria can both indicate possible outcomes theoretically,
further investigation is needed to determine which one would actually evolve from the
starting state of the conflict.
Table 7.9: The Overall Conflict in Option Form and Stabilities
DMs WH GOP USS CG ECs WH GOP USS CG ECs Overall
Option Num. 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) State Num. State Num.
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Options N N N N Y N N 1 (1,11) g r r r r g
Y N N N Y N N 2 (2,11) s,   s,   r
N Y N N Y N N 3 (1,14) s,   r r r r s,  
Y Y N N Y N N 4 (2,14) r s,   r
Y N Y N Y N N 5 (3,11)   r   r
Y Y Y N Y N N 6 (3,14) r r   r
Y N N Y Y N N 7 (4,11) s,   r s,   r
Y Y N Y Y N N 8 (4,14) r r s,   r
Y N Y Y Y N N 9 (5,11)   r r   r  
Y Y Y Y Y N N 10 (5,14) r r r   r  
N N N N Y Y N 11 (6,11) s,   r r r
Y N N N Y Y N 12 (7,11) s,   r r
N Y N N Y Y N 13 (6,14) s,   r r s,   r s,  
Y Y N N Y Y N 14 (7,14) r r r
Y N Y N Y Y N 15 (8,11)   r r r
Y Y Y N Y Y N 16 (8,14) r r r r
Y N N Y Y Y N 17 (9,11) s,   r r r
Y Y N Y Y Y N 18 (9,14) r r r r
Y N Y Y Y Y N 19 (10,11)   r r r r  
Y Y Y Y Y Y N 20 (10,14) r r r r r r
N N N N N N Y 21 (1,12) s,   r r r r s,  
Y N N N N N Y 22 (2,12) r s,   r
N Y N N N N Y 23 (1,15) r r r r
Y Y N N N N Y 24 (2,15) s,   s,   r
Y N Y N N N Y 25 (3,12) r r   r
Y Y Y N N N Y 26 (3,15) r s,   r
Y N N Y N N Y 27 (4,12) r r s,   r
Y Y N Y N N Y 28 (4,15) s,   r s,   r
Y N Y Y N N Y 29 (5,12) r r r   r  
Y Y Y Y N N Y 30 (5,15)   r r s,   r  
N N N N Y N Y 31 (1,13) s r r
Y N N N Y N Y 32 (2,13) s,  
N Y N N Y N Y 33 (1,16) s,   r r s,  
Y Y N N Y N Y 34 (2,16) r s,  
Y N Y N Y N Y 35 (3,13) s,   r
Y Y Y N Y N Y 36 (3,16) r r s,  
Y N N Y Y N Y 37 (4,13) s,   r
Y Y N Y Y N Y 38 (4,16) r r s,  
Y N Y Y Y N Y 39 (5,13) s,   r r
Y Y Y Y Y N Y 40 (5,16) r r r s,  
N N N N N Y Y 41 (6,12) s,   r r r
Y N N N N Y Y 42 (7,12) r r r
N Y N N N Y Y 43 (6,15) s,   r r s,   r s,  
Y Y N N N Y Y 44 (7,15) s,   r r
Y N Y N N Y Y 45 (8,12) r r r r
Y Y Y N N Y Y 46 (8,15)   r r r
Y N N Y N Y Y 47 (9,12) r r r r
Y Y N Y N Y Y 48 (9,15) s,   r r r
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Y N Y Y N Y Y 49 (10,12) r r r r r r
Y Y Y Y N Y Y 50 (10,15)   r r r r  
N N N N Y Y Y 51 (6,13) s,   r r
Y N N N Y Y Y 52 (7,13) s,  
N Y N N Y Y Y 53 (6,16) s,   r r s,  
Y Y N N Y Y Y 54 (7,16) r s,  
Y N Y N Y Y Y 55 (8,13) s,   r
Y Y Y N Y Y Y 56 (8,16) r r s,  
Y N N Y Y Y Y 57 (9,13) s,   r
Y Y N Y Y Y Y 58 (9,16) r r s,  
Y N Y Y Y Y Y 59 (10,13) s,   r r
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 60 (10,16) r r r s,  
7.6.5 Evolution of the Conflict
The evolution of the climate change conflict from the status quo to possible equilibria is
investigated to predict the actual outcome in reality. At the current status of the conflict,
WH has not proposed new laws in Congress. Thus, no action has been made from GOP
and USS. As the agreement was recently signed, both WH and CG show willingness to
adhere to it. CG plans to pressure ECs on reforming the energy industry. However, they
have voiced some discontent. Hence, the status quo corresponds to state (6, 14), which is
also state 13. The evolution of the overall conflict from the status quo on the left to the
equilibrium on the right is demonstrated as a range of states connected by UIs made by
DMs.
As can be seen in Table 7.10, the overall conflict evolves from the status quo to state
(7, 14) when CG proposes new environmental legislation. The subsequent UI from GOP
to block the laws results in state (8, 14). State (10, 14), which is a Nash equilibrium, can
be accessed from state (8, 14) by USS’s UI. At state (10, 14), no DM has any UI. Thus,
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the overall conflict will stay at state (10, 14), which indicates the outcome that is most
likely to happen.
7.6.6 Implications for Decision Makers
The stability results in the hierarchical model indicate possible resolutions for DMs. The
Nash equilibrium that can be reached from the status quo suggests that both WH and CG
will adhere to the agreement. For WH, the proposal of new environmental laws will be
opposed by GOP. To achieve the abatement goals, WH may wish to persuade Congress to
pass these laws. Alternatively, it should find other methods to abate the CO2 emissions
under the current legislation framework, such as by supporting the development of new
energy and encouraging an energy-saving lifestyle.
As CG abides by the bilateral agreement, it will reform the current energy industry
to reach the abatement goals. The China-US agreement is also an opportunity for CG to
improve the e ciency of China’s energy usage. A possible way for CG to accomplish this
is to put forward stricter environmental legislations. The Nash equilibrium, state (10, 14),
indicates that ECs are unwilling to support CG’s initiative. CG needs to impose political
and economic pressure on these energy companies, such as stricter penalties for violating
environmental laws, and replacing the board of directors in these companies, because CG
has direct control of these state-owned companies.
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Table 7.10: Evolution of the Conflict
DMs Options SQ (7, 14) (8, 14) (10, 14)
WH 1. Propose New Laws N  ! Y Y Y
2. Comply Y Y Y Y
GOP 3. Block N N  ! Y Y
USS 4. Support N N N  ! Y
CG 5. Pressure ECs Y Y Y Y
6. Comply Y Y Y Y
ECs 7. Follow CG N N N N
7.6.7 Comparison of Stability Results
The stability results in the general hierarchical graph model are compared with the results
in the separate graph models. The stabilities in each local graph model are listed in Table
7.11. Compared with Table 7.9, each component of a Nash stable state for a CDM in G is
also Nash stable in the corresponding local graph. A Nash state for an LDM in G contains
the Nash component in the subconflict it participates in. At an SEQ state for a CDM
in G, one of the two component states can be a non-SEQ state. Thus, the SEQ states
for the focal CDM in the local graph model cannot predict all the SEQ states in G. For
example, state (6, 15) is SEQ for WH in G. The component in G(1), state 6, is SEQ for
WH. However, the other component, state 15, is not SEQ for WH in G(2). The UIs for WH
at state (6, 15) are demonstrated in Table 7.12. At this state, WH can improve in either
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state 6 or state 15, or both, resulting in three UIs, states (6, 12), (7, 12), and (7, 15). Note
that the sanctions on these UIs are imposed on the component state in G(1). Thus, these
UIs can be sanctioned even though state 15 is not an SEQ state. Similar findings can also
be concluded for GMR and SMR states for CDMs in G. For LDMs, a GMR or SMR state
in G contains the GMR or SMR component in the subconflict it participates in.
State (6, 15) indicates the situation in which both WH and CG adhere to the greenhouse
gas agreement. WH does not plan to propose new environmental laws. Thus, GOP does
not show any opposition, and USS does not need to show any support. ECs are willing to
follow CG’s directive to reform without being pressured by CG. This state is SEQ for WH
in G, even though a component state, state 15, is not SEQ for WH in G(2). Facing the
di culty of achieving the abatement goals using current environmental laws, WH would
break the bilateral agreement. This UI results in state (6, 12). Subsequently, CG would
also break the agreement. The resulting state, state (1, 12), is less preferred by WH.
Comparing state (1, 12) with the starting state, state (6, 15), state 1 is less preferred
to state 6 for WH in G(1), and state 12 is more preferred to state 15 in G(2). Since the
US subconflict (G(1)) is more important for WH, state (1, 12) is less preferred to state
(6, 15). The unilateral breach of the greenhouse gas emissions agreement will result in a
disadvantageous situation for both WH and CG. Thus, WH would not move away from
state (6, 15). For WH, the sanction from CG cannot be foreseen by considering the two
subconflicts separately. In the US subconflict, WH would break the agreement if it only
considers the situation within the country. The narrow vision of WH will give rise to a less
desired outcome in reality. Thus, the general hierarchical graph model can provide WH
with a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the overall conflict, and guide WH
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Table 7.11: Stability Results in the Two Local Graphs
G(1) G2
States WH GOP USS CG Overall States WH CG ECs Overall
1 s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   s, g,   11 g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   g,  
2 r, s, g,   s, g,   12 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
3 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   g,   13 s, g,  
4 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   s, g,   14 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
5 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   g,   g,   15 r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
6 s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   16 r, s, g,   s, g,  
7 r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
8 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
9 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
10 r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,   r, s, g,  
in taking beneficial actions.
7.7 Summary
The general hierarchical graph model for conflict resolution has been developed to model
hierarchical conflicts having more DMs compared with former hierarchical graph models
presented in previous chapters. The preference structure for the general hierarchical graph
model has been defined based on the option prioritization method. Two types of pref-
erences, weighted preference and lexicographic preference, are proposed. As a simplified
preference structure, lexicographic preference can be used to e↵ectively rank states in the
hierarchical graph model and facilitate the calculation of stabilities. Moreover, the inter-
relation between stabilities in the general hierarchical graph model and those in its local
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Table 7.12: UIs for WH at SEQ State (6, 15)
Focal State UIs Sanctioning UIs
(6, 15)
WH+   ! (6, 12) CG+   ! (1, 12)
WH+   ! (7, 12) CG+   ! (8, 12)
WH+   ! (7, 15) GOP+    ! (8, 15)
graphs has been demonstrated. As an application, the bilateral greenhouse gas disputes
between USA and China are investigated. A detailed modelling and calculation process
have been provided, as well as implications for DMs and in-depth results analysis. The
general hierarchical graph model has been demonstrated to provide DMs with guidance
for how to act in any interrelated conflict in the real world.
Further studies can be carried out within the hierarchical graph model methodology.
A preference structure to incorporate uncertainties deserves further research. As the gen-
eral hierarchical graph model usually has a complex structure, more e cient algorithms to
implement calculations of stabilities need to be developed. Furthermore, as current hier-
archical graph models have only two levels, a multiple level model should be constructed
to solve more complex hierarchical conflicts in the real world, such as climate change ne-
gotiations among countries and between di↵erent levels of governments.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Further Study
Hierarchical graph models are developed to solve interrelated conflicts in the real world.
After investigating water diversion conflicts in China, a typical hierarchical conflicts in the
real world, the basic hierarchical graph model is developed using lexicographic preference
and weighted preference. Di↵erent ways of representing the model and approaches of
calculating stabilities have been provided.
More complex hierarchical graph models, the duo hierarchical graph model and the
general hierarchical graph model, have defined using lexicographic preference. Algorithms
of calculating stability results have been designed. The duo hierarchical graph model has
been applied to the market competition between Airbus and Boeing. The greenhouse gas
emissions disputes have been studied using the general hierarchical graph model.
Compared with classical graph model methodologies, hierarchical graph model has the
following advantages. Firstly, the novel methodology can reveal the interrelation among
conflicts that are connected logically or geographically. Secondly, the resolutions in a hi-
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erarchical graph model can provide DMs with a more comprehensive understanding of the
interrelated conflicts and guidance of taking reasonable actions. In comparison, the resolu-
tions in a local model may be reasonable for DMs within the corresponding subconflict, but
less favourable in the overall conflicts. In addition, hierarchical graph model methodology
can be used to e ciently determine stability results using the theorems developed from
Chapter 4 to 7. Calculations for stability results can be realized by GMCR II, a decision
support system that has been designed for classical graph models.
8.1 Major Contributions
Interrelated conflicts are ubiquitous in the real world. The most important contribution of
this thesis is the establishment of hierarchical graph models to analyze interrelated conflicts.
Based on the graph model for conflict resolution paradigm, hierarchical graph models have
been developed in this thesis, and are proposed to describe the decision process of DMs in
certain forms of interrelated conflict.
Two types of preference structure, lexicographic preference and weighted preference,
have also been developed for hierarchical graph models. Preference information in hierar-
chical graph models is not completely determined by preferences in the local graphs. The
proposed preference structures are crucial to provide the complete preference information
in hierarchical graph models.
Furthermore, theorems have been developed to elucidate the relationship between sta-
bilities in hierarchical graph models and stabilities in local graph models. These theorems
can be used to e ciently conclude stabilities in hierarchical graph models using the stability
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information in local models. As indicated by the theorems, a stable states in a hierarchical
model may contain a component state which is unstable in local models. These theorems
have indicated the conditions on which this hierarchical state is stable.
Di↵erent methods of calculating stabilities in a hierarchical graph model have been
provided in this thesis. In the basic hierarchical graph model with lexicographic preference,
each state in the hierarchical model is investigated for stabilities using the theorems. In
the basic hierarchical graph model with weighted preference, algorithms are designed for
calculating stabilities in matrix form. In the duo and general hierarchical graph models,
the stabilities have been calculated when the preferences are expressed using the option
prioritization method. The decision support system, GMCR II, has been used to facilitate
the stability calculations. The lexicographic preference is simple and e cient in calculating
stability results, while weighted preference is more formal and precise in describing the
relative importance for a CDM.
The three real world applications in this thesis have demonstrated the usefulness of the
hierarchical graph model methodology in understanding hierarchical conflicts. In the water
diversion conflicts, Chinese Government is well-advised to implement its construction plan
in di↵erent locations sequentially. In the sales competition between Airbus and Boeing,
both aircraft manufacturers can adjust their marketing strategies in the wide and narrow
body markets. In the greenhouse emissions disputes, the two national governments are
given suggestions on how to deal with their domestic oppositions while adhering to the
bilateral agreement.
Di↵erent from previous GMCR methodologies, which are used to investigate simple
conflicts, hierarchical graph model methodologies can provide DMs with a comprehensive
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understanding of the interrelated components of a hierarchical conflict. With new insights,
DMs can obtain strategic resolutions in hierarchical disputes and reach win-win situations.
8.2 Assumptions and Limitations of Hierarchical Graph
Models
The hierarchical graph models developed in this thesis are based on certain assumptions
that are reviewed here. First, some general assumptions regarding the use of the graph
model methodology apply to hierarchical graph models. All decision makers (DMs) in a
graph model are aware of the options and preferences of all other DMs. All DMs can
move in any order whatsoever and may not decide to move at all. DMs mainly care about
the final state; intermediate states do not a↵ect their preferences. Second, there are some
specific assumptions for the hierarchical graph model methodology. More specifically, in
a hierarchical graph model, a CDM can move across local models, while a LDM can only
move within its own local model. If LDMs can move in many local models, the hierarchical
graph model must be considered as a classic graph model. DMs who can move in some
local models, but not all, are not considered in this thesis, but may be investigated in the
future.
The hierarchical graph model methodologies are used to provide strategic resolutions
for DMs in solving interrelated conflicts. Some limitations of the model are now clarified.
Graph model methodologies are used to analyze the strategic aspects of a conflict by
considering only the basic elements of the conflict, such as decision makers, options, moves,
and preferences. The output of the model consists of possible resolutions of the conflict at
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the strategic level. Some specific details of the conflict may not be considered such as how
the types of moves made may a↵ect preference. Furthermore, stability results in a graph
model can be used for many purposes, including to predict the outcome of the conflict.
When more than one equilibrium may occur, the equilibrium that is closest to the status
quo is considered as the outcome most likely to happen. Other equilibria can suggest
possible scenarios when DMs have di↵erent foresights and perception of risks. In addition,
the stability results for the hierarchical graph model do not reflect any lapse of time within
the conflict. Any change of model inputs with time, such as options, preferences, and DMs,
is not considered in this thesis, but deserves further study.
8.3 Further Study
The variety of the interrelated conflicts in the real world calls for further development
of hierarchical graph model methodologies. As current models feature the hierarchical
structure in only two levels, new hierarchical graph models consisting of multiple levels
can be developed. DMs at a higher level can be considered as common decision makers
(CDMs), compared with DMs at a lower level, and this structure may be repeated at other
levels.
Uncertainty is an important ingredient in interactive strategic decision making. A
well-developed conflict analysis methodology should take account of uncertainties in the
interaction among DMs. To consider uncertainty in hierarchical graph models, the pref-
erences for DMs can be expressed using fuzzy (Bashar et al., 2014), grey (Kuang et al.,
2015), or probabilistic relations, adopting suitable stability definitions. These uncertainty
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theories already exist, but are yet to be incorporated into the hierarchical graph model
methodology.
The definition of preferences in hierarchical graph models can be extended. For a
DM, one unilateral improvement (UI) can improve its well being or interests in a conflict
more significantly than another UI. Thus, the focal DM discriminates amongst the UIs in
the conflict. Xu et al. (2009b) have studied multiple levels of preferences, referred to as
strength of preference by Hamouda et al. (2004), in a classical graph model. Thus, this
new preference structure in a hierarchical graph model should be investigated.
The time frame in hierarchical graph model can also be studied. The time frame
can influence the decision making process, as DMs, options, and preferences may change
with the lapse of time. Under the graph model paradigm, Yasser et al. (2013) have
used ”robustness” to measure the sustainability of a resolution in a given conflict. As
a conflict may evolve over time, some equilibria may change with time, while others are
stable. In a hierarchical graph model, the evolution of a hierarchical conflict should be
investigated. Furthermore, an optimization algorithm can be developed to determine the
relative importance of local models for a CDM at di↵erent periods of a conflict, in order
to achieve a more desired outcome for the CDM.
The concept of coalitions in graph model was first studied by Hipel and Meister (1994).
Coalitions in hierarchical graph models can also be analyzed. As LDMs usually have limited
influence in that they participate in only one local graph, the situation in which they act
collectively for a common purpose should be analyzed. Stability results containing such
coalitions can be compared with the stability results without any coalition. In addition,
attitudes (Walker et al., 2012; Inohara et al., 2007) and emotion (Obeidi et al., 2005) have
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been incorporated into the graph model paradigm, and may be adapted for employment
within the hierarchical graph model methodology.
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Appendix A
Proofs for Theorems
A.1 Proof for Theorem 4.1
Theorem 4.1 (Nash for CDM in G): If s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are Nash stable for CDM
in G(1) and G(2), respectively, then (s(1), s(2)) is Nash stable for CDM in G.
Proof. Because s(1) is Nash stable for CDM inG(1), then s(1) %(1)C q(1) for all q(1) 2 R(1)C (s(1)).
Similarly, s(2) %(2)C q(2) for all q(2) 2 R(2)C (s(2)). Suppose (s(1), s(2)) is not Nash stable for
CDM in G, then there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 S such that (r(1), r(2)) 2 RC(s(1), s(2)) and
(r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)).
Assume that r(1) -(1)C s(1) and r(2) -
(2)
C s
(2). Then (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). This
contradicts (r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)). Therefore, either r(1)  (1)C s(1) or r(2)  (2)C s(2). Hence,
either s(1) is not Nash stable for CDM in G(1) or s(2) is not Nash stable for CDM in G(2).
By contradiction, we conclude that (s(1), s(2)) is Nash stable for CDM in G.
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A.2 Proof for Theorem 4.3
Theorem 4.3 (SEQ for CDM): Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are sequentially
stable for CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively. Then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G.
Proof. Let (q(1), q(2)) be a UI from (s(1), s(2)) for CDM inG(1), i.e. (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2)).
Then (q(1), q(2))  C (s(1), s(2)).
As before, either q(1)  (1)C s(1) or q(2)  (2)C s(2). Assume q(1)  (1)C s(1), then q(1) 2
R(1)+C (s
(1)). As s(1) is SEQ for CDM in G(1), there exists r(1) 2 R+L1(q(1)) such that s(1) %(1)C
r(1). Similarly, if r(2)  (2)C s(2), there exists r(2) 2 R(2)+L2 (q(2)) such that s(2) %(2)C q(2).
(1) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2) -(2)C s(2), (r(1), q(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2)). Then (r(1), q(2)) 2
R+L (q
(1), q(2)) and (r(1), q(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). Thus, (r(1), q(2)) is a sanction and the UI for
CDM from (s(1), s(2)) to (q(1), q(2)) is sanctioned.
(2) Similarly, if q(1) -(1)C s(1) and s(2)  (2)C s(2), there exists (q(1), r(2)) 2 R+L (q(1), q(2))
such that (q(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). Thus, (q(1), r(2)) is a sanction to the UI for CDM from
(s(1), s(2)) to (q(1), q(2)).
(3) Assume that q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), then there exists (r(1), r(1)) 2 R+L (q(1), q(2))
such that (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). Thus, (r(1), r(2)) is a sanction.
Overall, a sanction can be found for every UI for CDM from (s(1), s(2)) to (q(1), q(2)).
Therefore, (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G.
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A.3 Proof for Theorem 4.4
Theorem 4.4: Assume G(1) > G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) both s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are SEQ for CDM, or
(2) s(1) 2 S(1) is strictly sequentially stable for CDM in G(1) and, for all q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1))
and q(1) = s(1), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1), where R(1)+,=C (s(1)) is
the set of UMs for CDM from s(1) which are no less preferred to s(1).
Proof. Assume that (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for CDM in G. Then, if (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2)),
there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+L (q(1), q(2)) such that (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2). Note that (q(1), q(2))  C
(s(1), s(2)) implies either q(1)  (1)C s(1) or q(2)  (2)C s(2).
As both s(1) and s(2) can be either SEQ or not, there are four possibilities:
(i) If both s(1) and s(2) are SEQ for CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively, then (s(1), s(2)) is
SEQ by Theorem 4.3. This is case (1) of the Theorem.
(ii) Suppose s(1) 2 S(1) is SEQ for CDM in G(1) while s(2) 2 S(2) is not SEQ for CDM in
G(2). We investigate whether every UI from (s(1), s(2)) is sanctioned.
Assume q(1)  (1)C s(1). Then there exists r(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (q(1)) such that r(1) -(1)C s(1).
Because s(2) is not SEQ for CDM in G(2), there must be a UI q(2) 2 R(2)+C (s(2)) such that
r(2)  (2)C s(2) for all r(2) 2 R(2)+L2 (q(2)).
a) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2) -(2)C s(2), then (r(1), q(2)) 2 R+L (q(1), q(2)) and (r(1), q(2)) -C
(s(1), s(2)). Therefore, (r(1), q(2)) is a sanction, so (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ.
b) If q(1) -(1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), then since G(1) > G(2) and (q(1), q(2))  C (s(1), s(2)),
q(1) ⇠(1)C s(1) or q(1) = s(1). In G, the sanction against (q(1), q(2)) by LDMs can be
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(r(1), r(2)) 2 R+L (q(1), q(2)) when either r(1) = q(1) or r(2) = q(2), but not both. Note that
r(2)  (2)C s(2), so (r(1), r(2)) is a sanction, i.e. (r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)), only if r(1)  (1)C s(1).
c) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), the sanction against (q(1), q(2)) by the LDMs satisfies
(r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)) i↵ r(1)  (1)C s(1). In particular, s(1) is strict SEQ for CDM in G(1).
Together, (a), (b), and (c) prove case (2) of the Theorem. To complete the proof, we
show that if (1) and (2) fail, then (s(1), s(2)) is not SEQ for CDM in G.
(iii) Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) is not SEQ for CDM in G(1) while s(2) 2 S(2) is sequentially
stable for CDM in G(2).
(iv) s(1) is not SEQ for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is not SEQ for CDM in G(2).
(iii) and (iv) can be proved together. (s(1), s(2)) cannot be SEQ if one of its UIs cannot
be sanctioned.
Assume q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2). As before, every UI from (q(1), q(2)) for LDMs
can be written as (r(1), r(2)). As s(1) is not SEQ for CDM in G(1), r(1)  (1)C s(1) for all
r(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)). Since G(1) > G(2), (r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)) is alway true. Thus, no
sanction is found in (iii) and (iv) and (s(1), s(2)) cannot be SEQ for CDM in G in cases
other than (1) and (2) in the Theorem.
A.4 Proof for Theorem 4.6
Theorem 4.6 (SEQ for LDMk in G): A state (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for
LDM1 in G i↵ either
(1) s(1) 2 S(1) is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G(1), or
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(2) for every q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)), there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+{C,L2}(q(1), s(2)), such that r(1) -
(1)
L1
s(1).
Proof. (1) If s(1) 2 S(1) is SEQ in G(1), then for every q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)), there exists
r(1) 2 R(1)+C (q(1)), such that r(1) -(1)L1 s(1). For LDM1, for every UI from (s(1), s(2)) in G, i.e.
(q(1), s(2)) 2 R+L1(s(1), s(2)), there exists (r(1), s(2)) 2 R+C(q(1), s(2)), such that (r(1), s(2)) -L1
(s(1), s(2)). Thus, (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G.
(2) If s(1) 2 S(1) is not SEQ in G(1), then r(1)  (1)L1 s(1) for every q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)) and
r(1) 2 R(1)+C (q(1)). If G(1) > G(2) for CDM, for every (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+{C,L2}(q(1), s(2)), there
must satisfy: (r(1), r(2)) -L1 (s(1), s(2)), which can be simplified as r(1) -(1)L1 s(1).
A.5 Proof for Theorem 4.7
Theorem 4.7 (GMR for CDM): Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are GMR for
CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively. Then (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G.
Proof. Let (q(1), q(2)) be a UI from (s(1), s(2)) for CDM in G, i.e. (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2)).
Then (q(1), q(2))  C (s(1), s(2)).
As before, either q(1)  (1)C s(1) or q(2)  (2)C s(2). Assume q(1)  (1)C s(1), then q(1) 2
R(1)+C (s
(1)). As s(1) is GMR for CDM in G(1), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that
s(1) %(1)C r(1). Similarly, if q(2)  (2)C s(2), there exists r(2) 2 R(2)L2 (q(2)) such that s(2) %(2)C r(2).
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(1) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2) -(2)C s(2), (r(1), q(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2)). Then (r(1), q(2)) -C
(s(1), s(2)). Thus, (r(1), q(2)) is a sanction and the UI for CDM from (s(1), s(2)) to (q(1), q(2))
is sanctioned.
(2) Similarly, if q(1) -(1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), there exists (q(1), r(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2))
such that (q(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). Thus, (q(1), r(2)) is a sanction to the UI for CDM from
(s(1), s(2)) to (q(1), q(2)).
(3) Assume that q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2). Then there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2
RL(q(1), q(2)) such that (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). Thus, (r(1), r(2)) is a sanction.
Overall, a sanctioning UM can be found on every UI for CDM from (s(1), s(2)) to
(q(1), q(2)). Therefore, (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G.
A.6 Proof for Theorem 4.8
Theorem 4.8 Assume G(1) > G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G i↵ either
(1) both s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are GMR for CDM, or
(2) s(1) 2 S(1) is strictly GMR for the CDM in G(1) and, for all q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1)) and
q(1) = s(1), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1).
Proof. Assume that (s(1), s(2)) is GMR for CDM in G. Then if (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2)),
there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2)) such that (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)). Note that
(q(1), q(2))  C (s(1), s(2)) implies either q(1)  (1)C s(1) or q(2)  (2)C s(2).
As both s(1) and s(2) can be either GMR or not, there are four possibilities:
194
(i) If both s(1) and s(2) are GMR, then (s(1), s(2)) is GMR by Theorem 4.7. This is case (1)
of the Theorem.
(ii) Suppose s(1) 2 S(1) is GMR for the CDM in G(1) while s(2) 2 S(2) is not GMR for the
CDM in G(2). We investigate whether every UI from (s(1), s(2)) is sanctioned by an LDMs’
subsequent UM.
Assume q(1)  (1)C s(1). Then there exists r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that r(1) -(1)C s(1).
Because s(2) is not GMR for CDM in G(2), there must be a UI q(2) 2 R(2)+C (s(2)) such that
r(2)  (2)C s(2) for all r(2) 2 R(2)L2 (q(2)).
a) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and s(2) -(2)C s(2), then (r(1), q(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2)) and (r(1), q(2)) -C
(s(1), s(2)). Therefore, (r(1), q(2)) is a sanction, so (s(1), s(2)) is GMR.
b) If q(1) -(1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), then since G(1) > G(2) and (q(1), q(1))  C (s(1), s(2)),
q(1) ⇠(1)C s(1) or q(1) = s(1). The sanction against (q(1), q(2)) by LDMs can be (r(1), r(2)) 2
RL(q(1), q(2)) when either r(1) = q(1) or r(2) = q(2), but not both. Note that r(2)  (2)C s(2), so
(r(1), r(2)) is a sanction, i.e. (r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)), only if r(1)  (1)C s(1).
c) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), the sanction against (q(1), q(2)) by the LDMs satisfies
(r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)) i↵ r(1)  (1)C s(1). In particular, s(1) is strict GMR for CDM in G(1).
Together, (a), (b), and (c) prove case (2) of the Theorem. To complete the proof, we
show that if (1) and (2) fail, then (s(1), s(2)) is not GMR for CDM in G.
(iii) Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) is not GMR for the CDM in G(1) while s(2) 2 S(2) is GMR for
the CDM in G(2).
(iv) s(1) is not GMR for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is not GMR for CDM in G(2).
(iii) and (iv) can be proved together. (s(1), s(2)) cannot be GMR for CDM if one of its
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UIs cannot be sanctioned.
Assume q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2). As before, every UM from (q(1), q(2)) for LDMs
can be written as (r(1), r(2)). As s(1) is not GMR for CDM in G(1), r(1)  (1)C s(1) for all
r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (s(1)). Since G(1) > G(2), (r(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)) is always true. Thus, no
sanction is found in (iii) and (iv) and (s(1), s(2)) cannot be GMR for CDM in G in cases
other than (1) and (2) in the Theorem.
A.7 Proof for Theorem 4.11
Theorem 4.11 (SMR for CDM in G): Suppose that s(1) 2 S(1) and s(2) 2 S(2) are states
in G(1) and G(2), respectively. Assume that s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is SMR
for CDM in G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G.
Proof. Because s(1) and s(2) are SMR for CDM in G(1) and G(2) respectively, they are also
GMR in G(1) and G(2), respectively. According to Theorem 4.7, (s(1), s(2)) is then GMR for
CDM in G. Thus, if (q(1), q(1)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2)) for q(k) 2 R(k)C (s(k)) (k = 1, 2), then there
exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2)), such that (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)).
As s(k) is SMR for CDM in G(k) (k = 1, 2), then if q(k) 2 R(k)+C (s(k)), there exists at
least r(k) 2 R(k)lk (q(k)) such that r(k) -
(k)
C s
(k), and t(k) -(k)C s(k) for all t(k) 2 R(k)C (r(k)).
Therefore, there exists (t(1), t(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)) for all (t(1), t(2)) 2 RC(r(1), r(2)). Hence,
(s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G.
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A.8 Proof for Theorem 4.12
Theorem 4.12: Assume G(1) > G(2). Then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G, i↵ either
(1) s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is SMR for CDM in G(2), or
(2) s(1) is strict SMR for CDM in G(1) and, for all for all q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1)) and q(1) = s(1),
there exist r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1) and t(1)  (1)C s(1) for all t(1) 2 R(1)C (r(1)).
Proof. Assume that (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G. Then if (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2))
for q(k) 2 R(k)C (s(k)) (k = 1, 2), there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2 RL(q(1), q(2)) such that (r(1), r(2)) -C
(s(1), s(2)), and (t(1), t(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)) for all (t(1), t(2)) 2 RC(r(1), r(2)). Note that (q(1), q(2))  C
(s(1), s(2)) implies either q(1)  (1)C s(1) or q(2)  (2)C s(2).
As (s(1), s(2)) must be GMR for CDM in G if (s(1), s(2)) is SMR, Theorems 4.11 and
4.12 are used in the following proof.
As both s(1) and s(2) can be either SMR or not, there are three possibilities:
(i) If both s(1) and s(2) are SMR, then (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G by Theorem 4.11.
This corresponds to case (1) of the theorem.
(ii) If s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1) while s(2) is not SMR for CDM in G(2), we have
proven (s(1), s(2)) can be GMR for CDM by Theorem 4.12. To further determine GMR, we
investigate whether (t(1), t(2)) is also a sanction for CDM based on part (ii) in the proof of
Theorem 4.12.
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Because s(1) is SMR for CDM in G(1), then if q(1) 2 R(1)+C (s(1)), there exists r(1) 2
R(1)L1 (q
(1)) such that r(1) -(1)C s(1) and t(1) -
(1)
C s
(1) for all t(1) 2 R(1)C (r(1)).
a) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2) -(2)C s(2), the sanction by LDM1 is (r(1), q(2)). We investigate
all UMs for CDM from (r(1), q(2)), which can be written as (t(1), r(2)) with the move on
G(1), (r(1), t(2)0 ) on G
(2) for t(2)0 2 R(2)C (q(2)), and (t(1), t(2)0 ) on both G(1) and G(2). They are
sanctions for CDM if r(1)  (1)C s(1) and t(1)  (1)C s(1), which means s(1) must be strict SMR
for CDM in G(1).
b) If q(1) ⇠(1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), the sanction by LDMs is (r(1), r(2)) if r(1)  (1)C s(1).
We investigate all UMs for CDM from (r(1), r(2)), which can be written as (t(1), r(2)) with the
move on G(1), (r(1), t(2)) on G(2), and (t(1), t(2)) on both G(1) and G(2). Because r(1)  (1)C s(1),
(r(1), t(2)) is a sanction for CDM. The other UMs, (t(1), q(2)) and (t(1), t(2)), are sanctions
for CDM if t(1)  (1)C r(1) for all t(1) 2 R(1)C (r(1)).
c) If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2)  (2)C s(2), the sanction by LDMs is (r(1), r(2)) if s(1) is strict
GMR for CDM in G(1). All UMs for CDM from (r(1), r(2)) can be written as (t(1), q(2)) with
the move on G(1), (r(1), t(2)) on G(2), and (t(1), t(2)) on both G(1) and G(2). As t(1)  (1)C s(1)
and r(1)  (1)C s(1), all of the UMs are sanctions for CDM.
Overall for (ii), (s(1), s(2)) is SMR for CDM in G if s(1) is strict SMR and for all for all
q(1) 2 R(1)+,=C (s(1)) and q(1) = s(1), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)L1 (q(1)) such that r(1)  (1)C s(1) and
t(1)  (1)C r(1) for all t(1) 2 R(1)C (r(1)).
The case (2) in the Theorem is thus proved. To complete the proof, we show that if (i)
and (ii) fail, then (s(1), s(2)) is not SMR for CDM in G.
(iii) If s(1) 2 S(1) is GMR for CDM in G(1), then if q(1) 2 R(1)+C (s(1)), there exists r(1) 2
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R(1)L1 (q
(1)) such that r(1) -(1)C s(1) and t(1)  (1)C s(1) for some t(1) 2 R(1)C (r(1)).
If q(1)  (1)C s(1) and q(2) -(2)C s(2), same as a) in case (ii), the sanction by LDM1
is (r(1), q(2)). All UMs for CDM from (r(1), q(2)) can be written as (t(1), r(2)) with the
move on G(1), (r(1), t(2)0 ) on G
(2), and (t(1), t(2)0 ) on both G
(1) and G(2). As t(1)  (1)C s(1),
(t(1), r(2))  C (s(1), s(2)). Thus, CDM’s UM (t(1), r(2)) 2 RC(r(1), q(2)) fails to be sanctioned
by other DMs.
Thus, (s(1), s(2)) is not SMR for CDM in G for case (iii). Overall, SMR states for CDM
in G only exist in cases (i) and (ii). Therefore, this theorem is proved.
A.9 Proof for Theorem 5.1
Theorem 5.1: Suppose that ⌦(k)C = {⌦(k)C1, ...,⌦(k)Cjk , ...,⌦
(k)
Chk
} (k = 1, 2; jk = 1, ..., hk)
is the set of preference statements for CDM in G(k), and ⌦C = {⌦C1, ...,⌦Cj, ...,⌦Ch}
(j = 1, ..., h) is the set of preference statements for CDM in G, with ⌦Cj = ⌦
(k)
Cjk
, and state
s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S for s(k) 2 S(k), for the weighted preference,
 (s) =  (1)(s(1))w(1) + (2)(s(2))w(2) (A.1)
Then, lexicographic preference is a special case of weighted preference for
(1) If w(1) > w(2),
w(1) = 2h2 and w(2) = 1;
(2) If w(1) < w(2),
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w(2) = 2h1 and w(1) = 1.
Proof. According to Equation (5.1),
 (k)jk (s
(k)) =
8<: 2hk jk if ⌦
(k)
jk
(s(k)) = T
0 otherwise
(A.2)
and
 (k)(s(k)) =
hkX
jk=1
 (k)jk (s
(k)) (A.3)
Also,
 j(s) =
8<: 2h j if ⌦j(s) = T0 otherwise (A.4)
and
 (s) =
hX
j=1
 j(s) (A.5)
Suppose w(1) > w(2), then
hX
j=1
 j(s) =
h1X
j1=1
 (1)j1 (s
(1))w(1) +
h2X
j2=1
 (2)j2 (s
(2))w(2) (A.6)
where h = h1 + h2.
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Let j0 = j1 and j00 = j2, for j0, j00 = 1, ..., h, because w(1) > w(2), it can be easily
concluded that j0 < j00. Thus,
 j(s) =
8<:  
(1)
j1 (s
(1))2h2 j  h1
 (2)j2 (s
(2)) j > h1
(A.7)
Thus, w(1) = 2h2 and w(2) = 1.
A.10 Proof for Theorem 5.2
Theorem 5.2: Suppose J (1)C is the m ⇥ m reachable matrix for CDM in G(1) and J (2)C
the n⇥ n reachable matrix for CDM in G(2), In is an identity matrix of n scale, then the
mn⇥mn hierarchical reachable matrix for CDM JC in G is written as:
JC = J
(1)
C
N
R J
(2)
C
=
0BBB@
J (1)C (1, 1)⌦r J (2)C ... J (1)C (1,m)⌦r J (2)C
...
. . .
...
J (1)C (m, 1)⌦r J (2)C ... J (1)C (m,m)⌦r J (2)C
1CCCA (A.8)
where J (1)C (s
(1), q(1)) is an entry in J (1)C (s
(1), q(1) = 1, ..., m) and
J (1)C (s
(1), q(1))⌦r J (2)C
=
8<: J
(2)
C s
(1) = q(1)
J (1)C (s
(1), q(1))(In + J
(2)
C ) s
(1) 6= q(1)
(A.9)
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Proof. Suppose that states s, q 2 S are two states in G where s = (s(1), s(2)) and q =
(q(1), q(2)) (s(1), q(1) = 1, ..., m; s(2), q(2) = 1, ..., n). The reachable matrix JC for CDM in
G can be defined as:
JC(s, q) =
8<: 1 if(s, q) 2 AC0 otherwise (A.10)
Note that AC is the set of moves for CDM in G according to Definition 4.1. (s, q) 2 AC
means (s(1), q(1)) 2 AC(1) or (s(2), q(2)) 2 AC(2), where AC(1) and AC(2) are the sets of
moves for CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively.
(1) If s(1) = q(1), then JC(s, q) = J
(2)
C (s
(2), q(2)). For each pair of s(1) and s(2) (s(1), q(1)
= 1, 2, ..., m), the entries in JC can be considered as a block. In each block, JC(s, q) can
be written as J (2)C . Thus, J
(1)
C (s
(1), q(1))⌦r J (2)C = J (2)C in the theorem can be proven.
(2) If s(1) 6= q(1), then
2.1) if s(2) = q(2), then JC(s, q) = J
(1)
C (s
(1), q(1))
2.2) if s(2) 6= q(2), then JC(s, q) = J (1)C (s(1), q(1))J (2)C (s(2), q(2))
In an n⇥ n identity matrix In, the entries can be written as
✓s(2),q(2) =
8<: 1 s(2) = q(2)0 s(2) 6= q(2) (A.11)
Also recall that J (2)C (s
(2), q(2)) = 0 if s(2) = q(2).
Thus, 2.1) and 2.2) can be combined as JC(s, q) = J
(1)
C (s
(1), q(1))[✓s(2),q(2)+J
(2)
C (s
(2), q(2))].
Hence, JC(s, q) can be denoted as J
(1)
C (s
(1), q(1))[In + J
(2)
C ] when s
(1) 6= q(1).
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Thus, Theorem 5.2 is proven.
A.11 Proof for Theorem 5.4
Theorem 5.4: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and G(2),
a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is Nash stable for CDM in G i↵ s(k) (k = 1, 2) is Nash stable
for CDM in G(k).
Proof. Suppose s, q 2 S for s = (s(1), s(2)) and q = (q(1), q(2)). The UI from s to q in J+C
can be written as J+C (s, q) = JC(s, q)P
+
C (s, q), where J
+
C (s, q) denotes the entry of J
+
C in
the sth row and qth column.
(I) If s(k) is Nash stable for CDM in G(k),
then
J (k)+C (s
(k), q
0(k)) = 0 8q0(k) 2 S(k) (A.12)
for k = both 1 and 2.
Suppose s = (s(1), s(2)) is not Nash stable for CDM in G. Then
J+C (s, q
⇤) 6= 0 9q⇤ 2 S. (A.13)
Equation (A.13) implies that
JC(s, q
⇤) 6= 0 (A.14)
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and
P+C (s, q
⇤) 6= 0 (A.15)
As defined by Xu et al. (2009a),
P+C (s, q
⇤) = sign
0@
    (q⇤)  (s)   + (q⇤)  (s)
2
1A
(A.16)
where
 (q⇤)  (s) = [ (1)(q⇤(1))  (1)(s(1))]w(1) + [ (2)(q⇤(2))  (2)(s(2))]w(2) (A.17)
according to Equation (A.1).
Assume that P (k)+C (s
(k), q
0(k)) = 0 for both k = 1 and 2. Then, P+C (s, q
⇤) = 0 according
to Equation (A.16). This contradicts Equation (A.15). Therefore, we conclude that state
s is Nash stable for CDM in G.
(II) If s = (s(1), s(2)) is Nash stable for CDM in G, we prove s(1) and s(2) are Nash stable
for CDM in G(1) and G(2), respectively.
Because J+C (s, q
⇤) = 0 for any q⇤ = (q⇤(1), q⇤(2)) 2 S (q⇤(1) = 1, 2, ...m and q⇤(2) =
1, 2, ...n), and
J+C (s, q
⇤) = J (1)C (s
(1), q⇤(1))J (2)C (s
(2), q⇤(2))P+C (s, q
⇤) (A.18)
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if s(k) is not Nash stable for CDM inG(k), then there exists q(k) 2 S, such that J (k)C (s(k), q(k)) 6=
0, which contradicts J+C (s, q
⇤) = 0 according to Equation (A.18). Thus, s(k) is Nash stable
for CDM in G(k).
Overall, the proof for (I) and (II) is completed.
A.12 Proof for Theorem 5.6
Theorem 5.6: In a weighted basic hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and
G(2), a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G if s(k) (k = 1, 2) is
sequentially stable for CDM in G(k).
Proof. According to the stability definition in Section 5.3, if state s(k) (k = 1, 2) is sequen-
tially stable for CDM in G(k), then M (1)SEQC (s
(1), s(1)) = 0 and M (2)SEQC (s
(2), s(2)) = 0.
The SEQ matrix for CDM in G can be written asMSEQC = J
+
C ·[E sign(M+L ·(P ,=C )T )],
where M+L is the joint UI matrix by LDM1 and LDM2.
MSEQC (s, s) = 0 implies that
for any q 2 R+C(s), there exists r 2 R+L (q) such that
M+L (q, r)P
 ,=
C (s, r) 6= 0 (A.19)
M (1)SEQC (s
(1), s(1)) = 0 and M (2)SEQC (s
(2), s(2)) = 0 imply that
9r(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (q(1)), such that
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J (1)+L1 (q
(1), r(1))P (1) ,=C (s
(1), r(1)) 6= 0 (A.20)
and
9r(2) 2 R(2)+L2 (q(2)), such that
J (2)+L2 (q
(2), r(2))P (2) ,=C (s
(2), r(2)) 6= 0 (A.21)
Equations (A.20) and (A.21) indicate that
J (k)+lk (q
(k), r(k)) 6= 0
and
P (k) ,=C (s
(k), r(k)) 6= 0 (A.22)
for k = 1, 2.
Thus, there exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+L (q) such that P ,=C (s, r) 6= 0.
Equation (A.19) can be written as
M+L (q, r)P
 ,=
C (s, r) 6= 0 (A.23)
According to equation (5.13), M+L (q, r) can be written as
M+L (q, r) =
 0_
t=2
(JL1(q, r) + JL2(q, r) +M
<t,+>
L1
(q, r) +M<t,+>L2 (q, r)) (A.24)
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where obviously  0 > 2 and
8<: M
<t,+>
L1
(q, r) = sign(JL1(q, r)M
<t 1,+>
L2
(q, r))
M<t,+>L2 (q, r) = sign(JL2(q, r)M
<t 1,+>
L1
(q, r))
There exists JL1(q, r) = J
(1)+
L1
(q(1), r(1)) when q(2) = r(2) and JL2(q, r) = J
(2)+
L2
(q(2), r(2))
when q(1) = r(1). Then, there exist JL1(q, r) 6= 0 and JL2(q, r) 6= 0 such that M+L (q, r) 6= 0.
Thus,
 
eTq ·M+L
  · (eTs · P ,=C )T 6= 0, and therefore MSEQC (s, s) = 0. Note that eTq is the
transpose of a 0-1 vector with the qth entry being 1 and others 0.
A.13 Proof for Theorem 5.7
Theorem 5.7: Suppose G is a weighted basic hierarchical graph model consisting of G(1)
and G(2), if a state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G, then
(1) s(k) is sequentially stable for CDM in G(k) for both k = 1 and 2, or
(2) when s(k) is not sequentially stable for CDM in G(k) (k = 1 or 2, but not both), there
exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 S, such that  (r)   (s), where state r 2 S corresponds to the
entries in vector r:
r = r(1) ⇥ r(2)   eq(1) ⇥ eq(2) , for ⇥ symbolizes Cartesian Product;
r(1) = (J (1)+L1 )
T · eq(1) + eq(1) and r(2) = (J (2)+L2 )T · eq(2) + eq(2) for all (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s);
eq(k) is a 0-1 vector with the q
(k)th entry being 1 and others 0.
Proof. If s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G, there exists (r(1), r(2)) 2
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R+L (q
(1), q(2)) for every (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+C(s(1), s(2)), such that (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)), where
R+L (·) represents the set of joint UIs for LDM1 and LDM2.
Situation (1) has been proven in Theorem 5.4.
In situation (2), because s(1) is not SEQ for CDM in G(1), then r(1)  (1)C s(1). State r(1)
can be either a UI for LDM1 from q(1), referred to as the non-zero entry in (J
(1)+
L1
)T · eq(1) ,
or just q(1), corresponding to the non-zero entry in eq(1) . Thus, the vector to represent r
(k)
can be written as r(k) = (J (k)+Lk )
T · eq(k) + eq(k) (k = 1, 2).
In addition, (r(1), r(2)) -C (s(1), s(2)) can also be written as  (r)   (s), where r =
(r(1), r(2)) 2 S.
A.14 Proof for Corollary 5.1
Corollary 5.1: State (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G i↵ |w(k)| 2 (↵,  )
for either ↵ = 0 or   = 1.
Proof. This corollary can be proven based on Theorem 5.7.
(1) According to Theorem 5.7, if s(1) and s(2) are SEQ for CDM in G(1) and G(2), respec-
tively, then (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G regardless of the value of
|w(k)|. Hence, |w(k)| 2 (0, 1).
(2) If neither s(1) nor s(1) is SEQ for CDM, (s(1), s(2)) 2 S cannot be sequentially stable for
CDM in G regardless of the value of |w(k)|.
(3) According to Theorem 5.7, if s(1) is SEQ for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is not SEQ for CDM
in G(2), (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDM in G i↵ P ,=C (s, r) 6= 0.
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This means that there exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+L (q), such that
[ (1)(s(1))  (1)(r(1))]|w(1)|+ [ (2)(s(2))  (2)(r(2))]|w(2)|   0 (A.25)
Note that  (1)(s(1))  (1)(r(1))   0 and  (2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2)) > 0.
This expression can also be written as
|w(1)|   [ 
(2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2))]
[ (1)(s(1))  (1)(r(1))] + [ (2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2))] (A.26)
Thus,
↵ =
[ (2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2))]
[ (1)(s(1))  (1)(r(1))] + [ (2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2))] (A.27)
and   = 1.
Analogously, if s(1) is not SEQ for CDM in G(1) and s(2) is SEQ for CDM in G(2), for
|w(1)|, ↵ = 0 and
  =
[ (2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2))]
[ (1)(s(1))  (1)(r(1))] + [ (2)(r(2))  (2)(s(2))] . (A.28)
Therefore, this corollary has been proven.
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A.15 Proof for Theorem 5.8
Theorem 5.8: Suppose there exists a weighted basic hierarchical graph modelG consisting
of G(1) and G(2), and the number of states in G(1) is |S(1)| = m and |S(2)| = n in G(2). If a
state s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G, then
(1) s(1) is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G(1) or
(2) s(1) is general metarational for LDM1 in G(1),
eT
s(2)
· J (2)+C 6= 0 and eTs(2) ·M
(2)+
{C,L2} 6= 0
where M (2)+{C,L2} is the joint improvement matrix for CDM and LDM2 in G
(2) and eT
s(2)
is
the vector with s(2)th element 1 and others 0, and
9r 2 S, such that  (r) >  (q) for CDM and the rth element in 0-1 vector r is 1,
where r =
⇣
eT
q(1)
· J (1)C
⌘
⇥
⇣
eT
s(2)
·M (2)+{C,L2}
⌘
6= 0 8q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)), and q = (q(1), s(2)).
Proof. If state s(1) is sequentially stable for LDM1 in G(1), then M
SEQ
L1
(s(1), s(1)) = 0. This
implies that
for any q(1) 2 R(1)+L1 (s(1)), there exists r(1) 2 R(1)+C (q(1)), such that
J (1)+C (q
(1), r(1))P ,=L1 (s
(1), r(1)) 6= 0. (A.29)
State s = (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for LDM1 in G i↵,
for any q = (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+L (s), there exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+N L1(q), such that
M+C,L2(q, r)P
 ,=
L1
(s, r) 6= 0 (A.30)
210
where M+C,L2(q, r) is the joint UI matrix by CDM and LDM2 in G .
Because J (1)+C (q
(1), r(1)) 6= 0, then 9r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+C,L2(q), such that J+C (q, r) 6= 0.
Hence, M+C,L2(q, r) 6= 0. Because P ,=L1 (s(1), r(1)) 6= 0, then r(1) -L1 s(1). One can conclude
that (r(1), r(2)) -L1 (s(1), s(2)), 8r(2), s(2) 2 S(2). This means that P ,=L1 (s, r) 6= 0.
Therefore, for any q = (q(1), q(2)) 2 R+L (s), there exists r = (r(1), r(2)) 2 R+C,L2(q),
such that M+C,L2(q, r)P
 ,=
L1
(s, r) 6= 0. State s = (s(1), s(2)) is SEQ for LDM1 in G for any
s(2) 2 S(2), if s(1) is SEQ for LDM1 in G(1).
A.16 Proof for Theorem 6.1
Theorem 6.1: In a hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1) and G(2), suppose G(1)
is more important than G(2) for CDMi (i = 1, 2). Let {⌦(k)Ci1, ⌦(k)Ci2, ..., ⌦(k)Cihk} be the set of
preference statements in G(k) (k = 1, 2). Then the set of preference statements for CDMi
in G can be written as {⌦(1)Ci1, ⌦(1)Ci2, ..., ⌦(1)Cih1 , ⌦(2)Ci1, ⌦(2)Ci2, ..., ⌦(2)Cih2}.
Proof. Let ⌦Cij = ⌦
(k)
Cijk
for ⌦Ci = {⌦Ci1, ...,⌦Cij, ...,⌦Cih} (j = 1, 2, ..., h) and ⌦(k)Ci =
{⌦(k)Ci1, ...,⌦(k)Cijk , ...,⌦
(k)
Cihk
} (k = 1, 2; jk = 1, 2, ..., hk). Suppose G(1) >i G(2), and suppose
s(1)  (1)Ci t(1), and s(2)  (2)Ci t(2) where s = (s(1), s(2)) 2 S and t = (t(1), t(2)) 2 S. Theorem
6.1 is equivalent to proving:
For any ⌦Cija = ⌦
(1)
Cij1
and ⌦Cijb = ⌦
(2)
Cij2
, ja < jb always holds, where ja, jb = 1, ..., h and
jk = 1, ..., hk (k = 1, 2).
(1) Suppose h1, h2 = 1, s(1)  (1)Ci t(1) implies
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⌦(1)Ci1(s
(1)) = T and ⌦(1)Ci1(t
(1)) = F ;
and s(2)  (2)Ci t(2) implies
⌦(2)Ci1(s
(2)) = F and ⌦(2)Ci1(t
(2)) = T .
Because s  Ci t, then ja < jb for ⌦Cija = ⌦(1)Ci1 and ⌦Cijb = ⌦(2)Ci1.
(2) Suppose h1 = 2, h2 = 1. Then the set of preference statements for CDMi in G is
written as {⌦(1)Ci1,⌦(1)Ci2,⌦(2)Ci1}.
Because ⌦(2)Ci1(s
(2)) = F and ⌦(2)Ci1(t
(2)) = T , then ⌦Cijb(s) = F and ⌦Cijb(t) = T .
Because s  Ci t, then ja < jb for ja = 1, 2.
Inductively, ja < jb holds for ja = 1, ...h1 and h2 = 1. Analogously, ja < jb holds for
ja = 1, ...h1 and jb = 1, ..., h2.
A.17 Proof for Theorem 7.1
Theorem 7.1: Suppose in a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of G(1), ..., G(K),
w(k1)Ci and w
(k2)
Ci
denote the weight of G(k1) and G(k2) for CDMi (k1, k2 = 1, 2, ..., K) and
G(k1) >Ci G
(k2). Let the preference statements in G(k1) and G(k2) be ⌦(k1)Cijk1
2 ⌦(k1)Ci and
⌦(k1)Cijk2
2 ⌦(k1)Ci , for 0 < jk1 < hk1 and 0 < jk2 < hk2 . Then, the weighted preference is a
lexicographic preference when
w
(k1)
Ci
w
(k2)
Ci
> 2hk2   1.
Proof. Suppose s = (s(1), ..., s(k1), ..., s(k2), ..., s(K)) 2 S and s0 = (s(1), ..., s0(k1), ..., s0(k2), ..., s(K)) 2
S (k1, k2 = 1, 2, ..., K) for s(k1), s0(k1) 2 S(k1) and s(k2), s0(k2) 2 S(k2), where s(k1)  (k1)Ci s0(k1),
s(k2)  (k2)Ci s0(k2). The aggregated score for s and s0 can be expressed as
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 Ci(s) =
KX
k=1
 (k)Ci (s
(k))w(k)Ci (A.31)
 Ci(s
0) =
KX
k=1
 (k)Ci (s
0(k))w(k)Ci (A.32)
Thus,
 Ci(s)  Ci(s0) =
⇣
 (k1)Ci (s
(k1))  (k1)Ci (s0(k1))
⌘
w(k2)Ci +⇣
 (k2)Ci (s
(k2))  (k2)Ci (s0(k2))
⌘
w(k2)Ci
(A.33)
Suppose   (k1)Ci =  
(k1)
Ci
(s(k1))    (k1)Ci (s0(k1)) and   (k2)Ci =  (k2)Ci (s0(k2))    (k2)Ci (s(k2)),
then
 Ci(s)  Ci(s0) 
⇣
  (k1)Ci
⌘
min
w(k1)Ci  
⇣
  (k2)Ci
⌘
max
w(k2)Ci (A.34)
where there exist⇣
  (k1)Ci
⌘
min
= 1, and
⇣
  (k2)Ci
⌘
max
= 2hk2 1 + ...21 + 20 = 2hk2   1.
Then,  Ci(s)    Ci(s0) > 0 indicates that
⇣
  (k1)Ci
⌘
min
w(k1)Ci  
⇣
  (k2)Ci
⌘
max
w(k2)Ci > 0,
namely,
w(k1)Ci
w(k2)Ci
> 2hk2   1 (A.35)
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A.18 Proof for Corollary 7.1
Corollary 7.1: Recall that ⌦(k)Cijk 2 ⌦
(k)
Ci
(k = 1, 2, ..., K; jk = 1, ..., hk) represents
the preference statements for CDMi 2 N (k)C in G(k), and ⌦Cij 2 ⌦Ci (j = 1, ..., h)
represents the set of preference statements for CDMi in G, with ⌦Cij = ⌦
(k)
Cijk
, and state
s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S for s(k) 2 S(k),
(1) For the weighted preference,
 Ci(s) =
KX
k=1
 (k)Ci (s
(k))w(k)Ci (A.36)
where
 (k)Ci (s
(k)) =
hkX
jk=1
 (k)Cijk(s
(k)).
and
 (k)Cijk(s
(k)) =
8<: 2hk jk ⌦
(k)
Cijk
(s(k)) = T
0 otherwise
(2) For the lexicographic preference, Equation (A.36) exists, plus
w(k)Ci = 2
hk+1+...+hK (A.37)
and
h =
KX
k=1
hk (A.38)
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Proof. Situation (1) can be proved by Definition 2. In Situation (2), Equation (A.38) can
be proved by Theorem 2. Also, according to Theorem 2, Equation (A.36) can be written
as
hX
j=1
2h jsgn(⌦Cij) = w
(1)
Ci
h1X
j1=1
2h1 j1sgn(⌦(1)Cij1) + ...
+ w(K)Ci
hKX
jK=1
2hK jKsgn(⌦(K)CijK ) (A.39)
where
w(1)Ci = 2
h h1
...
w(k)Ci = 2
h (h1+...+hk)
...
w(K)Ci = 2
h h = 1
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A.19 Proof for Theorem 7.3
Theorem 7.3: A state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S in general hierarchical graph model G is
Nash stable for CDMi 2 NC if for all k = 1, ..., K, s(k) 2 S(k) is Nash stable for CDMi in
G(k).
Proof. If for all k = 1, 2, ..., K, state s(k) 2 S(k) is Nash stable for CDMi in G(k), then
R(k)+Ci (s
(k)) =  . Thus q -Ci s for any q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 RCi(s).
A.20 Proof for Theorem 7.5
Theorem 7.5: A state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S in general hierarchical graph model G is
sequentially stable for CDMi if for all k = 1, ..., K, s(k) 2 S(k) is sequentially stable for
CDMi in G(k).
Proof. If for all k = 1, ..., K, state s(k) 2 S(k) is SEQ for CDMi in G(k), there exists
r(k) 2 R(k)+Ci (q(k)) for every q(k) 2 R(k)+Ci (s(k)), such that r(k) -(k)Ci s(k).
If q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 R+Ci(s) with q(k) 2 R(k)+Ci (s(k)) for every k = 1, 2, ..., K, then there
exists r = (r(1), ..., r(K)) 2 R+N Ci(q) such that r -Ci s, where R+N Ci(q) is the set of UIs
for all DMs in G except CDMi at state q.
If q = (q(1), ..., q(k)) 2 R+Ci(s) with q(k) 2 R(k)+Ci (s(k)) for some k = 1, 2, ..., K, then there
exists r0 = (q(1), ..., r(k), ..., q(K)) 2 R+N Ci(q), such that r0 -Ci s.
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A.21 Proof for Theorem 7.6
Theorem 7.6 (SEQ for CDM): Suppose G is a general hierarchical graph model consisting
of G(k) for k = 1, ..., K, if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is sequentially stable for CDMi in
G, then
(1) either s(k) is sequentially stable for CDMi in G(k) for every k = 1, ..., K or
(2) if s(k) is not sequentially stable for CDMi in G(k) for some k = 1, ..., K, but not all,
there exists state r 2 R+N Ci(q) for every q 2 R+Ci(s), such that r -Ci s, where R+N Ci(q) is
the set of UIs from state q by all DMs in G except CDMi.
Proof. Situation (1) has been proven in Theorem 7.5.
In situation (2), if s(k) is not sequentially stable for CDMi in G(k), then r(k)  (k)Ci s(k)
for any r(k) 2 R+N Ci(q(k)) and q(k) 2 R+Ci(s(k)). Then, state s is SEQ for CDMi i↵ there
exists state r 2 R+N Ci(q) for every q 2 R+Ci(s), such that r -Ci s.
A.22 Proof for Theorem 7.7
Theorem 7.7 (SEQ for LDMs): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is sequentially stable for lk 2 N (k)L in G, then
(1) either s(k) is SEQ for lk in G(k), or
(2) s(k) is GMR for lk in G(k) and there exist r(k
0) 2 RN(k0)(s(k0)) for k0 = 1, ..., K except k,
such that r = (r(1), ..., r(k), ..., r(K)) 2 R+N lk(s) and r -lk s, where RN(k0) denotes the set
of joint UMs by all DMs in G(k
0) and R+N lk the set of UIs by all DMs in G except lk.
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Proof. If s(k) 2 S(k) is SEQ for lk in G(k), then there exists r(k) 2 R(k)+N(k) lk(q(k)), such that
r(k) -(k)lk s(k) for every q(k) 2 R
(k)+
lk
(s(k)). R(k)+
N(k) lk is the set of UIs for all DMs in G
(k) except
lk. Then, for s = (s(1), ..., s(k), ..., s(K)) 2 S, there must exist r = (q(1), ..., r(k), ..., q(K)) 2
R+N lk(q), such that r -lk s for every q = (q(1), ..., q(k), ..., q(K)) 2 R+lk(s). Thus, situation
(1) in the theorem applies in this case.
If s(k) 2 S(k) is not SEQ but GMR for lk in G(k), then there exists r(k) 2 R(k)N(k) lk(q(k)),
such that r(k) -(k)lk s(k) for every q(k) 2 R
(k)+
lk
(s(k)). To be an SEQ state for lk in G, state
s = (s(1), ..., s(k), ..., s(K)) 2 S must satisfy:
there exists r(k
0) 2 RN(k0)(s(k0)) for k0 = 1, ..., K except k, such that r = (r(1), ..., r(k), ..., r(K)) 2
R+N lk(s) and r -lk s.
Then, for every q = (q(1), ..., q(k), ..., q(K)) 2 R+lk(s) where q(k) 2 R
(k)+
lk
(s(k)) and q(k
0) =
s(k
0), there exists r -lk s. Therefore, situation (2) applies in this case.
A.23 Proof for Theorem 7.9
Theorem 7.9 (GMR for LDM): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is general metarational for lk in G if and only
if s(k) is general metarational for lk in G(k).
Proof. If s(k) is GMR for lk in G(k) (lk 2 N (k)L ), it can be easily proved that s is GMR for
lk in G.
If s(k) is not GMR for lk in G(k) (lk 2 N (k)L ), then r(k)  (k)lk s(k) always exists for every
r(k) 2 R(k)
N(k) lk(q
(k)) and q(k) 2 R(k)+lk (s(k)), where R
(k)
N(k) lk(q
(k)) is the set of joint UMs from
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q(k) made by all DMs in G(k) except lk.
For any r0 = (r0(1), ..., r0(K)) 2 S where r0(k0) 2 S(k0) (k0 = 1, 2, ..., K except k), r0  lk s
always stands. Thus, s is not GMR for lk in G.
A.24 Proof for Theorem 7.10
Theorem 7.10 (SMR for CDM): In a general hierarchical graph model G consisting of
G(1), ..., G(K), if a state s = (s(1), ..., s(K)) 2 S is symmetric metarational for CDMi in G,
and q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 R+Ci(s), then
(1) either s(k) is symmetric metarational for CDMi in G(k) for every k = 1, ..., K or
(2) if s(k) is GMR but not SMR for CDMi in G(k) (k = 1, ..., K, but not all), for ev-
ery q 2 R+Ci(s), there exists t 2 RCi(r), such that t = (t(1), ..., t(K)) -Ci s, where
r = (r(1), ..., r(K)) -Ci s and r 2 RN Ci(q).
Proof. (1) Because s(k) is symmetric metarational for CDMi in G(k) for every k = 1, ..., K,
for every q(k) 2 R(k)+Ci (s(k)), there exists r(k) 2 R(k)N(k) Ci(q(k)), such that r(k) -
(k)
Ci
s(k) and
t(k) 2 R(k)Ci (r(k)) for all t(k) 2 R(k)Ci (r(k)).
Because s(k) is symmetric metarational for CDMi in G(k), s(k) is also GMR for CDMi
in every G(k). Then, s is GMR for CDMi in G. This implies that there exists r =
(r(1), ..., r(K)) 2 RN Ci(q) for q 2 R+Ci(s), such that r -Ci s. In every G(k), t(k) -(k)Ci s(k) for
all t(k) 2 R(k)Ci (r(k)). Thus, t = (t(1), ..., t(K)) -Ci s for all t 2 RCi(r).
Therefore, for every q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 R+Ci(s) where q(k) 2 R(k)+Ci (s(k)) and q(k
0) 2
R(k
0)
Ci
(s(k
0)) (k0 = 1, ..., K except k), there exist (t(1), ..., t(K)) -Ci s and r = (r(1), ..., r(K)) -Ci
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s for t(k
0) 2 R(k0)Ci (r(k
0)) and r(k
0) 2 R(k0)
N(k0)(q
(k0)).
(2) If 9k = 1, ..., K, for s(k) is not symmetric metarational for CDMi in G(k), a SMR
state s 2 S for CDMi must be GMR in G. Then, for every q = (q(1), ..., q(K)) 2 R+Ci(s)
where q(k) 2 R(k)Ci (s(k)), there exists r = (r(1), ..., r(K)) -Ci s.
Because, t(k)  (k)Ci s(k), then there must exist t = (t(1), ..., t(K)) 2 RCi(r), such that
(t(1), ..., t(K)) -Ci s.
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